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HUMAN RIGHTS, CIVIL WRONGS AND FOREIGN 
RELATIONS: A "SINICAL" LOOK AT THE USE OF U.S. 
LITIGATION TO ADDRESS HUMAN RIGHTS 
ABUSES ABROAD 
Jacques deLisle* 
HuMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES CouRTs: CHINESE 
CAsEs IN CoMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 
On August 28, 2000, five nationals of the People's Republic of 
China (PRC or China) filed suit in federal court in New York.1 The 
defendant was China's former premier Li Peng.2 The plaintiffs 
claimed Li was liable under the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA)3 and 
the Torture Victims Protection Act (TVPA)4 for human rights abuses 
committed in connection with the suppression of the student-led pop-
ular democracy movement that had produced massive demonstrations 
and occupied Beijing's Tiananmen Square in May and June of 1989. 
The movement had come to an abrupt end when the regime, the gov-
ernment component of which was officially headed by Li Peng and 
had earlier issued a formal declaration of martial law over Li's signa-
ture, ordered troops of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) to fight 
their way to the Square on June 4.5 Widely known as the Tiananmen 
Massacre, this marked the violent beginning of a protracted campaign 
against many who had participated in or led what the PRC regime 
* University of Pennsylvania Law School. 
1. Concerning the suit against Li Peng, see, e.g .. China Slams US Lawsuit Against Li Peng as 
"Political Farce,"AGENCE FR. PRESSE, Sept. 26,2000, available at LEXIS NExts; U.S. Judge Ac-
cepts Lawsuit Against Li Peng, TtMEs oF INDIA, Sept. 23, 2000, available at LEXIS NExts; Edward 
Wong, Chinese Leader Sued in New York Over Deaths Stemming from Tiananmen Crackdown, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 2000, at A6; Human Rights in China, Global Justice: The Li Peng Lawsuit 
and Universal Jurisdiction over Violations of Rights, available at http://iso.hrichina.org/iso/arti-
cle.adp?article_id=408&category_id=79 (last visited Oct. 2, 2002); BBC News, Li Peng Faces 
Human Rights Claim, Sept. 1, 2000, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/llhi/worldlasia-pacificl 
905498.stm (last visited Oct. 2, 2002). 
2. In 2000, Li had moved from the premiership to the presidency of the National People's 
Congress, the PRC's national1egislature. It was on the basis of his occupation of that office that 
he attended the U.N. Conference. 
3. 28 u.s.c. §1350 (1998). 
4. /d. 
5. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
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officially dubbed the "counter-revolutionary turmoil."6 The plain-
tiffs-four of whom had been student leaders during the protests on 
the Square and prisoners of the regime thereafter, and the fifth of 
whom claimed that the PLA killed his sister during the crackdown-
alleged that Li was responsible for crimes against humanity, including 
summary execution, arbitrary detention, torture, and other torts.7 
Seizing the opportunity presented by Li Peng's presence in New York 
to attend a United Nations conference of parliament leaders, the 
plaintiffs dispatched a process server. At the Waldorf Astoria Hotel 
on August 31, the server delivered the papers to a State Department 
employee assigned to the Chinese leader's security detail.8 
On July 17,2001, a process server entered the Manhattan Plaza Ho-
tel and handed a summons to Zhao Zhifei, the head of the Hubei 
Provincial Public Security Bureau, who was in New York, apparently 
on official business. In Zhao's case too, the plaintiff, who was re-
ported to be in hiding in China, relied upon the ATCA and TVPA. 
The plaintiff's complaint claimed that Zhao, in his capacity as provin-
cial public security chief and as deputy head of the provincial-level 
secretive "6-10 Office," was liable for the killing of the plaintiff's 
mother and brother while they were in police custody in China. The 
two had been arrested for their participation in Falun Gong, an eclec-
tic movement that blends elements of Buddhism, Chinese folk relig-
ion, and qigong martial arts exercises. Falun Gong had attracted 
millions of Chinese followers to the teachings of its expatriate spiritual 
leader Li Hongzhi before PRC authorities declared Falun Gong to be 
the greatest threat to the regime since the 1989 democracy movement, 
proscribed it as an "illegal cult," and organized "6-10 Offices" to 
spearhead the suppression of the banned group. The plaintiff's allega-
tions paralleled those from the Li Peng case: "police officers under 
Zhao's direction and control ... employ[edJ murder, torture, cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment and arbitrary arrest and detention to 
6. Concerning the Tiananmen Democracy Movement, its suppression and its aftermath, see, 
e.g., GEORGE BLACK & RoBIN MuNRO, BLACK HA:--~ns .oF BEJJING: LIVES oF DEFIANCE IN 
CHINA's DEMOCRACY MovEMENT (1993); CRAIG CALHOUN, NEITHER Gons NoR EMPERoRs: 
STUDENTS AND THE STRUGGLE FOR DEMOCRACY IN CHINA (1997); ZHONGGUO "Lm-Sr" ZHEN 
XIANG (The True Story of China's June Fourth) (Zhang Liang ed., 2001); CHE Muor, BEIJING 
TuRMOIL: MoRE THAN MEETS THE EYE (1990). 
7. See Wong, supra note 1; see also supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
8. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. See also Eric Gruzen, The United Scates as a 
Forum for Human Rights Litigation: Is This the Best Solution?, 2001 TRANSNAT'L LAW 207; Alvin 
H. Chu, Vindicating the Tiananmen Square Massacre: "The Case Against Li Peng," 20 Wrs. biT'L 
L.J. 199 (2001). 
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eliminate and intimidate practitioners of Falun Gong;" some of those 
acts constituted "crimes against humanity."9 
Over the next several months, similar scenes played out several 
times around the United States, with plaintiffs invoking the ATCA 
and TVPA in civil suits arising from the Chinese regime's treatment of 
Falun Gong practitioners and activists. As he stepped from his limou· 
sine in Chicago on August 27,2001, Zhou Youkang, the Chinese Com-
munist Party Secretary for Sichuan Province, was served by a Falun 
Gong practitioner and Chinese national who lived in Boston. In this 
suit, the plaintiff claimed authorities in Sichuan had detained and tor-
tured-and probably executed-his sister for Falun Gong beliefs and 
practices. Again, the complaint charged torture, crimes against hu-
manity, false imprisonment, inhuman and degrading treatment, and 
similar human rights violations.10 On February 7, 2002, another pair 
of suits alleging local PRC authorities' abuse of Falun Gong adherents 
and supporters was filed, one against Beijing Mayor Liu Qi and an· 
other against Xia Daren, Deputy Governor of Liaoning Province. In 
the United States to attend the 2002 Winter Olympics in his capacity 
as mayor of the host city for the 2008 Summer Games, Liu had the 
papers thrust upon him as he prepared to board a flight from San 
Francisco to Salt Lake City.11 The plaintiffs, who included two Chi-
nese Falun Gong followers who had moved to the United States, 
charged that Liu was responsible for "torture, cruel, inhumane or de-
grading treatment, crimes against humanity and interference with 
freedom of religion and belief."12 They added that Liu had breached 
his "duty to prevent the police from" abusing citizens and "to investi-
gate and punish [such] violations," and had "endorsed the campaign 
of terror and violence in Beijing against Falun Gong."13 
9. Falun Gong Adherent Sues Chinese Official in U.S., REUTERS, July 18, 2001, available at 
http://www.censur.orgl2001/falun_july05.htm (last visited Oct. 2, 2002); Another Top Chinese Of-
ficial Hit by Falungong Torture Suit, AoENCE FR. PRESSE, Aug. 28, 2001. See also Stephen Col-
linson, Falungong Adherents Denounce China in U.S., AoENCE FR. PRESSE, July 19, 2001. 
Concerning Falun Gong and the PRC's response to it, see generally DANNY ScHECHTER, FALUN 
GONG's CHALLENGE TO CHINA: SPIRITUAL PRACfiCE OR EVIL CULT? (2000); Jacques deLisle, 
Who's Afraid of Falun Gong?, FoREIGN PoL'Y REs. !NST. E-NOTE, available at http:// 
www.atimes.corn!china/AH10Aclo2.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2002). 
10. See Another Top Chinese Official Hit by Falungong Torture Suit, supra note 9; AI Swanson, 
Chinese Official Accused of Torture, UPI, Aug. 28, 2001, available at http://clearwisdom.net/emh/ 
articles/2001/8/29/13343.html (last visited Nov. 25, 2002). 
11. See, e.g., John Pomfret, Fight Over Banned Chinese Sect Moves to U.S., WAsH. PosT, Mar. 
12, 2002, at A15; Ben Rowse, Lawsuit Against Beijing Mayor Shows Falungong Not Forgotten, 
AGENCE FR. PRESSE, Feb. 10, 2002. 
12. Rowse, supra note 11. 
13. ld. 
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On May 16, 2002, Chinese Communist Party Politburo member, 
Party Propaganda Department chief and national "6-10 Office" dep-
uty chief Ding Guangen found himself in much the same predicament 
when he was served at his hotel in Hawaii while in transit home from 
a visit to Canada. The plaintiffs, including three PRC nationals, 
brought a class action suit on behalf of themselves and other Falun 
Gong adherents. They asserted that Ding was "directly responsible," 
as a member of the PRC's top leadership and as the official in charge 
of the media campaign against Falun Gong, "for the deadly propa-
ganda, fabrication and lies to grossly distort Falun Gong's teachings 
and slander its founder and students with the purpose of bending pub-
lic opinion to support the government's persecution of Falun Gong."14 
In that capacity and as a top "6-10 Office" leader, Ding was also re-
sponsible for the arbitrary detention, torture, and abuse suffered by 
adherents in China, as well as for violations of Falun Gong followers' 
rights to life, liberty, security of person and freedoms of thought, con-
science, and religious belief.15 
Another variation on the same general theme had begun Li Peng's 
American legal troubles a few years earlier. Two veterans of China's 
"reeducation through labor" prison camps who had moved to the 
United States and others who remained incarcerated in the PRC filed 
a class action suit in U.S. federal court on behalf of themselves and 
thousands of their fellow Chinese nationals imprisoned in similar facil-
ities.16 They sought recovery for human rights abuses in the PRC that 
included punishment without due process, forced labor (in the form of 
sewing soccer balls with a multinational corporate logo), torture, and 
other extremely inhumane conditions of confinement. The defend-
ants included Li Peng, the Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party, 
the Bank of China, which is owned by the state and performs foreign 
exchange functions, and "various corporate branches of Adidas."17 In 
this case too, the plaintiffs invoked the ATCA and TVPA. They 
claimed, inter alia, that Adidas was liable under the two statutes and 
the PRC official defendants owed damages as well, given their entan-
14. Falungong Slaps Another Top Chinese Official with Lawsuit, AoENCE FR. PRESSE, May 21, 
2002 [hereinafter Falungong Slaps Another Top Chinese Official with Lawsuit]; see aiso Falun 
Data Information Center, China's Propaganda Minister, Politburo Member, Deputy Chief of "6· 
10" Office Served with U.S. Class-Action Lawsuit for Persecution of Falun Gong, May 17, 2002, 
available at http://faluninfo.net/DisplayAnArticle.asp?ID=5654 (last visited Nov. 25, 2002) (here-
inafter Falun Data). 
15. Falungong Slaps Another Top Chinese Official with Lawsuit, supra note 14; Falun Data, 
supra note 14. 
16. Bao Ge v. Li Peng, No. 98-1986, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10834 (D.D.C. July 9, 1999); Bao 
Ge v. Li Peng, 201 F. Supp. 2d 14 (D.D.C. 2000). 
17. Bao Ge, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 17. 
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glement with Adidas in the commercial venture to produce and export 
the sporting equipment that the plaintiffs had been forced to make. 1s 
These actions made real and tangible the Chinese specter that had 
long lurked at the fringes of the heated debate over using civil litiga-
tion in U.S. courts to address human rights abuses abroad. Well 
before the Li Peng and Falun Gong cases, U.S. courts had many occa-
sions to interpret the ATCA, TVPA, and other laws and doctrines that 
are relevant to litigation implicating foreign governments' behavior. 
Such cases produced opinions that the two sides in the debate re-
garded, variously and in keeping with their conflicting preferences, as 
a clear cast of villains and heroes.19 
What was striking about the divided body of case law was the de-
gree to which the cases, and particularly the ones in which plaintiffs' 
claims survived motions to dismiss, almost exclusively involved abuses 
committed under regimes that were defunct and repudiated by their 
successors, nearly universally shunned by other governments, pos-
18. See generally Bao Ge v. Li Peng, No. 98-1986, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10834 (D.D.C. July 
9, 1999); Bao Ge, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 14. 
19. For views favoring "expansive" views of the ATCA or TVPA, see, e.g., Richard B. Lillich, 
International Human Rights Law in U.S. Courts, 2 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & PoL'Y 1 (1993); Beth 
Stephens, Corporate Liability: Enforcing Human Rights Litigation through Domestic Litigation, 
24 HASTINGS !NT'L & CoMP. L. REv. 401 (2001) [hereinafter Corporate Liability); Beth Ste-
phens, Translating Filartiga: A Comparative and International Law Analysis of Domestic Reme-
dies for International Human Rights Violations, 27 YALE J. INT'L L. 1 (2002) (hereinafter 
Translating); Beth Van Schaak, The Civil Enforcement of Human Rights Norms in Domestic 
Courts, 6 ILSA J. lNT'L & CoMP. L. 295 (2000); Steven M. Schneebaum, Human Rights in the 
United States Courts: The Role of Lawyers, 55 WAsH. & LEE L. REv. 737 (1998); Bon. John M. 
Walker, Jr., Domestic Adjudication of International Human Rights Violations Under the Alien 
Tort Statute, 41 ST. LoUis U. L.J. 539 (1997); Joan Fitzpatrick, The Future of the Alien Tort 
Claims Act of 1789: Lessons from In Re Marcos Human Rights Litigation, 67 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 
491 (1993); Edward D. Re, Human Rights, International Law and Domestic Courts, 70 ST. 
JoHN's L. REv. 51 (1996); Lea Brilmayer, International Law in American Courts: A Modest Pro-
posal, 100 YALE L.J. 2277 (1991). For critiques of the expansive interpretation and arguments 
for a narrower reading, see Jack Goldsmith & Curtis A. Bradley, The Current Illegitimacy of 
International Human Rights Litigation, 66 FORDHAM L. REv. 319, 356-68 (1997) [hereinafter 
Illegitimacy]; Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Pinochet and International Human Rights 
Litigation, 97 MICH. L. REv. 2129, 2167-72 (1999) [hereinafter International Human Rights Liti-
gation]; Curtis A. Bradley, The Costs of International Human Rights Litigation, 2 Cm. J. Jr.rr'L L. 
457 (2001) [hereinafter Human Rights]; Curtis A. Bradley, Universal Jurisdiction and U.S. Law, 
2001 U. Cm. LEGAL F. 323 (2001) [hereinafter Universal Jurisdiction]; Curtis A. Bradley, The 
Alien Tort Statute and Article Ill, 42 VA. J. lNT'L L. 587 (2002) [hereinafter The Alien Tort Stat-
ute]: Curtis A. Bradley, Customary International Law and Private Rights of Action, 1 CHI. J. 
lNT'L L. 421 (2000) [hereinafter Customary International Law]; Donald J. Kochan, Constitutional 
Structure as a Limitation on the Scope of the "Law of Nations" in the Alien Tort Claims Act, 31 
CoRNELL INT'L L.J. 153 (1998); Michael D. Ramsey, Multinational Corporate Liability Under the 
Alien Tort Claims Act: Some Structural Concerns, 24 HASTINGS INT'L & CoMP. L. REv. 361 
(2001); Mark Gibney, Human Rights Litigation in U.S. Courts: A Hypocritical Approach, 3 BuFF. 
J. lNT'L L. 261 (1996-97); Fitzpatrick, supra, at 494 (summarizing arguments against expansive 
ATCA jurisdiction as imprudent and unconstitutional). 
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sessed of, at best, uncertain claims to statehood or legitimate state 
power, lacking in geopolitical significance, politically unimportant to 
Washington, or clearly condemned by the United States. The foreign 
state and official actions under scrutiny in such cases20 included: those 
20. Omitted from the following list of factual allegations and fact patterns are those drawn 
from several types of ATCA or TVPA cases that are not the usual focus of the "derangement of 
foreign policy" arguments against foreign human rights litigation-the arguments primarily ad-
dressed in this article. The types of cases that are excluded are as follows: 
Suits in which the United States is a defendant are not included. It is certainly plausible to 
argue that a U.S. sovereign choice to subject itself to liability for torture or for torts in violation 
of the law of nations that agents of the United States commit is not likely to pose the dangers 
that are ordinarily imagined in "derangement" arguments. If such cases do pose a risk of der-
angement, it is generally of a quite different sort from that stressed in critical arguments and 
rarely is likely to produce the problem of U.S. courts judging foreign regimes' human rights 
records that are the paradigmatic case for critics. In any event, the courts have generally con-
strued the ATCA's non-waiver of sovereign immunity broadly and the ATCA's substantive pro-
visions narrowly in suits against the United States and its officials. See generally Sanchez-
Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 266 F.3d 
1045 (9th Cir. 2001); Papa v. United States, 281 F.3d 1004 (2d Cir. 2001); Jama v. INS, 22 F. 
Supp. 2d 353 (D.N.J. 1998). 
Suits in which the plaintiffs are U.S. nationals are also excluded. (This category includes, of 
course, some TVPA suits but no ATCA suits.) Here, the risks of complicating or confounding 
U.S. foreign policy-and specifically doing so by inviting judicial consideration of foreign re-
gimes' human rights abuses-may be quite serious. But, all other things being equal, such cases 
lack the extra increment of offense involved in the United States (through its courts) "interfer-
ing" in a situation that many would see as none of its concern. Because passive personality-
based jurisdiction (that is, a state enacting and enforcing laws to address harms or activities that 
directly affect a state's nationals) has won fairly widespread acceptance in international law, such 
cases lack the "exceptional" quality that critics often discern and denounce in the ATCA and 
foreign plaintiff TVPA cases. See generally Ford v. Garcia, 289 F.3d 1283 (11th Cir. 2002); Ale-
jandre v. The Republic of Cuba, 996 F. Supp. 1239 (S.D. Fla. 1997). 
Notably, many of the ATCA or foreign plaintiff TVPA cases that have called for examining 
the actions of relatively important states and/or still-in-power regimes have a diluted form of a 
similar quality. That is, they involve U.S. corporate defendants, the overseas behavior of which 
is uncontroversially regulable under standard international legal principles of personality-based 
jurisdiction. The conventional character of such jurisdiction at least would seem to off-set in part 
the problematic character, as critics see it, of courts in such cases examining the domestic human 
rights behavior of foreign governments and their officials and agents. The problem fades still 
further-and exits the realm of U.S. judicial review of foreign human rights abuses that is the 
focus of this study and of most ATCA and TVPA critics-where there is no claim of "host 
country" human rights violations in an ATCA claim against a U.S. national. See, e.g., Bano v. 
Union Carbide Corp., 273 F.3d 120 (2d Cir. 2001) (concerning the Bhopal chemical plant disas-
ter, in which Indian government supported damages for Indian victims); cf Jota v. Texaco, Inc. 
157 F.3d 153 (2d Cir. 1998) (involving suit against Texaco for environmental harms, in which the 
Ecuadorian government switched to support the litigation going forward). 
Foreign plaintiff suits that do not allege what are generally regarded as serious human rights 
abuses also are not included in the following list of scenarios (although several are addressed 
later in this article). Where the allegations are limited to expropriation of property or relatively 
modest and non-violent rights violations, the risk of deranging U.S. foreign policy is generally 
much reduced. Such cases lack the provocative quality that the archetypal ATCA or foreign-
plaintiff TVPA complaint manifests and that critics fix upon. Moreover, U.S. courts generally 
dispose of such cases relatively early, ruling that the ATCA (like the TVPA) does not extend to 
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taken by a deposed Filipino dictator and his close relative;zt the Nazi 
regime and its corporate collaborators, in cases brought long after the 
war;22 the Japanese wartime regime, also in cases brought long after 
the war;23 the Soviet government of the Stalin era and the decades 
immediately following, in a case brought during the Glasnost era, al-
though for harms that plaintiffs alleged might be ongoing;24 an Argen-
tine junta-since replaced by a civilian government-for acts 
committed in a war against a close American ally;25 an Argentine gen-
eral who had served in the since-deposed junta's "dirty war" against 
dissident civilians;26 a Chilean military officer under the since-ousted 
military dictatorship, the leader of which had become the target of 
extensive litigation and condemnation for human rights violations;27 
an ousted Haitian military ruler and an exiled elected Haitian presi-
dent;28 a long-reigning head of an increasingly radical and authorita-
rian government in Zimbabwe;29 the Islamic revolutionary rulers in 
Iran;30 a Libyan regime that the United States has long regarded as a 
state sponsor of international terrorism;31 an ethnic cleanser strong-
man whose fragment of the former Yugoslavia had not won recogni-
tion as a state;32 police officials engaged in the ethnic cleansing in Bos-
the type of harms alleged. While this too does not eliminate the problem (given that foreign 
governments or officials having to defend such cases in all but the most preliminary and cursory 
way can raise complications for U.S. foreign policy), the risk has seemed to be clearly of a lesser 
magnitude in cases of this type. 
21. In re Estate of Marcos, Human Rights Litig., 25 F.3d 1467 (9th Cir. 1994); In re Estate of 
Marcos, Human Rights Litig., 978 F.2d 493 (9th Cir. 1992); Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 
789 (9th Cir. 1996). 
22. Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d 424 (D.N.J. 1999) (declaring corporate defen-
dant to be a de facto state actor in employing Nazi-forced slave labor); Dreyfus v. Von Finck, 534 
F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1976); Abrams v. Societe Nationale des Chemins de Fer Fran~ais, 175 F. Supp. 
2d 423, 440-41 (E.D.N.Y. 2001) (involving a corporate defendant as state instrumentality of 
France during period of Nazi domination, for role in deportation of French Jews); Bodner v. 
Banque Paribas, 114 F. Supp. 2d 117 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (involving an allegation that corporate 
defendant aided and abetted Vichy and Nazi regimes in ways that facilitated genocide). 
23. In re World War II Era Japanese Forced Labor Litig., 164 F. Supp. 2d 1153, 1153-60 (N.D. 
Cal. 2001). 
24. Von Dardel v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 623 F. Supp. 246 (D.D.C. 1985), va-
cated, 736 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1990). 
25. Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess, 488 U.S. 428 (1989). 
26. Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531 (N.D. Cal. 1987). 
27. Cabello Barrueto v. Fernandez Larios, 205 F. Supp. 2d 1325 (S.D. Fla. 2002); Estate of 
Cabello v. Fernandez-Larios, 157 F. Supp. 2d 1345 (S.D. Fla. 2001). 
28. Paul v. Avril, 901 F. Supp. 330 (S.D. Fla. 1994) (deposed military ruler); Lafontant v. 
Aristide, 844 F. Supp. 128 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (exiled democratically elected president). 
29. Tachiona v. Mugabe, 169 F. Supp. 2d 259 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). 
30. Jafari v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 539 F. Supp. 209 (N.D. Ill. 1982). 
31. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
32. Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995). 
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nia that U.S.-led NATO intervention sought to end;33 a radical Islamic 
group in Algeria that claimed, but did not wield, national government 
power;34 a former officer of a brutal Paraguayan military govern-
ment;35 local functionaries of a toppled Ethiopian military dictator-
ship;36 a former senior military leader of army death-squads with an 
anti-U.S. bent in Guatemala;37 the leader of a closely government-af-
filiated political organization that had helped implement the Rwandan 
government's genocidal policies;38 the deputy head of national secur-
ity in Ghana's repressive government;39 the Palestinian Liberation Or-
ganization, long before the establishment of the Gaza Strip and West 
Bank as territories governed by the Palestinian Authority;40 the de-
mocracy-movement-suppressing and unfortunately acronymed 
SLORC (State Law and Order Restoration Committee) in long-her-
metic and widely ostracized Burma;41 an authoritarian army-backed 
regime in Indonesia that had been replaced by an elected govern-
ment;42 and the former military authorities in Nigeria who had faced 
widespread condemnation for corruption and cruelty and been suc-
ceeded by an elected civilian administration.43 Even when targeting 
this rogue's gallery of governments and officials, plaintiffs in such 
cases often have not succeeded or even gotten very far, and the list of 
failed efforts tellingly includes all those that involved activities or lia-
bility of still-ruling governments in relatively important, non-pariah 
countries.44 
33. Mehinovic v. Vuckovic, 198 F. Supp. 2d 1322 (N.D. Ga. 2002). 
34. Doe v. Islamic Salvation Front, 993 F. Supp. 3 (D.D.C. 1998). 
35. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). 
36. Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844 (11th Cir. 1996). 
37. Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 163 (D. Mass. 1995). 
38. Mushikiwabo v. Barayagwiza, 1996 WL 164496 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 9, 1996). 
39. Cabiri v. Assasie-Gyimah, 921 F. Supp. 1189 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). 
40. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
41. Doe v. Unocal Corp., 110 F. Supp. 2d 1294 (C.D. Cal. 2000). 
42. Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, %9 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. La. 1997), affd, 197 F.3d 161 (5th 
Cir. 1999). 
43. Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 2002 WL 319887 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2002). 
44. See Beanal, 969 F. Supp. at 362 (holding that allegations of human rights abuse in Indone-
sia apparently extended to ongoing activities, but the suit was against a private company, not 
government or official actors, and focused primarily on actions undertaken by prior authorita-
rian regime); Wiwa, 2002 WL 319887 (ongoing suit against private company, not government of 
Nigeria or its official actors); Carmichael v. United Technologies Corp., 835 F.2d 109 (5th Cir. 
1988) (involving a claim against corporate defendant for complicity in Saudi Arabian authorities' 
imprisonment and torture of plaintiff in connection with business dispute, dismissed, inter alia, 
for improper service of process and inadequate assertion of state action); Eastman Kodak Co. v. 
Kavlin, 978 F. Supp. 1078, 1090-92 (S.D. Fla. 1997) (concerning allegations of Bolivian judicial 
officials' arbitrary and prolonged detention of foreign national and noting on-going corruption 
of the Bolivian judicial system, but alien's claim entangled with claim by corporate plaintiff 
which was a U.S. national). See also Von Dardel v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 623 F. 
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China, of course, has none of the foregoing characteristics that typ-
ify targets of ATCA and TVPA suits, especially targets of successful 
suits. For all the growing problems of popular disillusionment, social 
unrest, institutional fragmentation, and rampant corruption that beset 
the Chinese regime, any reports of its impending demise are grossly 
exaggerated. Although the object of occasional and pointed criticism 
from the United States and other governments, the PRC is hardly an 
international pariah, as China's accession to the World Trade Organi-
zation underscored in the midst of the flurry of filings of ATCA and 
TVPA suits against its officials. Nearly a quarter-century after the 
United States recognized the PRC as the government of China, no 
one seriously disputes that China is a sovereign state, the state actions 
of which are the responsibility of the government of the PRC.45 In 
addition, while the PRC's economic importance, strategic clout, and 
penchant for challenging the international status quo are often and 
easily overstated, China is a rising power with expanding military ca-
pacity and a large, rapidly growing, and increasingly internationalized 
economy. Thus, the PRC is likely to remain for the foreseeable future 
the partner in arguably the most important and volatile of the United 
States' bilateral relationships. 
China's vast population and the PRC's repressive politics-most 
garishly on display in the Tiananmen Incident of 1989 and the cam-
paign against Falun Gong that began in 1999-have made it the locus 
of a huge number of human rights violations. Increased opportunities 
for emigration-both legal and illegal-from the PRC to the United 
States promised to turn a considerable number of Chinese human 
rights victims into prospective plaintiffs in ATCA and TVPA actions. 
American and Chinese expatriate activists and lawyers stood ready to 
help them try to make ample use of U.S. substantive laws that prom-
ised redress for human rights violations abroad and U.S. rules permit-
ting jurisdiction based on a defendant's thin or transient connections 
to the forum. A growing number of defendants could be expected to 
come within plaintiffs' reach, as China's expanding participation in the 
United Nations and other international organizations and China's in-
creasingly dense and important economic and security relationships 
Supp. 246 (D.D.C. 1985); Von Dardel v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 736 F. Supp. 1 
(D.D.C. 1990) (if plaintiff had prevailed, current Soviet government would have been liable); cf 
Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d 424 (D.N.J. 1999); Dreyfus v. Von Finck, 534 F.2d 24 
(2d Cir. 1976) (involving issues at stake including postwar German government's handling of 
claims for reparations for Nazi regime's actions). 
45. Indeed, the uncertain claim to statehood in the region-Taiwan's-is largely the product 
of the PRC's insistence that the island republic is a part of China. See generally Jacques de Lisle, 
The Chinese Puzzle of Taiwan's Status, 44 0RHrs 35 (2000). 
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with the United States predictably bring more Chinese officials to the 
United States and entangle more U.S. individuals and entities with 
problematic human rights behavior in China. 
Given these features, China cases should have loomed large-even 
before the Li Peng and Falun Gong suits-as an important focus for 
advocates and critics of human rights litigation in American courts.46 
For proponents of such litigation, China cases hold out possible op-
portunities to address a particularly numerous and notorious set of 
abuses abroad, to show that U.S. legal remedies are available against 
defendants that are not only dead, ousted, insignificant, or deeply de-
spised regimes and officials, and to counter suspicions that litigation 
about human rights abuses abroad has an unsavory partisan tone, al-
most always targeting right-wing defendants.47 On all these fronts, a 
series of successful China cases could mark a major breakthrough for 
those who favor wide access to U.S. courts to redress foreign rights 
abuses. To opponents, China cases represent a singular case study in 
one of the principal dangers they often cite: inexpert or overreaching 
courts could take free rein to issue decisions that would damage the 
political branches' ability (and primarily the executive branch's abil-
ity) to conduct sensitive, complicated, and vitally important foreign 
policy on behalf of the United States and in service of its national 
interests. In the China cases, the danger of courts deranging the con-
duct of U.S. foreign policy seems especially grave. Compared to U.S. 
relations with the countries that are home to typical ATCA and TVPA 
defendants, U.S. relations with the PRC have serious national security 
consequences and are conducted in shades of gray, with especially 
complex connections among issues and with a well-established ten-
dency to volatility. 
The late arrival and limited progress of China cases suggests that it 
would be at least premature to celebrate or despair over an imminent 
Chinese addition to the pantheon of Filartiga v. Pena-Irala,48 the 
46. For rare references to the prospective problem of China cases from the period before the 
filing of the Li Pengfriananmen case, see Ramsey, supra note 19, at 365; Walker, supra note 19, 
at 560. Since the filing of the Li Peng/Tiananmen case, the case has received some passing men-
tion-although not much analysis-from critics as an example of the dangers of expansive 
ATCA or TVPA litigation. See, e.g., Human Rights, supra note 19, at 458, 461; Universal Juris-
diction, supra note, 19 at 347-48. For the rare analyses focusing primarily on the Li Peng/ 
Tiananmen case, see Chu, supra note 8; Gruzen. supra note 8. 
47. Some of the most strident critics of human rights litigation assert that the skewing toward 
addressing the acts only of weak regimes extends to the political branches' activities as well. See, 
e.g., Jack Goldsmith, International Human Rights Law and the United States Double Standard, 1 
GREEN BAG 2D 365, 370 (1998). 
48. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). 
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Marcos human rights litigation,49 Kadic v. Karadzic/'0 Xuncax v. 
Gramajo,51 and kindred cases. Less certain and more interesting is 
whether China cases present, in a particularly grave form, some of the 
problems that critics identify, whether the resulting perils that critics 
assert are indeed serious, and whether a significant amelioration of 
those evils would result from following a prescription of construing 
narrowly-or enacting legislation to narrow-the ATCA or TVPA 
routes to the courthouse. 
II. CHINESE HUMAN RIGHTS CASES AND DANGERS TO THE 
CoNDUCT oF U.S. FoREIGN Poucy 
Opponents of expansive readings of the ATCA and other avenues 
of broad access to U.S. courts for victims of foreign human rights 
abuses deploy two lines of argument. One invokes general separation 
of powers concerns, including questions of constitutional restrictions 
or constitutionally-grounded norms governing judicial construction of 
arguably ambiguous jurisdictional statutes, the appropriate roles of 
the political branches and the courts in bringing international law into 
U.S. law, and the basic allocation of authority over foreign affairs 
among the branches of the national government. The other strand in 
critical analyses emphasizes policy reasons that are thought to support 
the commitment of matters relating to foreign human rights abuses 
specifically-and foreign affairs more generally-almost exclusively 
to the political branches, at least absent clear legislative authorization 
(and perhaps executive support or acquiescence as well) for judicial 
involvement 
It is, of course, true that either sort of argument independently 
could be enough for proponents of a restrictive view to carry the day. 
While the two approaches may be separable in theory, few analysts 
confine themselves solely to the first type of argument.52 The two 
49. In re Estate of Marcos, Human Rights Litig., 25 F.3d 1467 (9th Cir. 1994): In re Estate of 
Marcos, Human Rights Litig., 978 F.2d 493 (9th Cir. 1992); Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 
789 (9th Cir. 1996). 
50. 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995). 
5l. 886 F. Supp. 162 (D. Mass. 1995). 
52. For examples of prudential arguments and blending of constitutional-structural and pru-
dential foreign policy arguments. see. e.g., Human Rights, wpra note 19. at 460-63, 470-73; Uni-
versal Jurisdiction, supra note 19, at 344-48; Ramsey, supra note 19: International Human Rights 
Litigation. supra note 19, at 2181-84; cf. Jack Goldsmith, Should International Human Rights 
Law Trump Domestic Law?, 1 CHI. J. bn'L L. 327 (2000) (making prudential argument with 
respect to incorporation of treaty-based international human rights law). The same critics have 
also tried to develop arguments that confine themselves more narrowly to constitutional-struc-
tural or original intent arguments. See, e.g .. The Alien Tort Statute. supra note 19; Illegitimacy, 
supra note 19, at 356-67; Curtis A. Bradley & Jack A. Goldsmith, Customary lntemational Law 
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strands' tendency to intertwine may reflect a sense that the concerns 
that are the foci of the second, prudential and consequentialist, line of 
analysis ordinarily are thought to animate some of the constitutional 
and near-constitutional principles invoked in the first type of argu-
ment. Or, the proclivity for conjoining the two types of arguments 
may suggest that their adherents doubt whether their positions can 
persuade without relying on empirical claims about the significant ad-
verse impact on U.S. foreign relations when U.S. courts hear civil 
claims arising from human rights abuses committed by foreign defend-
ants in foreign lands. 
An analysis of human rights suits that have or might come from 
China has little to add to the voluminous debates that have elaborated 
or rejected the first line of arguments. Not so for the second. Reflec-
tion on the implications of litigation relating to human rights abuses in 
China-including cases that range well beyond ATCA and foreign-
plaintiff TVPA suits-suggests that there are legitimate causes for 
concern about adverse effects on the conduct of American foreign 
policy. But such an examination also reveals good reasons to discount 
the parade of horribles that the usual critiques imply would flow from 
U.S. suits by Chinese nationals for human rights abuses in China. 
Critics often point to the judicial branch's lack of expertise in for-
eign policy matters that foreign human rights cases require courts to 
address. They suggest that inept or ignorant courts will simply make a 
mess of things.53 The criticism has considerable resonance in a num-
as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modem Position, 110 HARV. L. REv. 815, 869-73 
( 1997). But even these typically include an admixture of consequentialist arguments which ex-
plain why the issue is important, and point out the adverse impact that their opponents' views 
portend for U.S. foreign policy or American democracy or federalism. 
53. This aspect of the argument surfaces in a number of forms. It is a central concern of the 
political question doctrine as applied in foreign affairs cases, the animating concerns of which are 
strongly shared by critics of foreign human rights litigation in U.S. courts. The political question 
doctrine and its application to ATCA, TVPA, and other foreign human rights cases is discussed 
infra at notes 87-95 and accompanying text. For an example of an argument that the political 
question doctrine should be applied to stop a China-focused ATCA case (specifically the Li 
Peng{Tiananmen suit), see Gruzen, supra note 8, at 226-27, 239-40. 
The argument of dangerous judicial inexpertise also arises from critics' attack on the lack of 
executive control over civil litigation concerning foreign human rights abuses (as opposed to 
criminal prosecution). See, e.g., Human Rights, supra note 19, at 360; Universal Jurisdiction, 
supra note 19, at 346-47. This point is discussed more fully infra at note 124 and accompanying 
text. See also infra notes 2l0-215 and accompanying text. While the immediate focus of this 
critique usually is the risk that plaintiffs will have an agenda that departs from that of the execu-
tive and thus might lead to foreign policy embarrassment. courts are part of the imagined prob-
lem as well, for they are the institutions that fail to rein in and, instead, validate, amplify and 
make "governmental" or "official" statements or criticisms of foreign human rights practices 
that otherwise would be merely the assertions of private individuals who are particularly critical 
of the targeted government and its agents. 
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ber of decided cases that have involved China. Judges called upon to 
address China-related issues have penned statements that have made 
many U.S. diplomats and China-hands wince (and the anticipation of 
such judicial moves has sometimes prompted the State Department to 
intervene in litigation). Federal court decisions have characterized the 
PRC as a brutal communist dictatorship, a regime that can be ex-
pected to quash civil liberties and the rule of law in post-reversion 
Hong Kong, and a systematic violator of its citizens' rights to freedom 
of religion, political speech, and procreation. 54 They have opined that 
Taiwan is a part of the PRC and that Taiwan is an independent state 
legally distinct from the PRC-contradictory statements that are po-
litically highly charged, not the least because of the volatile interna-
tional relations that have increasingly focused on the contrasting 
human rights regimes on opposite sides of the Taiwan Strait. 55 Courts 
have made similarly contradictory statements, again sometimes more 
than a little tinged with human rights issues, concerning Hong Kong's 
status during the diplomatically tense period surrounding the terri-
tory's formal reversion to China. 56 One court has held that were it not 
Finally, the argument of court ineptness or inexpertise resonates with another favorite argu-
ment of critics of foreign human rights litigation in U.S. courts: the largely customary interna-
tional law that courts are asked to apply in such cases is uncertain. One of the implications is 
that, unlike conventional domestic law, there is no way anyone-and therefore no way that any 
court-could get it right. 'This line of argument is explored more fully at infra notes 58-60. 206-
208 and accompanying text. 
54. See, e.g., Li Wu Lin v. INS, 238 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2001) (describing the "Chinese 
government" as having "frequently used force and coercion to repress political dissent" and 
crediting reports that .. the Chinese government used tanks and machine guns to kill at least 700 
and possibly more nonviolent protesters"); Lui Kin-Hong v. United States. 957 F. Supp. 1280. 
l28X-H9 (D. Mass. 1997). rcv'd. 110 F.3d 103 (1st Cir. 1997) (concerning Hong Kong): Doe v. 
INS, X67 F.2d 2H5 (6th Cir. 19ll9) (concerning likely treatment of Christian convert and aspiring 
prosdytizer if returned to China); Zheng Quan Li v. INS, No. 97-71175. 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 
21542 (9th Cir. Feb. 10, 1999) (finding that "China continues to persecute low-level dissidents" 
even ten years after the Tiananmcn Incident): Fengchu Chang v. INS. 119 F.3d 1055 (3d Cir. 
1997) (concerning persecution on account of political opinion); Ke Zhen Zhao v. United States 
Dep't of Justice. 21>5 F.3d 83. 91-92 (2d Cir. 2001) (concerning pattern of coercive family plan-
ning and forced sterilization in China). 
55. See, e.g., Millen Indus. v. Coordinating Council for N. Am. Affairs. 1987 WL 8707, at *1 
(D.D.C. Mar. 17. I t.)H7) (finding jurisdiction over a suit against "an association comprised of 
subjects of the Republic of China'' under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2). which provides for jurisdiction 
over actions between "citizens of a State [of the United States] and citizens or subjects of a 
foreign state"). afj'd, 855 F.2d 879 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (affirming trial court decision but relying on 
provision in U.S. law requiring courts to treat Taiwan as if it were a state): At!. Mut. Ins. v. 
Northwest Airlines. 24 F.3d 958. 959 (7th Cir. 1994) (characterizing lower court's decision as 
holding that "Taiwan [is) a province of the [PRC]"). See also deLisle, supra note 45. at 55-60 
(concerning the issues of Taiwan's democracy and human rights in PRC and Taiwan diplomacy). 
56. Lui Kin-Honfi, 957 F. Supp. at 1280 (tlnding post-reversion Hong Kong so assimilated to 
PRC that prior extradition treaty with Hong Kong cannot be construed to extend where trial 
would occur after reversion); Tai-Chiu Wong v. llchert. 998 F.2d 61>1 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding 
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for Congress's decision not to make the Foreign Sovereign Immunities 
Act (FSIA) retroactive, the PRC would be obliged to honor Qing dy-
nasty bond obligations, which the PRC regards as void, odious debts 
incurred by a traitorous regime and imposed by rapacious foreigners 
who impermissibly disregarded China's sovereignty.57 
China human rights cases, however, also suggest how the critical 
view both begs the question and proves too much. The critics' argu-
ment proves too much in that courts are no less inexpert and likely to 
reach potentially destructive judgments when facing other arcane mat-
ters that find their way into litigation. Courts' clunking statements 
about conditions in China sound no more silly or distressing to Sinolo-
gists and State Department regional desk officers than judicial han-
dling of many other matters sounds to economists, other social 
scientists, and specialists in the relevant industries or sectors. Despite 
ample opportunities to use special masters and expert witnesses, 
courts routinely "get it wrong" in potentially disastrous ways on com-
plex economic and technical questions and other matters. To be sure, 
a cottage industry among academics has used this aspect of judicial 
inexpertise and ineptitude to argue for much greater judicial humility 
and restraint in a wide range of cases. But that program is clearly a 
good deal more radical than what the opponents of expansive litiga-
tion over foreign human rights abuses take themselves to be arguing. 
The usual criticisms also tend to beg the question by asserting that 
what courts are asked to do in ATCA and similar cases is to decide 
subtle and ambiguous questions arising from the unjudicial and murky 
realms of foreign policy and customary international law, which are 
depicted as profoundly uncertain and thus vulnerable to considerable 
manipulation.58 China cases seem especially to reinforce the critics' 
point. Indeed, it is hard to find an aspect of recent American foreign 
policy that has been as fraught with ambivalence, complexity, conten-
tiousness, and instability as U.S.-PRC relations in general and human 
rights issues in Sino-American relations in particular. Some of the 
tense and testy exchanges between the two governments have focused 
post-Tiananmen executive order granting immigration relief to PRC nationals did not extend to 
applicant who entered from Hong Kong and subsequently acquired PRC passport; U.S. law does 
not accept PRC position that pre-reversion Hong Kong residents are Chinese nationals). 
57. Jackson v. People's Republic of China, 794 F.2d 1490 (llth Cir. 1986). 
58. See, e.g., International Human Rights Litigation, supra note 19, at 2140-46, 2165-66, 2175-
79 (describing the uncertain content of international law, the judicial reception of international 
law governing immunities as "politicized and unpredictable," and the vagueness of international 
law's content); cf. Goldsmith, supra note 52, at 332-34 (concerning U.N. Covenant treaty-based 
international human rights law provisions which are generally acknowledged-although not by 
the author-to reflect much of customary international human rights law); Kochan, supra note 
19. at 185. 
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specifically on the question of whether international human rights as 
the U.S. government defines them are applicable or appropriate to 
China and binding on the PRC as a matter of internationallaw.59 But 
the matters alleged in the Li Peng, Falun Gong, and other China 
human rights cases are profoundly unsubtle.60 They typically concern 
behavior that has caused extensive physical and emotional harms that 
are widely documented by scholars, journalists, non-governmental or-
ganizations, the U.S. State Department and, occasionally, official PRC 
sources. Additionally, the law to be applied-the most core of inter-
national human rights standards-is not obviously less accessible to 
U.S. courts or less amenable to their judicial interpretation and appli-
cation than is much international, foreign, state, and common law that 
federal judges are asked to apply every day. Indeed, some of the rele-
vant human rights standards are recorded in U.S. treaties or statutes 
and parallel familiar U.S. constitutional rights, all of which are con-
ventional sources of the law of the United States. 
Clearly, this does not completely take care of the problem of a court 
decision's potential for upsetting delicate foreign policy arrange-
ments.61 But, with such cases thus recharacterized as presenting diffi-
culties that are genuine, but hardly sui generis, in the work of U.S. 
courts, it becomes more plausible to argue that the concerns they raise 
are better handled through the episodic intervention of the executive 
branch rather than wholesale, categorical exclusion of foreign human 
rights cases or a large subset of them. If what otherwise appears to be 
the relatively ordinary functioning of the judiciary in applying not-
especially-inaccessible law to not-especially-elusive facts would risk, in 
a particular case, an unacceptable impact on U.S. relations with China 
or other nations, then the executive branch can be expected to per-
form its customary role of intervening as it sees necessary in specific 
cases, as it is presumed to be capable of doing in non-ATCA or non-
59. See, e.g., Human Rights in China "Superior" to Those in West. RENMJN RIBAO (People's 
Daily). Nov. 8, 1991; Chinese President at Cambridge Stresses "Chinese Values", XINHUA, Oct. 
22, 1999; No More of "Human Rights Above State Sovereignty", X!NHt'A, May 26, 1999: FM 
Spokesman Refutes U.S. Human Rights Acmsalirm. XINHl;A, Feb. 26, 2000, available at LEXIS 
NEXJS. 
60. The China human rights cases other than the Li Peng and .Falun Gong litigation are dis-
cussed in greater detail infra at Section Ill. 
61. Indeed, a critic could argue plausibly that misplaced analogies to U.S. Bill of Rights juris-
prudence are a particular danger in courts' adjudication of foreign human rights claims; cf Wiwa. 
2002 WL 319887. at *11-12 (including violations of rights to peaceful assembly and expression 
among possible grounds for ATCA recovery); see also Guo Chun Di v. Carroll, 842 F. Supp. 852 
(E.D. Va. 1994). 
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TVPA cases that raise political questions, act of state issues, head of 
state or diplomatic immunity requests, and the like.62 
Critical arguments often portray such an approach as putting inap-
propriate or imprudent pressure on a political branch-primarily the 
executive branch-to set forth its views in individual cases or classes 
of cases. On this view, such pressure is significant and is constitution-
ally disfavored or proscribed because it unduly or impermissibly con-
strains or burdens the conduct of U.S. foreign policy by requiring the 
executive branch to choose between, on the one hand, staking out po-
sitions that it might wish to leave ambiguous or unarticulated or, on 
the other hand, accepting excessive risk that the court will disregard 
the need for the nation to speak with one voice in international af-
fairs.63 Again, China-related cases add some credibility to such con-
cerns. The Tiananmen and Falun Gong cases have been obviously 
awkward for the administration and stressful for the U.S.-PRC rela-
tionship, with the United States having to argue in court that a suit 
alleging severe human rights abuses in China should be thrown out for 
inadequate service of process,64 having to explain to Chinese officials 
that another suit making broadly similar claims would likely proceed 
because there was nothing that executive branch officials could do to 
stop it,65 and having to endure and respond to howls of protest from 
Beijing about the threat that such suits pose to Sino-American 
relations.66 
62. For a discussion of the executive's role in intervening in individual cases implicating for-
eign affairs, see infra note 222. 
63. The "unitary voice" argument is a central element of the political question doctrine and 
thus of the argument that the political question doctrine should be used to dispose of some or 
most foreign human rights litigation. The "forced to speak" issue is a concem of the act of state 
doctrine and thus an underpinning of arguments that the act of state doctrine should be used to 
restrict foreign human rights litigation in U.S. courts. See also Human Rights, supra note 19, at 
461 (arguing that human rights litigation, specifically the Li Peng/Tiananmensuits threatens to 
upset the "carefully calibrated strategy" of the president and Congress toward China); cf lnter-
nmional Human Rights Licigation, supra note 19, at 2182-83 (arguing that issues of bringing 
human rights law into U.S.law by judicial means places in the courts' hands matters that are best 
resolved by the political branches); Ramsey, supra note 19, at 376 (making the •·unitary voice" 
argument). 
64. See. e.g., Court Decision on Li Peng Applauded, TIMES OF INDIA, Sept. 23, 2000, available 
at LEXIS NEXIs; Li Peng Tiananmen Law Suit Could be in Danger, available at LEXJS NExrs; 
Wong, supra note 1; The Li Peng Lawsuit and Universal Jurisdiction over Violations of Rights, 
supra note 1 (concerning U.S. argument that service on a State Department employee in Li's 
security detail was not appropriate or adequate, and noting court's rejection of that argument in 
light of the difficulty of serving Li). 
65. See, e.g., Pomfret, supra note 11 (describing PRC requests, U.S. response, and Chinese 
legal experts' rejection of U.S. response). 
66. See, e.g., China Slams US Lawsuit Against Li Peng as "Political Farce", supra note 1; China 
Says Falungong Lawsuit on Beijing's Mayor is a "Nasty Trick", AGENCE FR. PRESSE, Feb. 10, 
2002; Global Justice: The Li Peng Lawsuit and Universal Jurisdiction Over Violations of Rights, 
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Here too, however, China cases illustrate how such critical argu-
ments, especially when cast in general and abstract terms, can over-
reach. The Li Peng and Falun Gong cases and much other litigation 
touching upon human rights conditions in China have not forced the 
political branches to articulate a previously shadowy position on 
whether the Tiananmen Incident and its aftermath or much of the 
crackdown on Falun Gong or forced prison labor conditions and the 
like were condemnable and condemned. United States official state-
ments have long made this abundantly clear in many far more visible, 
extrajudicial contexts. The annual report issued by the State Depart-
ment on human rights conditions in China is one of the more routine 
and recurring forms of such statements.67 The post-Tiananmen Inci-
dent executive order suspending immigration restrictions on PRC na-
tionals in the United States, the early Clinton administration 
executive order linking recommendations on renewal of China's most-
favored nation trading status to amelioration of specific human rights 
abuses (including imprisonment for political expression, forced prison 
labor, and inhumane treatment of prisoners), Congress's adoption of 
amendments to the immigration laws to authorize grants of asylum to 
victims of coercive family planning in China (and the findings behind 
the legislation), and congressional statements and hearings condemn-
ing the persecution of Falun Gong are some of the more high-profile 
instances.68 There are countless others. What the Chinese human 
supra note 1 (quoting PRC Foreign Ministry Spokesman statement that the lawsuit is ·•a political 
farce fabricated by a handful of anti-China elements in the U.S. out of despicable political mo-
tives"); Pomfret, supra note ll (describing Chinese government calls on Bush administration to 
stop the AfCA suits against PRC officials). 
67. See U.S. Dep't of State, Human Rights Rep(lrt (China), available at http:llwww.state.gov 
(last visited Nov. 25. 2002) [hereinafter China Report] (issued annually in March). 
68. Exec. Order No. 12.711. 55 Fed. Reg. 13,897 (Apr. I 1, 1990) (directing deferral of en-
forced departures of all PRC nationals in the United States on or after the day following the 
Tiananmen Incident of June 4. l989, and directing "enhanced consideration" of asylum requests 
from individuals claiming to flee coerced abortion or sterilization); Exec. Order No. 12,850. 58 
Fed. Reg. 31.327 (May 28. l993) (conditioning Secretary of State's recommendation for renewal 
of MFN on PRC progress in freedom of immigration. and compliance with prison labor agree-
ments; and directing Secretary to consider if there has been progress on adherence to the Uni-
versal Declaration of human rights, release of Chinese nationals detamed for non-violent 
expression of political or religious beliefs. humane treatment of prisoners, treatment of 11bet, 
and access of Chinese nationals to information broadcast from abroad); 8 U.S.C § 110l(a)(42) 
(1998) (as amended to include in the definition of a refugee eligible for asylum those who have 
been subjected to, or have been persecuted for refusing. involuntary sterilization or abortion, or 
have been persecuted for resistance to such policies). Executive Order 12,711 was adopted in 
the shadow of congressional legislation. vetoed by the President. that would have extended simi-
lar relief to Chinese nationals. The China-specific findings behind the amendment of 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1101(a)(42) are discussed in Zhao, 265 F.3d at 92-93. For examples of congressional state-
ments and investigations concerning Falun Gong, see, e.g .. Statement by Congresswoman !kana 
Ros-Lehtinen at Falun Gong Press Conference in Washington DC. m·ailable ac http://www.free 
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rights-related court cases have pushed any political branch to do has 
been (at most), first, merely to address the limited and narrowly litiga-
tion-related question of whether procedural or jurisdictional require-
ments had been satisfied (and whether the courts thus should hear 
cases involving behavior that the United States had criticized offi-
cially), or second, perhaps to sit uncomfortably on the sidelines as the 
courts heard such cases despite misgivings that diplomatic troubles 
might ensue, but with such limited expected consequences that it did 
not seem worth bearing the modest cost of criticism for hypocrisy that 
would greet more aggressive executive branch intervention on behalf 
of the defendants. 
Moreover, the context of China-related cases reminds us that adju-
dication of an occasional foreign human rights case or executive com-
ments in response to the filing of an occasional ATCA or TVPA suit 
are but an insignificant part of a dense and complex set of interna-
tional interactions. In a bilateral relationship as economically and 
strategically important as the U.S.-PRC relationship, the channels are 
constantly open and well-tended despite numerous frictions, many of 
which far surpass the difficulties portended by human rights litigation 
in U.S. courts. The protracted wrangling over U.S. preconditions for 
support for China's entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
and the resulting entitlement to permanent normal trade relations, 
U.S. bombing of the PRC embassy in Belgrade, the incident surround-
ing the United States EP-3 reconnaissance plane's collision with a 
shadowing Chinese fighter jet and subsequent forced landing, arms 
sales or discussions of defense links to Taiwan, and the PRC's deten-
tion of U.S. citizens or residents as spies are but a few of the most 
recent, far greater irritants in U.S.-PRC relations. Indeed, they are 
irritants in which issues of international law (including human rights 
law), U.S. foreign relations law, and the like have been central. 
United States support for PRC accession to the WTO had hinged in 
· significant part on human rights issues, given that China's entry would 
demand an end to U.S. laws imposing human rights conditions on 
China's Most Favored Nation (MFN) trading status. The PRC re-
garded the embassy bombing as part of a broader human rights-violat-
ing U.S.-led NATO intervention in the former Yugoslavia. Beijing 
denounced the Belgrade and EP-3 incidents and U.S. involvement in 
Taiwan as violations of the United States' obligations to respect 
lists.orglarchiveslminghui-engl07-2001/msg00013.html (last visited Nov. 25, 2002); Congressional 
Human Rights Caucus Members' Briefing and Exhibit on Human Rights in China: The PRC's 
Anti-Human Rights Tactics in the United States, available at http://www.house.govllantoslcaucus/ 
brief_FalinGong061102.html (last visited Nov. 25, 2002). See also infra note 99. 
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China's sovereignty and, in turn, the human rights of the Chinese peo-
ple to enjoy the full attributes of sovereignty. And the detention, con-
viction, and expulsion of several U.S.-national or U.S.-based 
researchers for alleged espionage pitted China's explicit claims about 
its right to national security and implicit suggestions that China-born 
individuals remained to a degree subject to the PRC's authority 
against the United States' familiar assertion of its rights to protect its 
nationals and, to a more limited degree, its non-citizen residents from 
mistreatment by foreign sovereigns, particularly in the form of ques-
tionable charges targeting activities that resonated with First Amend-
ment values.69 On the U.S. side, all of these instances of diplomatic 
friction have stemmed from actions or decisions taken or statements 
made by the executive branch, sometimes with support from Con-
gress. They have not come from the courts.7° 
Chinese officials and legal scholars have made predictable com-
plaints (although less strident ones than in other legal contexts) that 
the President or his subordinates can and should do more to stop the 
Tiananmen and Falun Gong suits. While some of those critiques are 
surely sincere and may be valid, a degree of skepticism is in order. 
Official China is not so uncomprehending of the United States system 
69. See, e.g., PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Strong Protest by the Chinese Government 
Against the Bombing by the US-led NATO of the Chinese Embassy in the Federal Yugoslavia, 
available at http://www.fmprc.gov.cnlengl5733.html (last visited Nov. 25, 2002); Erik Eckholm, 
Crisis in the Balkans: China Assails "Gross Violation of Sovereignty", N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 1999, 
at A6; PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Spokesman Zhu Bangzhao Gives Full Account of the 
Collision Between US and Chinese Military Planes, available at http://www.fmprc.gov.cnleng/ 
9576.html (last visited Nov. 25, 2002); Philip P. Pan & John Pomfret, American Crew Heads 
Home; China Accepts Letter of Regret, WASH. PosT, Apr. 12, 2001; PRC Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, Spokesperson on President Bush's Remarks on U.S. Arms Sale to Taiwan. available at 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng110024.html (last visited Nov. 25, 2002); Peter Lim, U.S. China Rela-
tions Improving, But Still Sticky: U.S. Ambassador, AGENCE FR. PRESSE, Jan. 21, 2002, available 
at LEXIS NEx1s; Alan S. Alexandroff. Concluding China's Accession to the WTO: The U.S. Con-
gress and Permanent Most Favored Nation Status for China, 3 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FoREIGN AFF. 
23 (1998); Xinhua Officials, Congress Deputy on Linking Human Rights with Trade Issues, TA 
KuNG PAO, Mar. 7, 1994, available at LExis NExis: Only Politics Keeping Us Out of WTO, Says 
China, AGENC'E FR. PRESSE, Dec. 10, 1996; Ministry Comments on Passage of Trade Bill in U.S. 
Senate, XINHUA, Sept. 21, 2000, available at LEXIS NExts; Craig R. Smith, Beijing Convicts Pro-
fessor; Orders Expulsion, N.Y. TIMES, July 15,2001, § 1, at 10 (discussing the cases of Li Shaomin 
and U.S. resident and PRC citizen Gao Zhan); China: Academic Li Shaomin charged with Espio-
nage, to be Deported. XINHUA, July 14, 2001, available at LExis NExis; Philip Shenon, Scholar 
Back in U.S. After Detention, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2001, § 1, at 8 (discussing the case of PRC 
national, U.S. resident law librarian, Song Yongyi); Jim Hoagland, The Harry Wu Defense, 
WASH. PosT, Aug. 31, 1995, at A23; China Brought Harry Wu Hongda to Trial According to 
Law, WEN WEI Po, Aug. 29. 1995, available at LEXIS NEXIS. 
70. Ironically. the courts were involved in one of these sets of issues on the Chinese side-the 
espionage prosecutions of U.S. nationals and residents. 
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of separation of powers as it claims to be.71 And the PRC's corn-
plaints over the cases have produced more of a quest for debating 
points than an occasion of measurable damage to the bilateral 
relationship. n 
None of this is to say that the foreign policy costs of U.S. litigation 
over Chinese human rights abuses are nonexistent or should be borne 
without good reason, but even a brief consideration of the realities of 
the relationship between Beijing and Washington cautions against as-
suming too readily that China-related human rights suits in American 
courts will substantially disrupt relations with a nation that is of vital 
concern to U.S. foreign policy. 
In addition, critics fear that the problem of deranging foreign policy 
through human rights litigation is likely to get worse in the wake of 
U.S. courts opening their doors to ATCA suits against non-state ac-
tors, including U.S. companies operating abroad.73 Here, conven-
tional critics of the ATCA may even under-appreciate the possibility 
of creeping expansion of judicial reach. Developments in interna-
tional law may be advancing the human rights lobby's cause and mak-
ing more difficult critics' arguments that foreign plaintiff suits against 
private defendants are hard to fit within the ATCA framework. An 
emerging view in international law holds that multinational corpora-
tions, and not just governments or individual international criminals, 
have human rights duties. If this view takes hold, suits against a U.S. 
company sufficiently implicated in severe human rights abuses in 
China, or elsewhere, become rather easily recharacterized as actions 
claiming torts under the "law of nations" that is the touchstone of 
ATCA jurisdiction and that courts have characterized as "evolving."74 
71. See the discussion of PRC understandings of U.S. separation of powers Jaw, infra note 211. 
72. See infra note 211; see also supra note 66. 
73. See, e.g., Human Rights, supra note 19, at 470-71; Ramsey, supra note 19. See also Corpo-
rate Liability, supra note 19 (discussing approvingly the expanding reach, and foreseeing trends 
that the critics fear); Murray Hiebert, The Era of Responsibility, FAR E. EcoN. REv., July 11, 
2002, 14-16 (discussing human rights-related risks of multinational corporations dealing with 
rights-abusing regimes); see also infra note 83. The cases have been something of a mixed bag. 
One line-including Kadic v. Karadzic, Doe v. Islamic Salvation Front, Tachiona v. Mugabe, and 
Mushikiwabo v. Barayagazima-has held state-like and state-affiliated entities to be within the 
scope of ATCA and/or TVPA liability. Another line-involving nationally private corporations 
and including Doe v. Unocal, Beanal v. Freeport McMoran, Bigio v. Coca Cola. Carmichael v. 
United Technologies Corp .. and /wanowa v. Ford-has found the courts only rarely willing to 
find corporate actors within the reach of plaintiffs' ATCA claims. See aLw infra notes 146-158 
and accompanying text. 
74. See e.g, Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 881; lama, 22 F. Supp. 2d at 362: liT v. Venacap, 519 F.2d 
1001 (2d Cir. 1975); Kadic, 70 F.3d at 238-40; Steven R. Ratner, Corporations and Human Rights: 
A Theory of Legal Responsibility, lll YALE L.J. 443 (2001 ). 
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On these private defendant issues as well, China-related litigation 
points to a scenario under which U.S. adjudication indeed could pose 
significant foreign policy difficulties. In Bao Ge v. Li Peng,75 the court 
initially allowed the plaintiffs limited discovery in their suit over 
forced prison labor, under inhumane conditions, to manufacture soc-
cer balls with the Adidas logo. By construing the ATCA potentially 
to allow plaintiffs to go after a private corporate actor allegedly entan-
gled with the host government, the court threatened to throw a spot-
light on human rights-related matters that the PRC did not want to 
see scrutinized in a U.S. court and that the PRC regarded as matters 
within its domestic discretion. The judicial inquiry into PRC human 
rights violations could have proceeded even if the official PRC de-
fendants were dismissed, so long as Adidas remained as a defendant. 
Moreover, the prospect that Adidas's corporate assets, unlike the Chi-
nese defendants' assets, would likely be available to satisfy a judgment 
gave the plaintiffs and their lawyers tangible incentives to press 
forward. 
The number of Baa Ge-like or other private defendant ATCA cases 
that might arise from the PRC is seemingly huge. By most accounting 
measures, the PRC is the world's second largest recipient of foreign 
direct investment, and by far the largest among states with seriously 
problematic human rights records. An unusually large share of that 
investment takes the form of project investment, rather than passive 
or portfolio investment (such as the purchase of shares in a listed com-
pany-an act which is unlikely to leave the investor open to ATCA 
liability for the company's entanglement in human rights violations 
even on the most expansive reading of the statute). Such project in-
vestment is heavily concentrated in export-oriented joint ventures or 
long-term contracted production with PRC state-owned enterprises, 
some of which are quite directly controlled by government entities 
and many of which operate with support and intervention from the 
state.76 At the same time, reforms to the PRC's penal regime in re-
cent years have subjected corrections officials to vastly greater pres-
sure to generate revenue to pay more of the costs of operating prisons. 
This reportedly has led to increased emphasis on developing prison 
75. 201 F. Supp. 2d 14 (D.D.C. 2000). 
76. On the structures and patterns of foreign direct investment in the PRC, see, e.g., Nicholas 
R. Lardy, The Roles of Foreign Trade and Investment in China's Economic Transformation, 144 
CHINA Q. 1065 (Dec. 1995); Margaret M. Pearson, China's Integration into the International 
Trade and investment Regime, in CHINA JmNs THE WoRLD: PRoGREss AND PRoSPECTS 161-205 
(Elizabeth Economy & Michel Oksenberg eds., 1999); Jerome A. Cohen & John E. Lange, The 
Chinese Legal System: A Primer for Foreign Investors, 17 N.Y.L. ScH. J. IN'r'L & CoMP. L 345 
(1997). 
494 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:473 
production of saleable goods, including those produced by the use of 
the forced labor of mistreated inmates. Some of this production has 
targeted the lucrative and foreign exchange-generating export market 
and fueled the now long-running controversy over prison exports in 
U.S.-China relations.77 
Still, the "threat" implied by the Baa Ge case is easily exaggerated. 
Despite the apparent potential for such cases presented by China's 
foreign investment and trade circumstances, there has been no rash of 
PRC-related prison labor or private defendant cases in U.S. courts, 
and the plaintiffs in Baa Ge were strikingly unsuccessful. The PRC 
official defendants were quickly dismissed. So too was Adidas, upon 
the court's finding that the plaintiffs could not show that Adidas was 
more than the name on the soccer balls (and presumptively the mar-
keter thereof), which was not sufficient for an ATCA claim against the 
company. As this suggests, even in the Chinese context, the type of 
factual circumstances the court found with respect to Adidas, and 
other relatively arms-length or remote relationships between multina-
tional companies and host-country rights abuse, are likely to be more 
common than patterns of deep entanglement and cooperation be-
tween multinational corporations and regimes in human rights-violat-
ing ventures, such as were at issue in the suits over Unocal's 
operations in Burma or Freeport-McMoran's venture in Indonesia-
suits in which the plaintiffs notably did not prevail and in which there 
seemed in the end to be little effective judicial inclination to treat cor-
porations as primary bearers of international human rights law 
obligations.78 
Finally, critics also have argued that broad permission to bring U.S. 
suits over human rights abuses abroad risks encouraging retaliation in 
the form of other states throwing open their less neutral and fair 
courts to politically motivated, ostensibly human rights-based suits 
against U.S. officials and other U.S. nationals.79 Once again, the Chi-
nese example makes such fears vivid. Many of the necessary elements 
77. See generally HoNGDA HARRY Wu, LAOOAI: THE CHINESE GuLAG 119-45 (1992): U.S. 
Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (2001): China Report, supra 
note 67, § 6.c., available at http://www.state.gov/gldrllrlslhrrpt/2001/eapi8289.htm (last visited 
Nov. 25, 2002) (concerning forced prison labor and export industries); see also Exec. Order No. 
12,850 (incorporating prison labor issues in conditions for MFN renewal). 
78. Doe v. Unocal Corp., 110 F. Supp. 2d 1294 (C.D. Cal. 2000); Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran 
Inc., 969 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. La. 1997). 
79. Human Rights. supra note 19, at 460-61; see also William Glaberson. Couns in the U.S. 
Become Arbiters of Rights and Wrongs Around the World, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 2001, at A8 
(describing the potential perils of foreign states opening their courts to suits against U.S. defend-
ants for human rights violations); cf Ramsey, supra note 19, at 373-74 (describing the "explo-
sion" of foreign criticism that greeted the Helms-Burton law's extension of "extraterritorial" 
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seem to be present in official China's shrill language about U.S. culpa-
bility and responsibility for atrocities in Kosovo and bombing deaths 
in Iraq, in the universally noted and widely criticized dominance of 
the Chinese Communist Party and Party-dominated government insti-
tutions over the PRC's courts, in Beijing's well-established taste for 
splashy political show trials of the politically disfavored (including 
Mao Zedong's widow, Jiang Qing, and other radicals who lost in the 
post-Mao succession struggle, pro-democracy dissidents, and religious 
dissenters) and in the prosecution of U.S. nationals and U.S. residents 
detained in China on dubious espionage charges and other similar 
grounds.80 
Official China also has shown some taste for transnational litigation 
to address apparent violations of Chinese nationals' human rights 
when committed by foreign hands or in alien lands. Thus, a PRC 
court accepted and Chinese state media reported favorably a suit by 
"victims'' of Falun Gong against the group's U.S.-resident leader Li 
Hongzhi.81 And PRC official commentaries and Party-affiliated Non-
Governmental Organizations (NGOs) have been supportive of repa-
rations suits brought (primarily in Japan) against Japan by Chinese 
nationals who were subjected to sex slavery and other human rights 
violations by Japanese forces during World War II.82 Also, the PRC 
did not launch any of its trademark tirades against a highly similar sex 
slavery suit brought in U.S. courts under the ATCA, or against an-
other ATCA suit brought on behalf of Chinese (and other) laborers 
reach for U.S. courts); Universal Jurisdiclion, supra note 19, at 344 (involving Helms-Burton law 
and also extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust law). 
80. See generally, U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices For 
2001; China Report. supra note 67. § 1 (describing politicization of criminal justice in China); 
Margaret Woo, Law and Discretion in Contemporary Chinese Courts, in THE LIMITS IN THE 
RuLE OF LAw IN CH!t'A 163-96 (Karen G. Turner et al. eds .. 20CO) (describing the role of Party 
officials in courts and criminal justice); DAVID BoNA VIA, VERDICT IN PEKING: THE TRIAL OF 
THE GANG OF FouR (1984) (describing the trial of Jiang Qing and others): CARLos WrNG-HUNG 
LO. CHP'>lA'S LEGAL AWAKENING 271-323 (1995) (describing trials of political dissidents); see 
also supra note 69 (describing PRC reaction to bombing incidents and PRC's detention of U.S. 
citizens or residents on spy charges). 
8l. See, e.g., Fa/ungong Leader Ready to Go Home, AGEC\ICE FR. PRESSE, July 27. 1999. availa-
ble at LEX!s NEXIS. 
82. WWII Sex Slaves File Class Action Suit Against Japan. XINHUA. Sept. 19, 2000. available at 
LE:XJs NEXJs, (reporting favorably, in official PRC media, on ATCA suit by Chinese nationals in 
United States); Chinese "Comfort Women" File Lawsuit Against Japanese Government, XINHUA, 
Dec. 2, 2001, available at LExts NExrs (reporting favorably, in official PRC media, on suit by 
Chinese nationals in Japanese court, and reporting support for and participation in the suit by 
PRC government/Chinese Communist Party-affiliated NGOs); China-Sex Slaves Demand Apol-
ogy from Japan, CHINA DAILY, Nov. 16, !998, available at LEXIS NEXIS (reporting, in official 
PRC newspaper, that Japan is "being urged not to evade its legal and moral obligations"). 
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for abuses committed by sweatshop owners of various nationalities 
operating in the U.S. territory of Saipan.83 
Here too, however, a closer look at Chinese contexts and behavior 
indicates that worries that an unnarrowed ATCA (or TVPA) will lead 
China to establish mirror-image jurisdiction may be easily overstated. 
Despite the features of China's politics and judicial system that might 
make human rights litigation against U.S. nationals attractive and 
available to the regime, and despite the provocation to retaliation that 
the Tiananmen and Falun Gong suits might seem to provide, the PRC 
has not moved in this direction. The Li Hongzhi, sex slavery and Sai-
pan litigations do little to portend the kind of retaliation that the 
ATCA's critics predict. Most of these suits do not share one or more 
of the characteristics that critics have in mind when they raise fears of 
retaliation. Although a U.S. resident, Li Hongzhi remained a PRC 
national and the harms of which plaintiffs complained were suffered 
primarily and arguably exclusively in China. The same is true for 
many of the Chinese plaintiffs suing over Japanese wartime atrocities. 
The sex slavery suits that have received strong official PRC endorse-
ment were brought in the home courts of the abusers, not China (or a 
third country). The Saipan labor rights suit focused on abuses occur-
ring in the territory of the forum state. Even the official tolerance of 
or acquiescence in the sex slavery and sweatshop ATCA suits brought 
by Chinese plaintiffs in U.S. courts do not clearly suggest a likelihood 
of retaliation. Rather, they have shown Beijing's inclination to forego 
seemingly promising opportunities-indeed, ones in which its aban-
donment of its own citizens' apparent interests would stifle charges of 
opportunism and hypocrisy-to denounce the United States' ATCA 
or assert a right to respond in kind to American legal overreaching. 
The possible reasons for the PRC's failure to resort to retaliation 
are numerous and instructive. Perhaps Beijing is deterred by the 
harm such moves would produce in U.S.-PRC relations. Perhaps the 
more thoughtful and savvy policy-makers in the PRC understand that 
the world would react to such litigation with skepticism and criticism 
far stronger than it has directed at U.S. human rights litigation; and 
that reaction would make such a PRC undertaking predictably futile 
as a diplomatic gambit. 
Perhaps PRC leaders simply recognize the severe tension between 
endorsing expansive Chinese litigation (even litigation they could con-
trol) over human rights abuses abroad and positions that have long 
83. See generally Seth Faison, Stretching Federal Labor Law Far Into South Pacific, N.Y. 
TrMES, Feb. 20, 1999, at A3; Nancy Cleeland, Firms Settle Saipan Factory Workers Suit, L.A. 
TrMES, Sept. 27, 2002, § 3. at 1. 
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been at the core of Beijing's approach to international law and inter-
national relations more broadly. A Chinese ATCA, or its criminal law 
equivalent, would be difficult indeed to square with the PRC's vener-
able insistence on strong notions of sovereignty, the impermissibility 
of the courts or government of one country judging or otherwise inter-
fering in the internal affairs of another state, and other related posi-
tions. Such PRC positions may not be lightly cast aside because they 
have been, among other things, the foundation of official Chinese cri-
tiques of U.S. human rights litigation, other aspects of American ap-
proaches to international law, Washington's human rights diplomacy, 
and United States policy on Taiwan, global security and a host of 
other issues.84 Even in foreign policy and even for the PRC, hypocrisy 
may have its limits, albeit perhaps only prudential ones. To the extent 
that embracing transparently incoherent positions on purportedly fun-
damental principles has its costs, the gains from retaliatory litigation 
may not be worth Beijing's trying to reap. 
Chinese domestic politics too may impose practical constraints on 
hypocrisy that reduce the urge to allow or encourage retaliatory litiga-
tion. The PRC regime may recognize that the modest imagined ad-
vantages of subjecting U.S. defendants to human rights suits or 
prosecution in China's courts could be easily outweighed by the risks 
of increased pressure or protests pushing for opening those same 
courts to Chinese nationals seeking justice and compensation for 
human rights abuses committed by their own government, much as 
American law subjects the U.S. government and its officials to liability 
for the kind of activity covered by the ATCA and TVPA.85 Certainly, 
the temerity of Chinese Falun Gong adherents and relatives of 
Tiananmen victims who sought to sue China's President and Commu-
nist Party Chief Jiang Zemin in Chinese courts-despite the predict-
able result of their cases being rejected and themselves risking jail-
84. See generally Wang Tieya, International Law in China: Historical and Contemporary Per-
spectives, in ACADEMIE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL, RECUEIL DES CoURS (collected COUrses of 
the Hague Academy) 203-357 (1990); Jacques deLisle, China's Approach to International Law: A 
Historical Perspective, 94 AM. Soc'y INT'L L. PRoc. 267 (2000). 
85. Examples of the suits that can be brought against the United States or U.S. officials in-
clude Bivens actions (constitutional claims on the model of Bivens v. Six Unknown Named 
Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971)), civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983, suits under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2674-2680, and ATCA suits against 
U.S. defendants. But cf Gibney, supra note 19 (criticizing the "hypocrisy" of U.S. courts being 
open to suits for human rights abuses by foreign defendants but not by U.S. government defend-
ants); Goldsmith, supra note 47. 
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provides good reason for China's rulers not to discount this 
possibility. 86 
The foregoing factors that may explain restraint in China are likely 
to be operative elsewhere, although to different degrees and in differ-
ent proportions depending on, for example, the independence of such 
nations' judiciaries, the friendliness of their relations with the United 
States, and the like. Small rogue states might not be thus restrained 
and one can imagine that China too might conceivably succumb to 
temptation under some circumstances. But it seems fair to question 
whether the relatively marginal adjustments entailed in restricting or 
even gutting the ATCA or TVPA would affect such regimes' decisions 
about whether to subject U.S. defendants to human rights litigation in 
their courts. 
In sum, a consideration of Chinese cases and circumstances indi-
cates that the general types of concerns raised by critics of expansive 
permission for foreign human rights litigation in the United States 
have a real foundation, including (and in some cases especially) in the 
context of particularly important and contentious bilateral relation-
ships. On the other hand, an examination of the Chinese examples 
also argues strongly against accepting dire claims made in the abstract 
and in categorical form about what is ultimately an empirical question 
of how much of a threat ATCA and TVPA litigation poses to the con-
duct of U.S. foreign policy. 
III. CLosiNG THE DooR BuT NoT THE WINDows 
If one credits the plausible dangers to U.S. foreign relations de-
scribed above, or even if one accepts that the most Cassandra-like 
critics are right about the harms threatened by broad readings of al-
legedly eccentric U.S. statutes permitting civil suits by foreign nation-
als for human rights abuses committed abroad, it is far from clear that 
narrow restrictions, or indeed the repeal, of the ATCA (or the foreign 
plaintiff portion of the TVPA) will do much to protect against the 
harms to foreign policy that critics identify as compelling reasons for 
limiting or eliminating such suits. Following such a prescription could 
well be a matter of trying to keep out flies by closing the door while 
leaving the windows open. Even without the ATCA or a TVPA that 
86. See, e.g., 2 Falun Gong Members Held After Lawsuit Against Jiang Zemin, AsiAN PoL. 
NEws, Oct. 16, 2000, available at LEX!s NEX!s; Victim's Families and Dissidents Applaud Court 
Decision on Li Peng, AGENCE FR. PRESSE, Sept. 22, 2000; see also Li Peng Lawsuit Background 
Page, available at http://iso.hrichina.org:8151/old_site/Lawsuit.htm (last visited Nov. 25, 2002) 
(describing Tiananmen victims' repeated petitions to PRC prosecutors and other government 
authorities to prosecute or investigate the wrongs committed at Tiananmen). 
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allows alien plaintiffs to bring suit, U.S. courts would still have ample 
occasion to address many of the same substantive questions and pass 
judgment on many of the same or similar foreign government actions 
committed abroad. The core dangers that critics identify would still 
exist: judicial derangement of foreign policy through civil litigation in 
U.S. courts concerning foreign human rights abuses. Cases involving 
China help, in several ways, to show why this is so. 
United States federal courts regularly decide cases that seek review 
of some of the thousands of proceedings in which the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (INS) grants or denies asylum to PRC nation-
als who claim to have suffered persecution for their religious or politi-
cal beliefs or opposition or subjection to PRC policies and practices 
that raise serious human rights issues. In many of these cases, U.S. 
courts have had to decide whether the Chinese government and its 
agents engaged in a variety of practices that violated international 
human rights law. The United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status 
of Refugees, which U.S. asylum law closely tracks, sets forth grounds 
for asylum that cover and in many respects extend well beyond the 
severe human rights violations typically alleged in ATCA and TVPA 
claims brought by Chinese nationals.87 The substance of typical PRC 
asylum-seekers' claims-torture, beating, imprisonment, systematic 
harassment, and the like for political dissent, opposition or resistance 
to coercive family planning, or practicing banned or unauthorized re-
ligion-are surely matters with respect to which U.S. court decisions 
can be every bit as offensive to the PRC regime and troubling to U.S.-
PRC relations as would be a pro-plaintiff determination of the facts 
alleged in the Ttananmen, prison labor and Falun Gong suits, and 
other imaginable ATCA and TVPA cases. 
Indeed, the facts alleged in the two types of cases are often quite 
similar. A considerable number of Chinese asylum-seekers whose 
cases have made it beyond the administrative adjudication of the im-
migration and asylum process and into Article III courts have won 
judicial acceptance of their claims about human rights abuses occur-
ring in China in connection with the post-Tiananmen crackdown or 
the suppression of Falun Gong. In Li Wu Lin v. /NS,88 for example, 
the court ordered asylum for an applicant whom PRC authorities had 
prosecuted ostensibly for destruction of property, but in reality for his 
peaceful political expression through active participation in the stu-
87. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 424 (1987) (stating that relevant portions of 
U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Act were designed to follow United Nations Protocol Re-
lating to the Status of Refugees). 
88. 238 F.3d 239 (3d Cir. 2001). 
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dent pro-democracy movement in 1989. In reaching this conclusion, 
the court explicitly relied upon media reports that "the Chinese gov-
ernment used tanks and machine guns to kill at least 700 and possibly 
more nonviolent protesters" in Beijing. The court added that "the 
Chinese government has frequently used force and coercion to sup-
press political dissent" and quoted liberally from an opinion in a Chi-
nese political asylum case that invoked "[t]he memory of Hitler's 
atrocities" as an analogy for the PRC's repressive practices.89 
Similarly, in Zheng Quan Li v. INS,90 the court directed withholding 
of deportation and consideration of asylum for a Tiananmen Square 
demonstrator after finding that "China continues to persecute low-
level political dissidents" and thus give them objectively reasonable 
reasons to fear persecution on account of their political opinions. Fac-
ing similar claims from another asylum seeker, another court followed 
much the same path in Guo Wei Xu v. INS.91 In Gao v. Ashcroft,"¥2 the 
court fully credited the immigration judge's determination that "an 
association with the Falun Gong could subject one to a well-founded 
fear of persecution" in China, and described State Department and 
Amnesty International reports of "beatings and deaths of practition-
ers in detention who refused to recant" and "torture[ ]" of adherents 
(including the administration of "electric shocks") as the "back-drop" 
of the case. (The remand directed more careful consideration of 
whether the asylum-seeker's account of her own experiences was 
credible.) 
Court judgments and the language of judicial opinions have been no 
less likely to roil Sino-American relations in asylum cases involving 
other forms of claimed human rights abuses. For example, in Fengchu 
Chang v. /NS,93 the court directed withholding of deportation and 
consideration of asylum for a Chinese national who failed to report 
the plans of members of his delegation to "defect" to the United 
States and who thereby violated China's State Security Law and came 
to face the likely prospect of persecution on account of his political 
opinion opposing that law and its requirements if he were returned to 
China. The Chang court credited State Department and NGO reports 
that the State Security Law's aim "appears to be to frighten dissidents 
into halting their activities,'" that China "has not yet 'significantly 
mitigated continuing repression of political dissent'" and that Chinese 
89. Id. at 244-45 (quoting Chang v. INS, 119 F.3d 1055, 1060-61 (3d Cir. 1997)). 
90. No. 97-71175, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 21542, at *6 (9th Cir. Sept. 3, 1999). 
91. No. 99-71288, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 19845 (9th Cir. Aug. 30, 2001). 
92. 299 F.3d 266, 268-70 (3d Cir. 2002). 
93. 119 F.3d 1055, 1064-66 (3d Cir. 1997). 
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authorities continued to manifest "intolerance of dissent" and to pro-
vide "inadequa[te] legal safeguards for freedom of speech"-a pattern 
of government behavior that was in violation of international human 
rights norms. 
Population control cases provide some particularly arresting judicial 
statements. Although noting that an applicant could not establish eli-
gibility for asylum "merely by pointing to some right guaranteed in 
the United States Constitution that is not guaranteed in his or her 
respective country," the court in Guo Chun Di v. Carrol/94 reasoned 
that, "[b]ecause the right to make procreational decisions is a basic 
liberty protected under the Bill of Rights, it is, in that respect, analo-
gous to other fundamental rights that are well-recognized as legiti-
mate grounds for asylum." As the court saw it, the political 
persecution the applicant faced for his opposition to PRC population 
control policies and practices placed him among the "huddled masses 
yearning to be free." Similarly, in Ke Zhen Zhao v. U.S. Department 
of Justice,95 the court reversed an unfavorable ruling from the Board 
of Immigration Appeals (BIA) after quoting extensively from-and 
at least implicitly adopting-accounts in congressional hearings and 
media sources supporting a conclusion that "China has repeatedly 
cracked down on those who resist forced sterilization [which is among 
the 'most gruesome human rights violations',] ... treat[ing] them as 
political and ideological criminals" and ''inflict[ing] harsh punishment 
on refugees who are returned, such as beatings and being sent to 
forced labor camps and being sentenced to prison." 
As such judicial statements suggest, courts in China-related asylum 
cases often have shown an inclination to follow State Department 
analyses and a reluctance to intrude on the conduct of foreign policy. 
Many asylum and refugee decisions explicitly defer to or seek State 
Department findings. 96 In the same vein, the court in Gao empha-
sized the special deference generally due the executive branch in im-
migration matters, while the court in Guo Chun Di was careful to 
stress that it would not "transform the asylum process ... into a vehi-
cle for foreign policy debates in the courts" or base its decision on the 
94. Di v. Carroll, 842 F. Supp. 858, 872-74 (E.D. Va. 1994). 
95. Zhao v. United States Dep't of Justice, 265 F.3d 83, 92 (2d Cir. 2001). 
96. See, e.g., Chen v. INS, 195 F.3d 198, 201-02 (4th Cir. 1999) (deferring to State Department 
report concerning prevalent, non-coercive means for enforcing PRC population control policy); 
Doe v. INS, 867 F.2d 285 (6th Cir. 1989) (remanding for request to State Department to offer 
opinion on asylum applicant's claims); cf Chang, 119 F.3d at 1064 (stating that "[w]e do not 
suggest that relief should be granted solely on [the basis of watchdog organization] reports, par-
ticularly where they conflict with findings of the Department of State"). 
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court's "implicit approval or disapproval of U.S. foreign policy and the 
actions of other nations. "97 
If the courts uniformly so restrained themselves, these cases might 
be of relatively little concern for those worried about the adverse im-
pact on U.S. foreign policy of adjudication of foreign human rights 
claims. The courts, after all, would add little to what the political 
branches had already put in place. Still, for the harshest critics of a 
substantial judicial role, there is something disquieting even in a 
merely untimely or unauthorized repetition of established political 
branch positions-especially in litigation that may occur years after 
the quoted and endorsed executive statements were made and have, 
perhaps, grown stale. And there is something potentially disruptive 
also in the additional U.S. sovereign act and potential insult to a for-
eign sovereign that inheres in a court decision that tracks clearly still-
operative executive statements. 
Moreover, as the cases described above also illustrate, courts in asy-
lum cases have not always limited themselves to following executive 
branch-or, for that matter, congressional-determinations concern-
ing human rights conditions in China that implicate issues in U.S. pol-
icy toward the PRC. Some courts handling Chinese immigration cases 
have looked to and embraced sources that have gone well beyond 
State Department reports in critical tone and substance, and some-
times have rejected State Department views. Thus, the court in 
Kezhen Zhao reached its conclusions partly on the basis of reports in 
the New York Times and the Congressional Record. And the court in 
Li Wu Lin relied upon reports in "every major American newspaper" 
and admonished the immigration adjudicators not to treat the State 
Department's reports as "Holy Writ."98 
Acts in the United States can provide another ground for U.S. judi-
cial examination of foreign human rights practices and policies in suits 
that could go forward in the absence of the ATCA or TVPA. Another 
type of Falun Gong case is illustrative. On April 4, 2002, fifty-one 
plaintiffs filed suit against the PRC's State Security Ministry and Pub-
lic Security Ministry and the state-owned China Central Television. 
Alleging a pattern of physical assault, intimidation, harassment, death 
threats, and vandalism against Falun Gong followers in the United 
States, the plaintiffs brought their claims under the Racketeer Influ-
enced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) and civil rights stat-
97. Di, 842 F. Supp. at 873; see also Gao, 299 F.3d at 93. 
98. Li Wu Lin, 238 F.3d at 242, 245, 248; see also Chang, 119 F.3d at 1064 (relying on a Human 
Rights Watch report that, though found consistent with the Department of State position, was 
more critical and detailed). 
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utes,99 following a path that other cases had suggested could be 
promising.l00 In comments to the media, the plaintiffs' spokesmen left 
little doubt that they expected-not implausibly-that the resolution 
of their claims would involve an inquiry into PRC officials' actions 
and practices in China that, on the plaintiffs' view of the case, were an 
integral part of the defendants' overarching efforts to suppress Falun 
Gong at home and abroad. As supporters and spokesmen put it, PRC 
President Jiang Zemin "is directly responsible for the entire thing that 
has happened to Falun Gong" and the actions over which plaintiffs 
sued were "the extension of that persecution to U.S. soil."101 Though 
hung on the hook of activities in the United States, the explicit goal of 
the suit was to "make clear to Jiang Zemin that his persecution poli-
cies have no place in the modern world," to "expose the brutality, 
intolerance and shortsightedness of the PRC," and to make clear that 
the United States "will not tolerate this blatant persecution, wherever 
it occurs."102 
Ordinary tort law-sometimes in conjunction with the Foreign Sov-
ereign Immunities Act-can offer still another avenue to U.S. judicial 
judgment concerning human rights abuses that occur at least in part 
abroad. While no such litigation appears to have gone forward with 
respect to PRC actions, a well-known case provided an occasion for 
addressing human rights-related actions attributable to another Chi-
nese dictatorship-pre-reform era Taiwan-and committed in part by 
one of its senior officials. In Liu v. Republic of China,103 the plaintiff's 
decedent was a naturalized U.S. citizen who was assassinated in Cali-
fornia by Taiwanese gangsters whom a high-ranking officer in the Re-
public of China's Military Intelligence Bureau had dispatched to 
punish and put an end to the decedent's articles critical of the Repub-
99. See, e.g., Falungong Followers Sue China for Systematic Criminal Harassment in U.S., 
AoENCE FR. PRESSE, Apf. 4, 2002; Chinese Communist Regime Sued in Landmark Lawsuit Over 
Illegal Activities in the United States, Apr. 3, 2002, available at http:llwww.faluninfo.net (last vis-
ited Nov. 25, 2002); Groundbreaking Civil Lawsuit Accuses PRC Ministries of Criminal Conduct 
Across United States, Apr. 5, 2002, at http://flgjustice.org/presskit/PlaintiffStatement.htm (last 
visited Nov. 25, 2002). 
100. Wiwa, 2002 WL 319887, at *20-27 (allowing RICO claims to proceed against corporate 
and individual defendants whose actions in conjunction with Nigerian state actors satisfied 
ATCA and TVPA state action requirements); Republic of the Philippines v. Marcos, 862 F.2d 
1355 (9th Cir. 1988); Does I v. GAP, Inc., 2002 WL 1000068 (D.N.Mar.I. May 10, 2002). But cf 
Doe v. Unocal Corp., 110 F. Supp. 2d at 1310-11 (finding insufficient allegation of acts in United 
States to satisfy RICO requirements). 
101. Falungong Followers Sue China for Systematic Criminal Harassment in U.S., supra note 
99. 
102. Chinese Communist Regime Sued in Landmark Lawsuit Over Illegal Activities in the 
United States, supra note 99. 
103. Liu v. Republic of China, 892 F.2d 1419 (9th Cir. 1989). 
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lie of China's president. Finding that the claim could go forward 
under the tortious activity exception in the Foreign Sovereign Immu-
nities Act, the court necessarily inquired into and reached judgments 
about the political motives behind the slaying and the state's and state 
agents' responsibility for it. The allegations in the Falun Gong RICO 
case in many respects parallel the pattern of the Liu case, suggesting 
that the possibly PRC-attributable actions at issue in that case, or sim-
ilar activities, could ground a viable tort suit and, with it, an extensive 
U.S. judicial probing of human rights violations by PRC officials in 
China. 
The Bao Ge prison labor case suggests another route to a similar 
end through the FSIA's other principal exception to the immunity of 
foreign sovereigns (and their instrumentalities and some of their offi-
cials) from jurisdiction: the commercial activity exception. Not sur-
prisingly in the wake of the Supreme Court decision in Nelson v. Saudi 
Arabia,104 the plaintiffs in Bao Ge failed in their suit against the Chi-
nese state defendants because the court concluded that the operations 
of the Chinese judicial and prison systems which formed the foci of 
the complaint were not commercial activities, and that any related 
commercial activities either lacked the requisite direct effect in the 
United States or the necessary nexus to the injuries plaintiffs claimed 
to have suffered in the labor camps.105 But the broader type of activ-
ity at issue in Bao Ge-forced prison labor producing goods for ex-
port-could come within the commercial activity exception to permit 
suit against a closely state-linked PRC defendant. It need take noth-
ing more than someone bringing the easily imaginable case against a 
PRC state-owned enterprise with ties to export-producing prison fac-
tories that were more active and entangling than the minimal and at-
tenuated connections the Bao Ge court found to exist for Adidas. 
Acts against U.S. citizens also could provide the basis for suits that 
could address the same behavior as some TVPA and ATCA claims 
and could go forward even if the TVPA and ATCA do not open the 
door to similar claims by foreign nationals. Many of the plaintiffs in 
the Falun Gong RICO litigation are U.S. nationals. Four of the plain-
tiffs in the Falun Gong-related ATCA and TVPA suit against Beijing's 
mayor are among the many Western sympathizers who have gone to 
China, mostly to Beijing, to protest or resist the PRC government's 
crackdown and have sometimes suffered detention or physical mis-
treatment, perhaps amounting to torture, at the hands of police au-
104. 507 u.s. 349 (1993). 
105. Baa Ge, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 23-25; see also Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349 (1993). 
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thorities.106 A foreign national was also among the plaintiffs in the 
Falun Gong class action suit against Ding Guangen. 107 Given that 
U.S. citizens have been among the foreigners traveling to China to 
support Falun Gong, it likely has been only a matter of luck that an 
American national has not brought a TVPA claim based on similar 
factual allegations. 
The prospect of such suits is not limited to the context of Falun 
Gong or other mass movements. People's Republic of China authori-
ties in recent years have detained individual U.S. citizens-notably 
ones who once were PRC nationals-for actions that the PRC claimed 
were crimes against state security but that the detainees asserted were 
innocent acts that became the object of politically motivated arbitrary 
detention and threats to prosecute and imprison. While Li Shaomin 
(a Hong Kong-based political scientist who was held for allegedly 
passing PRC secrets to Taiwan), Harry Hongda Wu (an alumnus of 
the PRC's prison labor camps who returned to China to gather infor-
mation for his exposes of Chinese prison conditions), and their peers 
have not sued, it does not require a great stretch of the imagination to 
envision that a more badly treated or a more litigious victim might 
turn, with some hope of success, to the TVPA or other possible routes 
to redress in U.S. courts.1os 
Judicial review of actions by the U.S. executive branch can also 
yield court judgments or assessments concerning human rights condi-
tions and government behavior in China. This category includes the 
asylum and refugee cases that have produced so many critical findings 
and conclusions about patterns of human rights abuse in China, for 
such cases involve judicial review of the INS/Board of Immigration 
Appeals administrative adjudication of petitioners' claims. The cate-
gory also includes some more exotic cases. 
In Wang Zong Xiao v. Reno,1o9 the court enjoined the United States 
from deporting a PRC national who had been a witness for the United 
States in a drug prosecution. The court did so in part because of the 
prosecutors' entanglement, to an extent that constituted a violation of 
constitutional substantive due process rights, with actions by PRC of-
ficials that had harmed or would harm the witness. In reaching that 
conclusion, the court found that the witness had been beaten and tor-
tured by PRC police who interrogated him to elicit the information 
106. See supra note 99. 
107. See supra note 15. 
108. See supra note 69 (concerning the Li Shaomin and Harry Wu incidents). 
109. Wang Zong Xiao v. Reno, 837 F. Supp. 1506 (XD. Cal. 1993), affd, 81 F.3d 808 (9th Cir. 
1996). 
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with respect to which American prosecutors sought his testimony, and 
the witness likely would face execution due to his testimony if he were 
to be returned to China. On the former issue, the court determined 
(partly on the basis of State Department Human Rights Reports) that 
Wang's treatment in the PRC police system-his detention without 
trial, his forced confessions, and the physical and mental torture ex-
erted upon his person-is consistent with the treatment of many 
other prisoners in the PRC. That the PRC police interrogated Wang 
many times, and forced him to give multiple confessions, is consis-
tent with the purposes of the PRC's criminal justice system to force 
the individual suspected of wrongdoing to cooperate with the 
state.110 
On the fate that would await Wang in China, the court wrote 
(largely on the basis of expert witnesses' reports), 
Today, Wang faces the harshest possible treatment in the event he is 
returned to the PRC. Wang's present predicament stems from the 
vastly different natures of the two systems in which he was asked to 
provide testimony. The PRC's criminal justice system exists to vin-
dicate the State's interests, not to guarantee the individual's rights. 
That criminal justice system is not concerned with questions of 
"guilt" or "innocence" .... Oncehe entered the United States and 
took the witness stand, Wang was faced with an irreconcilable 
choice of serving the PRC police officials and providing false testi-
mony, or honoring his oath as a witness and testifying truthfully .... 
The most likely scenario is that the Chinese government will exe-
cute Wang. 111 
In Lui Kin-Hong v. United States,112 the district court granted a writ 
of habeas corpus to prevent the United States from extraditing the 
petitioner to Hong Kong to face bribery charges that would not be 
prosecuted until after Hong Kong's reversion to China on July 1, 1997. 
The court held that the United States misinterpreted the U.S.-Hong 
Kong extradition treaty by construing it to permit handing over de-
fendants for a post-retrocession trial. Although the court's judgment 
was later reversed and although the court purported "not [to be] mak-
ing a judgment about the judicial or penal systems of China or [post-
reversion Hong Kong]," 113 its opinion lastingly set forth the kind of 
assessment of a foreign government's human rights record that wor-
ries those who fear judicial derangement of American foreign policy. 
The court wrote that "it strains credulity to suggest that the Senate 
would approve" an extradition treaty with so narrow a definition of 
110. ld at 1514. 
111. ld. at 1541·42. 
112. 957 F. Supp. 1280 (D. Mass. 1997), rev'tl, 110 F.3d 103 (1st Cir. 1997). 
113. ld. at 1289. 
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political offenses for which the relator cannot be tried if the relator 
could "only be tried by the Chinese judiciary," which is part of a "to-
talitarian" regime, which routinely hands out harsh sentences with no 
due process, and which, "signs" indicate, the Hong Kong judicial sys-
tem "will appear very much like" in the near future. 114 Even en route 
to reversal of the district court's judgment and dismissal of the claim 
(in an opinion stressing the need for deference to the executive 
branch, and the courts' limited role in cases presenting this type of 
foreign affairs question), the appellate court too restated at some 
length the assertions that had been the focus of the lower court opin-
ion and the basis of its holding: that the PRC was the sort of human-
rights-violating regime with which the Senate could not be presumed 
to have been willing to enter into an extradition treaty when it voted 
for the treaty between the United States and British-ruled colonial 
Hong Kong. 115 
In addition to the constitutional rights and treaty provisions at issue 
in Wang Zong Xiao and Lui Kin-Hong, statutes also provide potential 
triggers for judicial review (of executive actions) that can lead to court 
pronouncements on human rights conditions and abuses in China. Al-
though China's accession to the WTO and the United States' related 
granting of permanent normal trading relations has removed from the 
U.S. Code the most celebrated instance of human rights conditionality 
for China, the federal statute books remain littered with provisions 
that direct the President or his subordinates to withhold support or 
benefits from countries-and sometimes categories or lists of coun-
tries clearly or explicitly including the PRC-that have especially poor 
human rights records. Such statutes often authorize the President or 
other executive branch officials to waive the restrictions upon making 
certain findings, typically that a waiver is in the U.S. national interest. 
Others direct the President or his subordinates not to expend or not to 
support multilateral institutions' expenditure of funds where the bene-
ficiary country does not meet human rights conditions.116 
In principle, such executive determinations that statutory conditions 
have or have not been met, or executive interpretations of the statu-
tory standards, can be subject to judicial review. 
Such provisions have become the focus of litigation in which Chi-
nese human rights practices have come under criticism and scrutiny. 
114. !d. at 1289 n.17. 
115. United States v. Lui Kin-Hong, 110 F.3d 103 (1st Cir. 1997). 
116. See infra note 144. 
508 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:473 
For example, in Smith v. Atwood,117 the plaintiffs challenged an ad-
ministrative interpretation of a law banning the use of U.S. interna-
tional family planning assistance funds for coerced abortions or 
sterilizations. The plaintiffs, who included PRC nationals who 
claimed to be opposed to and subject to Chinese coercive family plan-
ning policies, claimed that the interpretation could unlawfully permit 
funding for U.N. Fund for Population Activities programs that oper-
ate in China and were therefore ineligible for U.S. funding because 
China has "a coercive family planning policy that mandates abortion 
for pregnant women and/or sterilization for parents who have ex-
ceeded the maximum allowable number of children." 118 
In practice, of course, such suits rarely get very far. The political 
question doctrine, administrative law doctrines requiring deference to 
agency interpretations or to decisions statutorily committed to the dis-
cretion of an agency, and other broad separation-of-powers-related 
principles generally can be expected to dispose of these cases at an 
early stage and at the district court level. But, as the grounds for dis-
missing the congressman-plaintiff's claim in Smith v. Atwood suggest, 
and as the asylum and refugee cases that involve successful challenges 
to INS/BIA interpretations and applications of the immigration stat-
utes also illustrate, it is not certain that such doctrines will always as-
sure a quick end to the litigation and the opportunity it presents for 
courts to weigh in on China's human rights conditions and practices. 
Moreover, the repertoire of statutes that open the door to judicial 
consideration of Chinese human rights practices could expand signifi-
cantly, principally through the mechanism of human rights-based reg-
ulation of non-state actors' foreign business activities. While the Bao 
Ge case focused on Adidas, the principal corporate targets. of those 
concerned about the PRC's human rights policies and practices have 
included U.S. multinationals as well. Given the magnitude of human 
rights problems in China and the PRC's status as one of the principal 
destinations for outward-bound U.S. foreign direct investment (a con-
siderable portion of the products of which are exported to the United 
States), operations in China inevitably loom large in any strategy of 
addressing human rights issues by targeting U.S. corporations' over-
seas activities. 
117. Smith v. Atwood, 845 F. Supp. 911 (D.D.C. 1994) (challenging Agency for International 
Development interpretation of statute requiring U.S. not to fund U.N. family planning program 
where such funds might be used for coerced abortion or sterilization; dismissed for lack of stand-
ing by Chinese plaintiffs, and for mootness with respect to Congressman's claim in light of ad-
ministrator's assurance that challenged interpretation would not be applied). 
ll!'i. /d. at 912. 
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Government procurement statutes are one option. Although there 
are formidable political obstacles to adopting a federal law targeting 
or including companies that do business with the Chinese state and its 
instrumentalities or enterprises, and although such a law might well be 
incompatible with the WTO regime for government procurement, 
there is no doubt that a federal law barring government purchases 
from companies with specified connections to China would survive 
constitutional scrutiny, even after the Massachusetts Burma Law 
case.119 Corporate code of conduct legislation offers another route. 
Activists focused primarily or partly on China have, at times, seemed 
to have reasonable prospects for success in pushing Congress to enact 
legislation that would proscribe or punish investment in operations 
that violate labor rights standards or investment in countries with un-
acceptable human rights records.120 
In many respects, such laws addressing U.S. government commer-
cial behavior or directly or indirectly regulating U.S. companies' be-
havior would be less controversial than the TVPA or ATCA, 
particularly with the recently emerging extension of the ATCA to cor-
porate or other private defendants. In addressing private actors, these 
laws would draw upon mundane international legal principles of na-
tionality-based jurisdiction, rather than the more controversial inter-
national legal principles of universality-based jurisdiction that critics 
attack as the problematic underpinnings of the ATCA and the foreign 
plaintiff provisions in the TVPA. United States laws, including, for 
example, antitrust statutes and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 
rather unexceptionally extend to American natural and legal persons 
acting abroad. Notably, China would have an especially hard time ob-
jecting to such nationality-based legislation given the PRC Criminal 
Code's expansive assertion of nationality-based jurisdiction over of-
119. Crosby v. Nan Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000) (striking down state statute 
on supremacy clause grounds). 
120. See, e.g., Diane F. Orentlicher & Timothy A. Gelatt, Public Law, Private Actors: The 
Impact of Human Rights on Business Investors in China, 14 Nw.J. INT'L L. & Bus. 66 (1993): cf 
Murray Hiebert & John McBeth, U.S. Foreign Policy: Calculating Human Rights, FAR E. EcoN. 
REv., Aug. 15,2002, at 18-19 (discussing Department of State's possible opposition to suit under 
existing laws against Exxon Mobil arising from human rights violations in Indonesia); Hiebert, 
supra note 73 (concerning legal exposure of multinational corporations in connection with for-
eign human rights abuses). Notably, one of the reasons that efforts to pass code of human rights-
related overseas corporate conduct legislation have fallen short is that some of the major corpo-
rate actors have adopted company policies that mimic what a statute might contain, although 
corporate and broader political opposition to such legislation probably has been a more impor-
tant factor in defeating legislative proposals. 
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fenses committed abroad by PRC citizens-and even by foreigners as 
well.I21 
Depending on their particular structure, such laws might avoid the 
impediments to judicial review that have characterized the human 
rights provisions in aid statutes, trade statutes, and the like. Because 
they deal less purely and unambiguously with foreign affairs, they 
might be less likely to employ the very broad language and wide 
grants of presidential waiver authority that are typical in existing 
human rights legislation, and courts might be less likely to interpret 
the language such statutes would contain with the high level of defer-
ence often accorded to political branch interpretations of foreign af-
fairs-related statutes. Moreover, such statutes might provide for 
enforcement through administrative adjudication, or through prosecu-
tion in court, or they might even countenance private rights of action. 
Each such additional enforcement mechanism (and especially those 
that permit complainant-initiated proceedings), of course, opens the 
door wider to litigation and expands the occasions when courts could 
examine and pass judgment on human rights conditions and policies 
abroad. 
Finally, court decisions under any constitutional or statutory rubric 
are only a part of the problem if the principal relevant evil is the der-
angement of the conduct of U.S. foreign policy. Even if the ATCA, 
the TVPA, and other existing or imaginable statutes did not give 
courts the authority to decide cases involving foreign human rights 
violations, that would not eliminate some of the greatest threats to a 
constitutional value that critics frequently invoke and seem to see as 
especially important or persuasive: the need for the nation to speak 
with one voice in foreign policy and principally through the voice of 
the executive branch.122 Congressional-executive dissonance, far 
more than the intervention of the courts (or the states, for that mat-
ter), has been the source of actions and statements that have produced 
multiple inconsistent positions in U.S. policy toward the PRC. Near-
121. See ZHONGHUA RENMIN GoNGHEouo XINGFA (Criminal Law of the People's Republic 
of China), arts. 6-8 (1997) (asserting jurisdiction over crimes committed by PRC nationals 
abroad, and over crimes committed by foreigners abroad, provided that such crimes committed 
by foreigners are punishable under the law of the place where they are committed); see also 
ZHoNGHUA RENMIN GoNGHEGUo XINoFA (Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China), 
arts. 4-7 (1979). 
122. See supra note 63; see also United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 
(1936) (asserting the need for a single voice of the nation in foreign affairs and concluding that 
the executive's role in foreign affairs is dominant); Curtis A. Bradley, Breard, Our Dualist Con-
stitution and the Internationalist Conception, 51 STAN. L. REv. 529, 555 (1999) (discussing argu-
ments for a unitary voice in foreign affairs and for excepting foreign affairs from ordinary 
separation of powers strictures). 
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overrides of President George Bush's waivers of MFN-denial to China 
after the Tiananmen Incident, congressional findings and commentary 
focusing on Taiwan's superior record of human rights and democracy 
as a basis for mandating continued or enhanced U.S. engagement in 
what Beijing considers an internal affair, protracted tussles between 
the political branches over funding for international family planning 
programs, House or Senate hearings and discussions of resolutions 
censuring China for repressing Falun Gong or other dissident groups 
and for other human rights abuses, and legislative directives to the 
State Department to prepare annual human rights reports on the PRC 
(including special sections on Hong Kong and Tibet) have been far 
more productive of discordant and disruptive voices in the United 
States' handling of Sino-American relations than anything that has 
happened in American courts. 
Of course, critics of expansive judicial involvement in matters of 
foreign affairs generally (although not always) argue that Congress 
properly has a far larger role to play in foreign policy than do the 
courts. If such a congressional role is seen as fully legitimate, how-
ever, then the "one voice" argument against judicial involvement rings 
a bit hollow or disingenuous, given Congress's large role (amply illus-
trated in the case of U.S.-PRC relations) in generating a "second 
voice." If, on the other hand, critics of the judicial role adopt a far 
more executive-dominant understanding of the allocation of foreign 
affairs power, then their argument concerning the deranging effects of 
foreign human rights litigation has more force, but is far more radical 
and less widely accepted in its conception of how the constitution as-
signs authority over foreign affairs. 
With all these many non-ATCA and non-TVPA routes to the dan-
gers that critics associate with expansive litigation in U.S. courts con-
cerning foreign human rights abuses, the critics' general 
"derangement" argument loses much of its force unless there is some-
thing especially pernicious about the particular mechanism of civil 
suits by foreign plaintiffs against official defendants. Several offered 
or imaginable arguments assert that there might be, but they are slen-
der or untested reeds on which to lean the rather weighty argument 
that ATCA and TVPA suits pose a special and significant threat to the 
exercise of foreign affairs powers and the conduct of U.S. foreign 
policy. 
Why might there be an especially serious impact on U.S. foreign 
relations when a U.S. court reaches a judgment that awards a foreign 
national damages from his own government or its relatively high-rank-
ing officials for harms committed at home? It is almost certainly not 
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about the award of money per se.123 For the highest-profile state de-
fendants, even large damage awards, if paid, would not have a ruinous 
financial impact. More to the point, ATCA and TVPA plaintiffs al-
most never collect awards. It is widely acknowledged that their pri-
mary motivation has been moral vindication, not the pursuit of 
unrealistic hopes of material redress.124 That, certainly, has been the 
articulated position of the plaintiffs in the major China ATCA and 
TVPA suits. The Tiananmen plaintiffs stressed their desire to promote 
democracy and human rights in China as well as justice for the victims 
of the massacre, while the plaintiffs in the Falun Gong cases and their 
supporters emphasized that their aim was not to recover damages but 
rather to draw attention to Falun Gong's plight and to bring interna-
tional pressure to bear against the Chinese regime's repressive 
behavior.125 
Further, as the Falun Gong RICO suit and the FSIA suit in Liu v. 
Republic of China illustrate, non-ATCA and non-TVPA channels can 
offer access to U.S. courts to secure substantial damage awards 
against foreign governments and official actors for human rights 
abuses that occur in part outside the United States or that have roots 
outside the United States. Also, as the issues at stake in the U.N. 
Fund for Population Activities case remind us, U.S. courts could play 
a role in imposing far greater financial consequences on China (and 
123. The suggestion that it is about the money seems to resonate with the law governing relief 
in civil suits against the U.S. government, with respect to which injunctive relief generally has 
been seen as less troubling than money damages. The reasons offered for this, however, have 
failed to convince many commentators in a vast federal courts literature on the subject, and 
some of the reasons offered do not translate well to the context of suits against foreign 
sovereigns. 
124. For this argument, see Anne-Marie Slaughter & David Bosco, Plaintiff's Diplomacy, 
FoREIGN AFF., Sept.-Oct. 2000, at 102; see also Ellen L. Lutz, The Marcos Human Rights Litiga-
tion: Can Justice Be Achieved in U.S. Courts for Abuses that Occurred Abroad?. 14 B.C. THIRD 
WoRLD L.J. 43, 45-46 (1994) (discussing In re Marcos human rights litigation as a possible op-
portunity for restoring justice to a damaged society and achieving public acknowledgement of 
unsavory truths). But cf Fitzpatrick. supra note 19. at 501-03 (arguing that it is unclear whether 
the class of plaintiffs in the In re Marcos litigation were primarily "ideologically motivated" or 
were more like ordinary tort victims seeking compensation for harms suffered). 
125. See, e.g., Why We Are Suing L.i Peng, at http:lliso.hrichina.orgliso/article.adp?article_id"' 
411&category_id"'79 (last visited Dec. 12, 2001); Human Rights in China, Global Justice; The Li 
Peng Suit and Universal Jurisdiction Over Violations of Rights, supra note 1; Pomfret, supra note 
11; Rowse, supra note 11; cf Chinese Communist Regime Sued in Landmark Lawsuit, supra note 
99 (concerning RICO suit); Groundbreaking Civil Lawsuit Accuses PRC Ministries of Criminal 
Conduct Across United States, Apr. 5, 2002, at http:llflgjustice.orglpresskit/PiaintiffState-
ment.htm (last visited Nov. 25, 2002). Even critics backhandedly acknowledge the limited impor-
tance to plaintiffs of damage awards; they argue that the prospect of the ATCA's or TVPA's 
extension to corporate defendants threatens only to increase suits above a baseline that is al-
ready problematic in the absence of the prospects for recovery that the new class of private and 
possibly forum-country national defendants would provide. 
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other states) for human rights misbehavior through denials of aid (or 
trade) privileges than through the typical ATCA or TVPA suit. 
It might be the case that ATCA or foreign plaintiff TVPA suits pose 
special threats to U.S. foreign relations because foreign sovereigns 
take qualitatively greater offense when U.S. courts entertain litigation 
by the foreign state's own nationals. This is perhaps plausible, but this 
argument notably has received little endorsement in PRC attacks on 
China-related human rights litigation in U.S. courts. The thrust of 
Beijing's complaints has focused less on the identity of the plaintiffs 
and more on the site of the alleged harms and, especially, the identity 
of the defendants. And if the problematic feature is U.S. courts riding 
to the rescue of the offended state's own nationals, then here too Chi-
nese human rights cases remind us that non-ATCA and non-TVPA 
pathways are available, including immigration and asylum review and, 
on some fact patterns, FSIA suits, RICO suits, and even constitutional 
or administrative law review of U.S. government actions that have 
been deployed, with mixed success, to address problematic PRC 
human rights practices. 
As the official PRC comments on the Li Peng/Tiananmen and Falun 
Gong suits suggest, ATCA or TVPA suits might be especially likely to 
roil U.S. international relations because they formally name foreign 
governments or officials-and especially high-ranking officials-as 
defendants in U.S. litigation. It might be that foreign governments 
and leaders find suits of this type more unacceptable than similar judi-
cial judgments and statements about their behavior issued in cases in 
which they are not formally defendants. But it is not clear that is so, 
or why it should be so. 
It is far from obvious that judicial statements about human rights 
abuses abroad made in ATCA or TVPA judgments would be more 
offensive to foreign officials and regimes than would similar state-
ments in other litigation contexts, including perhaps even in dicta. In-
deed, compared to the focus on the experiences of individual plaintiffs 
that characterizes many ATCA and TVPA cases, some non-ATCA, 
non-TVPA suits provide occasions for more sweeping judgments 
about policies and practices and overall human rights conditions in 
foreign states, as in the inquiries plaintiffs' complaints have sought, for 
example, in the Falun Gong RICO case, the administrative law chal-
lenge to U.S. funding for the United Nations Population Fund's China 
operations, and even some of the Chinese asylum cases. Certainly, of-
ficial PRC outrage over U.S. courts assessing Chinese human rights 
conditions has not seemed deeply sensitive to the specifics of the juris-
dictional statute that brought the case to court or the specific nature 
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of the relief that the court might grant. Also, whether ATCA and 
foreign plaintiff TVPA suits are especially likely to name top officials 
or major organs of government is, of course, an empirical claim of 
uncertain validity. The handful of such cases involving China have 
targeted high officials or major Party and government institutions. 
But generally, ATCA and TVPA cases have been brought against 
lower~ranking functionaries as well as top leaders, individuals who 
had fallen from power and office, and private actors. Human rights~ 
focused suits, including China~related ones, brought under other laws, 
including RICO and the FSIA, have also included high~ranking offi-
cials, major government organs, and the state itself as defendants. 
It might be true that ATCA and TVPA cases are especially danger-
ous to the conduct of U.S. foreign policy because they are beyond the 
control of the executive branch-and thus are more likely to go in 
directions that diverge from U.S. foreign policy preferences than are 
other possible routes to the courthouse to obtain an examination of 
foreign human rights practices.126 The large number of potential Chi-
nese plaintiffs and the pattern of cases in which Chinese plaintiffs 
have pursued political agendas of exposing and condemning on-going 
regime behavior (rather than only seeking redress of past wrongs or 
securing individual justice, which characterizes at least some ATCA 
and TVPA claims and garden-variety tort claims) suggest that this 
concern is plausible. Still, this argument, too, is less convincing than it 
first appears. One problem is that the executive branch does not in 
fact control many non-ATCA and non-TVPA suits, such as those that 
victims of abuses in China have brought under the FSIA, RICO, the 
asylum and refugee acts, or as challenges to extradition or deporta-
tion. As we will see, it is far from clear that the executive branch lacks 
means to cut off many problematic ATCA and TVPA cases, or that 
the executive branch being "in control" of litigation does more good 
than harm if the goal is to prevent the claimed evils of complicating 
U.S. foreign relations or, more specifically, "forcing" the executive 
branch to "speak" when it might prefer to remain silent. 
Finally, it is surely true that broad ATCA and foreign-plaintiff 
TVPA jurisdiction do produce additional cases in which courts can 
address human rights abuses abroad and thus cause foreign policy 
problems for the political branches. Some suits that can be pursued 
successfully under those statutes will prove impossible to bring, easier 
to dismiss, harder to win, or insufficiently attractive to file under other 
126. Human Rights, supra note 19, at 460; International Human Rights Litigation, supra note 
19, at 2181-82; Universal Jurisdiction, supra note 19, at 346-47. 
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laws. Whether the impact is marginal or substantial is, again, an em-
pirical question. But even small quantitative reductions of acknowl-
edged evils are, of course, good unless outweighed by countervailing 
concerns. 
IV. KEEPING FLIES FROM CoMING IN: ORDINARY ScREENS 
WILL Do 
If one finds convincing the plausible claims that ATCA and alien-
plaintiff TVPA suits pose particular dangers to the conduct of U.S. 
foreign policy, or if one is more generally concerned about the impli-
cations of U.S. courts weighing in on potentially sensitive and impor-
tant foreign relations issues in cases that include human rights 
questions, it does not necessarily follow that there are significant 
problems requiring urgent measures. Shutting the door or closing the 
windows is not necessary to keep out flies if the screens already in 
place are adequate for the job. Several such existing legal "screens" 
very well may be sufficient to keep out many of the cases that might 
significantly endanger the conduct of foreign policy.127 Here too, ac-
tual and easily imaginable Chinese cases make clear the more general 
point. 
A. Rights Violation "Thresholds'' 
Even on the most generous plausible readings of the A TCA and 
TVPA, these statutes permit recovery only for especially serious inter-
national human rights violations. Critics' comments can conjure up a 
vision of U.S. courts issuing awards for violations of any right on the 
long, possibly growing and often controversial list of "international 
human rights"-a list that, by some lights at least, includes rights to 
education, social security and perhaps economic development, electo-
ral democracy and a clean environment. But very few of the rights on 
the maximalist list or even in the major U.N. Covenants fall within the 
core handful of rights the violation of which is a necessary element in 
an ATCA or TVPA claim. While U.S. courts have indicated that the 
scope of behavior covered by the ATCA can expand with evolving 
international human rights law,128 U.S. courts generally have recog-
127. For an overview of some of these screens, see Walker, supra note 19 at 551-59; Fitzpat-
rick, supra note 19; BETH STEPHENS & MICHAEL RATNER, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 
LITIGATION IN U.S. CouRTS (1996); see also Ralph G. Steinhardt, Book Review, 91 AM. J. INT'L. 
L. 755, 755 (1997) (noting that there had been only thirty ATCA cases filed and decided from 
1980 to 1997); 28 U.S.C.A. § 1350 (1948) (providing notes concerning the few dozen cases de-
cided under the ATCA and TVPA). 
128. See supra note 74. 
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nized only a handful of severe abuses as the "torts in violation of the 
law of nations" that the ATCA requires.129 Thus, courts have held 
that genocidal campaigns of murder and rape,130 war crimes and 
crimes against humanity,131 torture,132 extrajudicial or summary exe-
cution,133 slave labor and slave-trading,134 "disappearing,"135 and pro-
tracted and arbitrary detention136 suffice, but state or state-sanctioned 
expropriation of property,137 repression of free speech,138 "cultural" 
genocide,139 environmental destruction,140 and civil rights violations141 
do not pass muster under the ATCA. Courts have been divided on 
129. 28 u.s.c. § 1350 (1948). 
130. Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 241, 241-42 (2d Cir. 1995) (including campaign of murder, 
rape, forced impregnation, and other forms of torture designed to destroy religious and ethnic 
groups as violation of international norm proscribing genocide); Mehinovic v. Vuckovic, 198 F. 
Supp. 2d 1332, 1354 (N.D. Ga. 2002) (genocide). 
131. Kadic, 70 F.3d at 242-43; Mehinovic, 198 F. Supp. 2d at 1350-54 (involving war crimes and 
crimes against humanity). 
132. Kadic, 70 F.3d at 242-43; Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 884-85 (2d Cir. 1980); In re 
Estate of Marcos, Human Rights Litig., 25 F.3d 1467, 1472-74 (9th Cir. 1994); Doe v. Unocal 
Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880, 890 (C.D. Cal. 1997); Nat'! Coalition Gov't of the Union of Burma v. 
Unocal Inc., 176 F.R.D. 329, 345 (C.D. Cal. 1997); Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531, 
1541 (N.D. Cal. 1987); Mehinovic, 198 F. Supp. 2d at 1345-46; Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 
162, 184-89 (D. Mass. 1995); Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 2002 WL 319887, at *6-7 
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2002); Tachiona v. Mugabe, 216 F. Supp. 2d 262 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). 
133. Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531, 1541 (N.D. Cal. 1987); Xunca.x, 886 F. Supp. at 
184-89: Wiwa, 2002 WL 319887, at *6-7; Estate of Cabello v. Frenandez-Larios, 157 F. Supp. 2d 
1345, 1357-60 (S.D. Fla. 2001). 
134. Kadic, 70 F.3d at 240; Doe v. Unocal, 110 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1302-08 (C.D. Cal. 2000); In 
re World War II Era Japanese Forced Labor Litig., 164 F. Supp. 2d 1160 (N.D. Cal. 2001); Iwa-
nowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d 424, 439-41 (D.N.J. 1999). 
135. In re Estate of Marcos, 25 F.3d at 1470-71; Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 694 F. Supp. 707 (N.D. 
Cal. 1988); Xuncax, 886 F. Supp. at 184-89; cf. Alvarez-Machain, 266 F.3d 1045, 1049-52 (9th Cir. 
2001) (holding state-sponsored kidnapping in territory of another state violates law of nations). 
136. In re Estate of Marcos, 25 F.3d at 1474-75; Xunca.x, 886 F. Supp. at 184-89; Hilao v. Estate 
of Marcos, 103 F.3d 789 (9th Cir. 1996); Forti, 694 F. Supp. at 709; Mehinovic, 198 F. Supp. 2d at 
1348-50; Wiwa, 2002 WL 319887, at *6-7; cf. Alvarez-Machain, 266 F.3d at 1052 (finding deten-
tion that is arbitrary is sufficient for ATCA even if not protracted). 
137. Jafari v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 539 F. Supp. 209 (N.D. Ill. 1982); cf. Dreyfus v. Von 
Finck, 534 F.2d 24,30-31 (2d Cir. 1976); liT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975); 
Nat' I Coalition Gov't of the Union of Burma, 176 F.R.D. at 345; Bigio v. Coca Cola Co., 239 F.3d 
440, 447-48 (2d Cir. 2001). 
138. Guinto v. Marcos, 654 F. Supp. 276, 280 (S.D. Cal. 1986). But see Wiwa, 2002 WL 
319887. at *11-12. 
139. Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 362, 372-73 (E.D. La. 1997), affd, 197 
F.3d 161, 166-68 (5th Cir. 1999). 
140. Id. at 382-83; Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp .. 2002 WL 1587224, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. July 16, 
2002). But cf. Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 1994 WL 142006, at *6-7 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 11, 1994) (sug-
gesting that serious environmental harms might be within ATCA's scope). 
141. Mendonca v. Tidewater, Inc., 159 F. Supp. 2d 299 (E.D. La. 2001); cf Bigio, 239 F.3d at 
447-48 (concerning religious discrimination). But see supra note 61. 
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whether "cruel, degrading and inhuman treatment" is enough, though 
most increasingly have found such claims adequate.142 
The torture and extrajudicial killing cognizable under the TVPA are 
not casual or slight violations of human rights. In terms of the serious-
ness and core human rights-violating character of the underlying be-
havior, the TVPA has not opened the door to a wider range of suits 
than the ATCA has. Official "torture" is behavior the prohibition of 
which, on most contemporary accounts, ranks among the very small 
handful of international legal norms classed as jus cogens, or nondero-
gable, peremptory norms.143 
These relatively narrow readings of the range of human rights viola-
tions that will sustain ATCA or TVPA claims are fully in keeping with 
other U.S. statutory grounds for suit that explicitly and specifically 
look to international human rights standards. Indeed, the latter are 
seemingly more expansive in their general references to "human 
rights," although they too hardly open the floodgates to a wide range 
of civil suits or other legal consequences from foreign state or state-
linked activity that arguably violates international human rights stan-
dards. Where the term "human rights" is used in aid and trade stat-
utes and elsewhere in the U.S. Code, it typically includes only a 
narrow range of "internationally recognized human rights," generally 
construed to mean only civil and political rights, and the statutes typi-
cally address only gross or consistent violations of them. The clearly 
human rights-rooted provisions of the asylum and refugee laws simi-
larly encompass only persecution-that is, significant mistreatment-
142. See Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844, 847 (11th Cir. 1996); Forti, 694 F. Supp. at 712; 
Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531, 1543 (N.D. Cal. 1987); Estate of Cabello v. Fernandez-
Larios, 157 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 1360-61 (S.D. Fla. 2001); Mehinovic, 198 F. Supp. 2d at 1347-49; 
Xuncax, 886 F. Supp. at 187-89; Wiwa 2002 WL 319887 at *7-9. 
Seemingly less severe harms that have been found to be torts under the law of nations ade-
quate for ATCA jurisdiction, are of a special type. Paradigmatically, they involve matters within 
the scope of what international law defines as protective jurisdiction. The interests covered by 
this category are peculiar and distinctive interests of the international system in maintaining the 
mechanisms for conducting relations among states. The classic example is diplomatic immunity. 
See Von Dardel v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 623 F. Supp. 246, 256-58 (D.D.C. 1985). 
While trampling upon the interests protected by such elements of the law of nations may not 
cause the grisly injuries that core human rights violations do, those interests have long received 
special protection under international law (and thus can be rather unexceptionally included as 
''international torts" under the ATCA as an exercise of the permission international law grants 
states to enact laws to protect those interests). 
143. The definition of "torture" in the TVPA is "severe pain or suffering ... whether physical 
or mental" that is intentionally inflicted to extract information or confessions, intimidate or co-
erce, effectuate discrimination, or impose punishment other than that incident to lawful sanc-
tions. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note (1993 & Supp. 2000). While such language perhaps could be 
construed expansively to reach a wider range of human rights violations, it has not been and 
critics of the A TCA have not claimed that courts have done so. 
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that violates a short list of civil and political rights, including those 
related to political opinion, religious belief, or membership in a dis-
tinct social group.144 
Simply, not every bit of foreign government or government-linked 
nastiness will do, and the Chinese cases filed so far suggest that even 
this relatively new group of plaintiffs (or their counsel) amply under-
stands that one cannot expect to get very far absent claims of crimes 
against humanity, torture, extrajudicial and politically motivated kill-
ing or protracted detention in inhumane conditions, systematic and 
brutal infringements of basic freedoms, near-slave labor, and the like. 
As we have seen, the claims in the major China-related human rights 
litigation-including the Tiananmen, Falun Gong, Chinese prison fac-
tories, and Chinese political asylum cases-consistently have included 
core allegations of this character concerning the behavior of the re-
gime and its agents in China. The same can be said about the ATCA 
or TVPA claims that one can imagine being brought by the non-U.S. 
nationals subjected to detention and interrogation in the PRC for es-
pionage or other political crimes.145 So, too, with potential ATCA 
claims, modeled on Unocal or Beanal, that might be brought against 
multinational corporations in connection with their China operations. 
Tellingly, a suit that ostensibly focuses on allegations of less serious 
harms-primarily harassment and intimidation-suffered by Falun 
Gong followers in the United States has relied not on the ATCA but 
144. For examples conditioning U.S. trade and aid on a beneficiary state's not engaging in a 
consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights, see, e.g., 7 
U.S.C. § 1733(j)(l) (1993 & Supp. 2002) (subsidized agricultural exports); 12 U.S.C. § 635(b)(6) 
(D) (1993 & Supp. 2002) (export-import bank loans); 22 U.S.C. § 262(d) (1993 & Supp. 2002) 
(United States voting in international financial institutions, including those of the World Bank 
Group): see also 22 U.S.C. § 2432 (1993 & Supp. 2002) (conditioning most favored nation/normal 
trading relations status for non-market economy countries on non-violation of right to 
tion; also provides key statutory underpinning for broader human rights conditionality for MFNI 
PNTR status of China): see discussion of President Bill Clinton's 1993 Executive Order, supra 
note 68, at 1217; 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101 et seq. (asylum and refugee statutes); see also RESTATEMENT 
(THfRD) OF THE fOREIG"' RELATIO"'S LAW OF THE UNITED STATES§§ 701-702 (1987) (diSCUSS· 
ing international human rights law in U.S. law). 
145. While Wu and Li were both U.S. citizens and thus could not have brought ATCA or 
foreign-plaintiff lVPA claims, other similar cases have involved people who had not shed their 
PRC citizenship in favor of U.S. citizenship. Examples include Gao Zhan, a U.S. green card-
holder whom PRC authorities claimed had collaborated with Li Shaomin and Song Yongyi, a 
U.S. university-based librarian in the final stages of the U.S. naturalization process whom Chi-
nese authorities held for allegedly possessing and seeking to take back to the U.S. documents 
that contained "'state secrets" -a broad category that includes many "internal" documents rou-
tinely collected by U.S. research libraries and documents in wide circulation inside China. Jypi-
cally, those who have retained PRC nationality are indeed subjected to harsher treatment by 
public security authorities than are those with U.S. (or other foreign, especially Western) citizen-
ship. See supra note 69. 
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upon RICO and civil rights statutes and the legal avenues they pro-
vide for linking such transgressions to the claimed more severe and 
brutal violations of human rights in the campaign against Falun Gong 
in the PRC.146 
B. State Action 
The inability to establish a sufficiently close connection between ei-
ther the actor committing the shocking and egregious behavior and 
the state or state actors, or between the state's severely human rights-
violating behavior and non-state defendants scuttles a good many 
ATCA or TVPA claims. A state action or, at least, a close and exten-
sive state-entanglement test stems from the ATCA's requirement that 
the tort be "in violation of the law of nations," which courts have con-
strued as referring primarily to rules and norms with a state behavior-
regulating character and which some courts have held explicitly to en-
tail a "color of law" requirement for all but a very few exceptional and 
exceptionally serious types of human rights violations,147 and the 
TVPA's requirement that the defendant have acted "under actual or 
apparent authority, or color of law, of a[] foreign nation."148 
In terms of the nexus between the party that commits the bad acts 
and the state or state actors, abuses committed by government offi-
cials and functionaries present relatively easy cases, even if the acts 
violated local laws.149 In addition, actions undertaken by a dominant 
political party acting ''in tandem" with and at the ''direction" of the 
President and top military officials satisfy the ATCA and TVPA re-
quirements150 for suits against top officials. So, too, do atrocities di-
rected by the leader of an entity that had uncertain and disputed 
status as a state and acted in concert with another undisputed state,151 
146. 11Ie reliance on RICO rather than the ATCA cannot be attributed to the inability to find 
non-U.S. national plaintiffs. Ibe pattern of harassment of Falun Gong followers and activists in 
the United States that the plaintiffs allege likely has not been so discriminating as to reach only 
U.S. citizens. 
147. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1993 & Supp. 2002). See, e.g., Dreyfus v. Von Finck, 534 F.2d 24 (2d 
Cir. 1976) (stating that the ATCA provision refers primarily to laws regulating state behavior); 
In re Estate of Marcos, 978 F.2d at 501-02 (suggesting a "color of state authority" requirement); 
Kadic, 70 F.3d at 239-43 (state action/color of law requirement for violations other than geno-
cide, and some war crimes/crimes against humanity); cj Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 791-96 (Edwards, 
J., concurring) (suggesting that non-state actors' liability is doubtful under the ATCA, except 
perhaps for a handful of serious violations such as piracy and perhaps torture). 
148. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2)(a) (1993 & Supp. 2002). 
149. See, e.g., In re Estate of Marcos, Human Rights Litig., 25 F.3d 1467 (9th Cir. 1994); Filar-
tiga, 630 F.2d 876; cf Mehinovic, 198 F. Supp. 2d at 1346-47 (finding police officials' actions in 
official capacity and under official authority sufficient for ATCA and TVPA liability). 
150. Tachiona, 169 F. Supp. 2d at 309-16. 
151. Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 244-46 (2d Cir. 1995). 
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a campaign of killings, torture, and terror directed by the leader of a 
group that was waging a civil war and that perhaps constituted a de 
facto state or de facto government, 152 and torture and massacres com-
mitted by a group that operated in conjunction with a government 
that had a policy of genocide.153 The connection, however, is not close 
enough where a private entity accused of badly mistreating plaintiffs 
only received government investment funds and other payments, gov-
ernment authorization to operate, extensive government-like control 
over activities in the area around its site, and access to military per-
sonnel for security purposes.t54 
In terms of the nexus between non-state defendants and rights-vio-
lating state behavior, a corporation's close cooperation with state au-
thorities who implemented a policy of slave labor and encouraged 
companies to make use of such labor in their activities establishes the 
requisite connection, 155 as does a joint venture between state authori-
ties and a company that cooperate to use slave labor for which the 
company pays the government.156 So, too, do a corporation's (and its 
officer's) paying, arming, and conspiring with military and police au-
thorities to conduct terror campaigns, engage in systematic violence 
and secure false convictions of critics of the corporation's activities,157 
and a local company's enlisting police and judicial authorities to se-
cure the prolonged detention of an alien in order to extort commercial 
concessions from his employer.158 On the other hand, a corporation 
merely benefiting knowingly from the government's use of slave la-
borers or commission of other human rights abuses with the effect of 
facilitating the company's activities does not establish a sufficient 
nexus.159 
Here too, China-related cases suggest the contours and potential 
efficacy of this doctrinal impediment to "foreign" human rights suits. 
152. Doe v. Islamic Salvation Front. 993 F. Supp. 6, 6-9 (D.D.C. 1998). 
153. Mushikiwabo, 1996 WL 164496, at *2 (S.D.N.Y Apr. 9, 1996). 
154. Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, 969 t<·. Supp. 372, 372-82 (E.D. La. 1997). 
155. lwanowa, 67 F. Supp. 2d at 445-46 (corporation as de facto state actor); cf Doe v. Unocal 
Corp., 110 F. Supp. 2d at 1309 (discussing Nazi cases). 
156. Unocal, 963 F. Supp. at 890, 895. 
157. Wiwa, 2002 WL 319887 at *13-15. 
158. Carballo, 978 F. Supp. 1078, 1090-94 (S.D. Fla. 1997). 
159. Unocal, 110 F. Supp. 2d at 1304-10; see also Bigio, 239 F.3d at 448-49 (holding that corpo· 
ration's economic benefit from buying property it knows to have been seized is not enough). But 
cf Nal'l Coalition Gov't of Burma, 176 F.R.D. at 346 (finding that failure to allege corporate 
defendant's conspiracy with government to commit violations of international human rights law 
does not make complaint insufficient where allegations of conspiracy to injure plaintiffs and to 
conceal repression may indicate corporation was a "willful participant in joint actions with the 
State"). 
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Establishing the connection between the human rights-violating ac-
tions in question and state actors would appear to be rarely a problem 
in China, given the PRC's authoritarian, one-party regime that exten-
sively penetrates Chinese society and the Chinese economy. Indeed, 
most of the actions that form the foci of complaints in China-related 
human rights litigation-the treatment of Falun Gong activists, politi-
cal dissidents, or prison laborers-have not raised "state action" 
problems under the ATCA or TVPA. The plaintiffs clearly have 
claimed that the harms at issue have been perpetrated or directed by 
agents or officials of the government or the all-pervasive and politi-
cally dominant Chinese Communist Party. Much the same can be said 
about most of the ATCA or TVPA claims that one can imagine being 
brought by plaintiffs who have suffered punishment for opposing 
China's family planning policies, or who have been subjected to prose-
cution and detention for spying, and so on. 
On the other hand, even in the seemingly auspicious Chinese con-
text, state action problems could and sometimes do arise to limit 
plaintiffs' access to American courts, and this suggests that such barri-
ers might be daunting in cases involving states that lack China's excep-
tional characteristics of a pervasive party and state. For example, 
much of the pattern of behavior-the beatings, harassment, coercion 
to submit to abortions or sterilization, and the like-at issue in cases 
that focus on China's family planning regime is perpetrated by "family 
planning activists" who are not unquestionably state (or ruling party) 
actors and whose actions exceed what Chinese law and policy formally 
permit. As the Bao Ge prison labor case illustrates, linking abuses to 
a particular Chinese state defendant (and especially one that is not 
shielded from suit by some other means such as sovereign immunity) 
can be a formidable task. The Bank of China's role in the foreign 
exchange transactions that were part of the prison labor product ex-
port business was simply not enough to keep the Bank in the case as 
the sole remaining PRC defendant. 
While the Bao Ge case focused on the issue of prison labor in which 
the deep involvement of some state actors is beyond dispute, many of 
the human rights cases related to labor conditions that one could im-
agine arising in China do not. By all accounts, many severe abuses of 
Chinese workers-including conditions that amount to coerced and 
arguably even slave labor (in the sense of employees not being free to 
leave )-occur in private or joint-venture factories. In those contexts, 
the state's role can be extensive, with enterprises owned or controlled 
by local authorities being the Chinese party to a joint venture, with 
state or party officials being the real owners in nominally private ven-
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tures, or with government officials facilitating or corruptly profiting 
from the rights-abusing enterprises' activities. Even on such facts, 
however, the state's role in inflicting the relevant harm is somewhat 
limited, indirect, and informal and thus leaves plaintiffs far from cer-
tain of being able to satisfy the ATCA or TVPA state action require-
ment despite China's unusually state-dominated and state-penetrated 
economic structure. 
As the Bao Ge case and these other conceivable Chinese labor 
cases also illustrate, even in China-related suits, plaintiffs also may 
face insurmountable obstacles in establishing the required nexus be-
tween human rights-violating state behavior and the activities of the 
private defendants who sometimes provide the only viable route to 
the courthouse and, especially, to enforceable judgments. Not surpris-
ingly, given the relatively passive and marginal role that the Bao Ge 
plaintiffs attributed to Adidas, their claims against the sporting goods 
company were dismissed. Given the courts' interpretation of the de-
gree of entanglement necessary to pursue a corporate defendant 
under the ATCA or TVPA, plaintiffs in less exotic imaginable China-
based cases can expect to fare no better. Foreign companies that sur-
pass Adidas in their active involvement with China's prison industries 
still might reasonably expect to escape-and so far have escaped-
U.S. litigation. The same is true for foreign companies in China that 
benefit from and may comply with PRC government demands to facil-
itate (primarily by providing information) suppression of independent 
labor movements or dissident Internet speech-activities that can and 
do lead to their participants' subjection to human rights-violating 
treatment by public security authorities in China. More broadly, the 
Chinese government's policies and incentives, regulatory approvals, 
grants of special privileges and position as co-owner, or even joint-
participant, in foreign-invested ventures in China are not likely to be 
enough to establish the necessary degree of foreign corporate collabo-
ration with the PRC regime's commission of any serious human rights 
abuses that are not directly and intimately related to the enterprises' 
activities. With human rights cases arising from foreign participation 
in China's still heavily state-entangled and state-pervaded economy 
thus likely falling short on this version of the state action requirement 
too, this doctrinal barrier looks rather impressive as a potential check 
to a general category of foreign human rights litigation. 
C. Sovereign Immunity 
Ordinary application of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act can 
bar many human rights claims against foreign states and state enti-
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ties-a class of suits that on some accounts are especially likely to 
offend foreign governments and complicate U.S. foreign policy.160 At 
least since the Supreme Court decided Argentine Republic v. Amerada 
Hess,161 the ATCA has not offered a route around the restrictions that 
the FSIA imposes on jurisdiction over states and their instrumentali-
ties. It has become equally clear that there is no general human rights 
or even jus cogens exception in the ATCA or elsewhere to the immu-
nity conferred under the FSIA.162 Relatively few alien plaintiffs will 
be able to link the human rights abuses they suffered to state defend-
ants' tortious acts in the United States or to commercial activities that 
are carried on in the United States or that have sufficient "direct ef-
fect" in the United States-the two most relevant and common cate-
gories of exceptions to foreign sovereign immunity.163 
A smattering of Chinese cases suggests the potential efficacy of this 
barrier. In most cases, the tortious activity exception will not apply 
because, as the court noted in Bao Ge, "all of the legally significant 
acts giving rise to plaintiffs' claims occurred in China, not the United 
States."164 This is, of course, the case with respect to most of the 
human rights issues that Chinese plaintiffs have sought to raise in 
ATCA and TVPA cases (and that have arisen in U.S.litigation involv-
ing human rights in China more generally). Cases like Liu v. Republic 
of China have yet to arise against PRC defendants, and the fact pat-
tern of torts allegedly committed by PRC agents in the United States 
have been and are likely to remain rare, especially for alien plaintiffs. 
The Falun Gong suit that was filed in 2002 focusing on tortious ac-
tions by PRC agents in the United States indicates that this may be 
changing. But a successful suit of that sort under the FSIA's excep-
tion for torts in the United States might not achieve the plaintiffs' 
stated goal of throwing open to court scrutiny and condemnation se-
vere abuses committed by the PRC at home. Only the relatively mod-
est harms inflicted in the United States would be immediately at issue, 
160. The key provisions of the FSJA are 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330. 1602-161L The TVPA by its terms 
does not provide for suits against foreign states or their instrumentalities, but only against 
"individuals." 
161. 488 U.S. 428. 433-39 (1989); see also Siderman de Blake v. Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 714-
19 (9th Cir. 1992) (finding that violation of jus cogens is a tort in violation of the law of nations, 
but does not confer jurisdiction for suit against foreign sovereign, given FSIA). 
162. See generally Edward D. Re, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Domestic 
Courts, 31 SuFFOLK U. L. REv. 585, 600 (1998); Walker. supra note 19, at 553; International 
Human Rights Litigation. supra note 19, at 2146-58. The possible exception to immunity in such 
circumstances is often cast as an implied waiver of FSIA immunity. 
163. 28 U.S.C. §§ l605(a)(2), (a)(5) (1993 & Supp. 2002). 
164. Bao Ge, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 25. See generally Amerada Hess, 488 U.S. at 433-39 (holding 
tortious acts did not occur in United States and therefore there was no jurisdiction under FSIA). 
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with the plaintiffs having to fight further battles to drag PRC domestic 
behavior into the mix, or for their case to survive at all. The limited 
abuses that plaintiffs claim PRC agents committed in the United 
States might be found to come within the discretionary function ex-
ception, which lifts the exception to sovereign immunity where the 
tortious activity was merely a problematic exercise of discretion or a 
bad policy call (rather than an extreme abuse of human rights that 
clearly lay beyond the scope of political choice or a mere mis-
performance of a ministerial function).165 Moreover, few cases from 
the PRC will come in the handily packaged form of the Liu case, 
wherein the courts of the targeted "sovereign" (the Republic of 
China) made findings that smoothed the path to the judicial inquiry 
that plaintiff needed and wanted the court to undertake into the for-
eign state's and officials' actions at home. The plaintiffs in the U.S.-
activity-based Falun Gong case appear to have recognized these diffi-
culties. Notably, the suit over PRC agents' harassment of Falun Gong 
followers in the United States relied upon RICO, which might allow 
an inquiry into the broader nature and activities of the alleged "enter-
prise," including the PRC state entities that suppress Falun Gong both 
abroad and, far more violently, at home. 
Chinese cases also illustrate and underscore the weakness of the 
commercial activity exception to foreign sovereign immunity. Most of 
the abuses at issue in China cases unambiguously involve activities 
that lack a sufficiently "commercial" nature to establish jurisdiction 
under FSIA standards. Courts have construed the "commercial activ-
ity" exception as excluding situations in which abuse by foreign police 
officials arose from a commercial relationship or furthered a commer-
cial venture,l66 and situations in which the foreign government's 
human rights-violating behavior may have produced substitutes for 
commercial activities. 167 Even if the activity can be shown to be ade-
quately commercial in nature, the requisite "direct effect" in the 
United States very often will be lacking, given that mere economic 
impact in the United States is not enough.168 
165. On the discretionary function exception in the context of foreign human rights litigation, 
see International Human Rights Litigation, supra note 19, at 2154-55. 
166. See Saudi Arabia v. Nelson. 507 U.S. 349, 360 (1993); Unocal, 963 F. Supp. at 887-88 (in 
ATCA and TVPA case). 
167. This is one plausible, if not uncontroversial, interpretation of the activity at issue in the 
Japanese wartime sex slavery/forced labor cases. See, e.g., Hwang Geum Joo v. Japan, 172 F. 
Supp. 2d 52 (D.D.C. 2001); see also supra note 82. 
168. Cf Unocal, 963 F. Supp. at 887-88 (discussing cases ruling that mere economic impact is 
not enough to establish "direct effect" under FSIA, in ATCA!TVPA case). 
2002] FOREIGN RELATIONS 525 
One of the most commercially tinged China-related cases, Bao Ge, 
addressed these matters squarely. The "allegedly unlawful incarcera-
tion and mistreatment of plaintiffs in prison by the Chinese govern-
ment" arose out of "an alleged abuse of China's police power," which 
is a sovereign and not a commercial function. 169 That the soccer balls 
produced by prison labor were exported to the United States was sim-
ply not enough to make the "operation of the Chinese judicial and 
penal systems" into a "commercial activity."170 Moreover, any impact 
of the prison labor abuses in the United States was too attenuated to 
count as "direct." The one Chinese state defendant that might have 
engaged in commercial activities-the Bank of China-was not suffi-
ciently connected (through its involvement in foreign exchange trans-
actions relating to the soccer ball exports) to any rights abuses in 
prison labor carnps.t71 
D. Individual Immunity 
Doctrines conferring immunity on heads of state and other ex-
tremely high-ranking foreign officials may dispose of some foreign 
human rights suits, including some that are particularly likely to pro-
duce friction in U.S. foreign relations. While the construction of the 
FSIA to include state officials within the scope of immune "instru-
mentalities" of a foreign state might offer very broad immunity here, 
it has not done so in practice. Courts generally have limited such im-
munity to official capacity suits (which plaintiffs have generally been 
clever enough to avoid when necessary) or to acts taken within the 
scope of official authority (which courts have been reluctant to inter-
pret as including the severe human rights abuses that are the focus of 
mainstream ATCA and TVPA cases).172 
Of more relevance and promise has been the doctrine of head of 
state immunity, which courts have held to be applicable in ATCA and 
TVPA cases. 173 The contours of this doctrine are contested. It is gen-
169. Baa Ge, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 24. 
170. !d. 
171. ld. at 25. 
172. Chuidian v. Phil. Nat'! Bank, 912 F.2d 1095, 1103 (9th Cir. 1990) (giving FSIA immunity 
for officer acts within official capacity): Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202 (D.C. Cir. 
1985); Chuidian, 912 F.2d at 1106 (giving no FSIA immunity for acts beyond scope of authority); 
In re Estate of Marcos, 978 F.2d at 498 (involving acts of torture by head of state); Xuncax, 886 
F. Supp. at 175-76. See also International Human Rights Litigation, supra note 19, at 2155-56 
(describing courts as divided on the application of FSIA immunity in individual capacity suits 
against foreign officials). 
173. Tachiona v. Mugabe, 169 F. Supp. 2d 259 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (holding head of state immu-
nity is outside of FSIA and unchanged by TVPA and finding immunity for president and foreign 
minister of Zimbabwe in ATCA and TVPA case); Lafontant v. Aristide, 844 F. Supp. 128 
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erally seen as rooted in notions of the inappropriateness of equal 
states exercising judicial authority over one another (and, by exten-
sion, one another's heads of state), and in related notions of interna-
tional comity. While some see it as incorporated without specific 
reference in the FSIA and others see it as a principle of customary 
international law, courts in ATCA and TVPA cases generally have 
deferred to executive branch views on whether the doctrine should 
apply in a particular case, taking as conclusive (or nearly conclusive) 
formal executive determinations that an individual is the head of state 
of a foreign state and showing considerable willingness to follow exec-
utive suggestions of immunity even where they extend to individuals 
who are not clearly recognized heads of state.174 
Once again, these China cases suggest how the doctrine (and its 
possible extensions) might be effective in warding off suits that are 
claimed to pose some of the potentially most serious problems for 
U.S. foreign policy. People's Republic of China plaintiffs in U.S. 
human rights litigation relatively often have named Li Peng, Jiang 
Zemin, and other top-ranking leaders as defendants. Presumably, this 
reflects some combination of the PRC regime's durability, its political 
structure of relatively centralized control, the presence of political and 
policy mandates for many of the abuses giving rise to litigation, and 
Chinese plaintiffs' beliefs that it is legally appropriate or politically 
desirable to hold top level officials formally accountable. Whatever 
the mix of defendant responsibility or plaintiff agendas behind it, this 
pattern suggests that individual immunity doctrine-particularly if the 
U.S. executive branch weighs in to support it or to extend it beyond 
(E.D.N.Y. 1994) (analyzing common law basis of head of state immunity, holding that it survives 
unchanged by the FSIA and TVPA and finding immunity for U.S.-recognized president of Haiti 
in TVPA case). But see Chuidian, 912 F.2d at 1103 (concluding in non-ATCAinon-TVPA case 
that FSIA governs individual immunity, displacing prior common law doctrines). On head of 
state immunity and broader FSIA individual immunity, see International Human Rights Litiga-
tion, supra note 19, at 2165-71 (arguing that courts are divided on whether head of state immu-
nity is included in the FSIA or is a discretionary prerogative of the executive branch and that 
U.S. courts do not accept customary international law of head of state immunity); Harold 
Hongju Koh, Is International Law Really Stale Law?, 111 HARV. L. REv. 1824, 1829 (1998) (as-
serting applicability of customary international law); see also David J. Bederman. Dead Man's 
Hand: Reshuffling Foreign Sovereign Immunities in U.S. Human Rights Litigation, 25 GA. J. 
INT'L & CoMP. L. 255, 258-70, 280-82 (1995-1996); Walker, supra note 19. at 554-58. 
174. See generally Lafontant, 844 F. Supp. 128 (treating as determinative Department of State 
position that defendant was head-of-state and that defendant president should enjoy immunity; 
refusing to inquire into exiled president's lack of possession of actual power of state); Tachiona, 
169 F. Supp. 2d 259 (treating as determinative the Department of State's suggestion of immunity 
for defendant president and defendant foreign minister as part of president's travelling en-
tourage); cf Kadic, 70 F.3d at 248 (suggesting that executive branch support for immunity for 
defendant head of entity of uncertain state status would be dispositive). 
2002] FOREIGN RELATIONS 527 
the formal head of state-can bar many Chinese nationals' human 
rights suits in U.S. courts or leave the plaintiffs unable to go after the 
most important (and sometimes perhaps the only available) 
defendants. 
In some cases, the broadly related, but less esoteric, doctrine of dip-
lomatic immunity can provide an adequate shield for high-ranking of-
ficers and other individual official defendants in ATCA and TVPA 
cases. Here too, China-related cases illustrate and illuminate a 
broader pattern. The PRC objected loudly that some doctrine should 
have protected Li Peng from amenability to the Tiananmen-related 
suit in which he was served when he was in New York as an official 
attendee of a U.N. function. The Chinese complaint was not wholly 
and obviously misplaced, given that U.S. courts have ruled that diplo-
matic immunity does-and does not-apply to foreign leaders visiting 
New York for U.N. activities. Notably, and presumably much to the 
PRC's anger, the disparate outcomes in such cases seem to have cor-
related with the executive branch's support or lack of support for such 
immunity.175 
China cases also suggest how diplomatic immunity might insulate 
individual defendants of lower rank as well. True, the "official" char-
acter of the visits by various Chinese provincial, ministerial, or munici-
pal officials is very unlikely to sustain claims of diplomatic immunity; 
it would stretch the doctrine well beyond its ordinary and rather for-
malistic contours. (Moreover, according to plaintiffs, not all of the 
PRC official defendants served in Falun Gong ATCA or TVPA suits 
were in the United States on official business.) But diplomatic immu-
nity may be available where the targets of human rights litigation in-
dependently enjoy diplomatic status. The possibility is not as far-
fetched as it may seem. The Falun Gong RICO claim, for example, 
alleges that agents based at the PRC embassy and consulates commit-
ted much of the harassment of Falun Gong followers in the U.S. that is 
the basis of the suitP6 
E. Avoiding the Process Server 
The "tag" jurisdiction that plaintiffs have relied upon in ATCA and 
TVPA cases against foreign officials may falter or fade. Particularly as 
175. Mugabe was in New York under conditions very similar to Li Peng. In the Mugabe case, 
the United States supported immunity. See Tachiona, 169 F. Supp. 2d at 297-303 (finding diplo-
matic immunity, deferring to State Department interpretation of relevant treaties and laws); 
Kadic, 70 F.3d at 247-48 (noting Department of State view that defendant's status on visit to the 
United States was such that he enjoyed no immunity). 
176. See supra notes 139, 145. 
528 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW (Vol. 52:473 
visiting foreign officials become more aware of what befell Li Peng 
and Zhao Zhifei in New York, Liu Qi in San Francisco, Zhou 
Youkang in Chicago, and Ding Guangen in Hawaii, they may become 
far more savvy about avoiding effective service of process. Prime de-
fendants may not come at all (or they may devise ways to come as 
accredited diplomats or with promises of protection from the execu-
tive branch). Some of the most high-ranking defendants might be ad-
equately insulated on this score already, as the Tiananmen-related suit 
against Li Peng suggests. The defense asserted, with the initial sup-
port of the U.S. government, that service of process on a U.S. State 
Department employee accompanying Li Peng was insufficient. While 
the court in that case rejected the argument, citing the near-impossi-
bility of serving Li through any other means, it is far from clear that 
such a result can be counted upon, given the conceded irregularity of 
such service or, perhaps, if the executive branch were to weigh in 
more forcefully in favor of the defendant. 177 
F. Acts of State 
The act of state doctrine also has the potential to close off foreign 
human rights suits in U.S. courts. After all, alien plaintiff TVPA, 
ATCA, and other foreign human rights litigation often entails asking 
U.S. courts to pass judgment on actions a foreign sovereign has under-
taken in its own territory-precisely the situation that the act of state 
doctrine addresses. When courts enter into the types of inquiry that 
such cases demand, there often will appear to be substantial risks of 
the evils against which the act of state doctrine is supposed to guard: 
embarrassing or hindering the executive branch's conduct on foreign 
affairs or otherwise producing an adverse impact in the field of foreign 
relations in which the political branches are constitutionally assigned 
preeminent roles. I7s 
True, defendants' efforts to invoke this judicially crafted jus-
ticiability doctrine have not met with much success in ATCA and for-
177. See Court Decision on U Peng Applauded, supra note 64; Li Peng Tiananmen Law Suit 
Could be in Danger, supra note 64; Wong, supra note 1; The Li Peng Lawsuit and Universal 
Jurisdiction over Violations of Rights, supra note 1: Pomfret, supra note 11; see also Tachiona. 169 
F. Supp. 2d at 302-09 (holding that personal inviolability of head of stale and possessor of diplo-
matic immunity did not preclude service of process for suit against political party headed by 
individual enjoying immunity). 
178. See generally Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964); First Nat'! City 
Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759 (1972); Anne-Marie Burley, Law Among Liberal 
States: Liberal Internationalism and the Act of State Doctrine, 92 CoLUM. L. REv. 1907 (1992). 
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eign plaintiff TVPA cases.179 But efforts to invoke the act of state 
doctrine and the concerns it addresses have not uniformly failed in 
foreign human rights cases.l80 Moreover, the many cases in which 
courts have not applied the doctrine have included several not-neces-
sarily-ubiquitous factors that seem to underlie the judicial chilliness 
toward dismissing foreign human rights suits on act of state grounds. 
These cases include: state actors' having engaged in conduct of a type 
that has faced near-universal condemnation (including torture), espe-
cially where the acts violate jus cogens prohibitions against genocide, 
slavery, and the like; 181 state actors' having acted contrary to funda-
mental laws of their own countries and not plausibly in the public in-
terest;182 violations having been committed under a now-defunct 
regime, especially where successors have repudiated their predeces-
sors' actions;183 and the U.S. executive branch having explicitly sup-
ported the litigation or, at least, the political branches having clearly 
condemned the targeted regime and its actions. 184 Simply, and as the 
179. See, e.g., Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 889-90 (expressing doubt about whether state official's 
action violating state's laws and constitution and unratified by the state would constitute act of 
state}; Wiwa. 2002 WL 319887, at *28 (refusing to apply act of state doctrine where challenged 
actions were those of government no longer in power}. Notably, some of the legislative history of 
the TVPA addresses and rejects the idea that the act of state doctrine should apply in TVPA 
cases. SeeS. REP. No. 249 (1991}. 
180. See Guinto v. Marcos, 654 F. Supp. 276,280 (S.D. Cal. 1986) (holding that an inquiry into 
Marcos's acts as president engaging allegedly in a systematic policy of human rights violations 
requires the type of inquiry that the act of state doctrine precludes); see also Tel-Oren. 726 F.2d 
at 798-808 (Bork, J., concurring) (invoking concerns that animate the act of state doctrine in 
construing the ATCA not to create a cause of action); Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 789-90 (Edwards. L 
concurring) (criticizing Bork concurrence for using act of state doctrine concerns to reject con-
struction of ATCA that would allow plaintiff to have a cause of action). 
181. Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531 (N.D. Cal. 1987); Liu, 892. F.2d at 1432-33; 
Kadic, 70 F.3d at 250; Nar'l Coalition Gov 't of Burma, 176 F.R.D. at 349-57; Unocal, 963 F. Supp. 
at 892-95. 
182. Unocal, 963 F. Supp at 892-95 (holding that act of state doctrine generally applies only 
where acts are in the public interest); Nat'! Coalition Gov't of Burma, 176 F.R.D. at 349-57 
(noting that disregard of state's own laws cuts against application of act of state doctrine); Filar-
tiga, 630 F.2d at 889-90 (expressing doubt about whether state official's action violating state's 
laws and constitution and unratified by the state would constitute act of state); Kadic, 70 F.3d at 
250 (finding that acts taken in violation of nation's fundamental law unlikely to come within act 
of state doctrine). 
183. Wiwa, 2002 WL 319887, at *28 (refusing to apply act of state doctrine where challenged 
actions were those of government no longer in power); Bodner v. Banque Paribas, 114 F. Supp. 
2d 117, 130-31 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (holding that subsequent French regime's repudiation of Vichy 
government and its actions meant act of state doctrine would not be applied); cf. Kadic, 70 F.3d 
at 250 (finding that acts wholly unratified by government unlikely to qualify as acts of state): 
Bigio, 239 F.3d at 452-53 (current regime had repudiated acts by prior regime that are focus of 
complaint); Jota v. Texaco. 157 F.Jd 153, 156-58 (2d Cir. 1998). 
184. Unocal, 963 F. Supp. at 892-95 (finding that act of state doctrine does not apply where 
coordinate branches have condemned the actions in question); Nat'/ Coalition Gov't of Burma, 
176 F.R.D. at 349-57 (holding that act of state doctrine not applied where Department of State 
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classic early act of state cases suggested, high levels of international 
consensus on relevant legal principles, and support or lack of opposi-
tion from the U.S. executive branch and the target state's government 
will do a great deal to remove concerns that allowing a foreign human 
rights case to go forward will lead to a problematic lack of judicial 
deference to any foreign sovereign acts to which deference is due ac-
cording to the concerns animating the act of state doctrine. 
China cases suggest that the factors weighing against the act of state 
doctrine's application may not be as pervasive in ATCA, TVPA, and 
similar cases as might be supposed. The concerns that typically have 
supported non-application of the doctrine are not strongly present in 
many China-related cases. Obviously, the PRC regime that has been 
the target of human rights litigation in U.S. courts is still in power. 
Moreover, the regime is strikingly unrepentant with respect to the ac-
tions that have been the foci of human rights suits in the United 
States. Chinese authorities assert that the suppression of Falun Gong 
and the Tiananmen democracy movement were proper measures 
taken by the state to maintain order, security, and stability. As this 
suggests (and with the exception of some of the means for implement-
ing population control policies that have been at issue in asylum-re-
lated proceedings), most of the Chinese state actions at issue in U.S. 
human rights litigation have been defended by PRC authorities as ac-
tions in the public interest and consistent with state laws. The PRC 
has claimed that the self-described victims of human rights abuses in 
the regime's repression of political dissent and Falun Gong have been 
prosecuted and punished consistent with China's criminal laws. Also, 
the PRC regards mandatory prison labor as a part of lawful punish-
ment for crimes and other offenses. Thus, the defunct regime, repudi-
ated actions and violation-of-local-law arguments against applying the 
act of state doctrine ill fit cases from China (and many other states ). 185 
letter to court and other statements to court condemn the targeted regime and its actions); cf 
Kadic, 70 F.3d at 250 (suggesting that if executive had favored application of act of state doc-
trine, which it clearly did not, court might defer but would not be bound to do so). Some of 
these judicial discussions concern the so-called Bernstein letter or Bernstein exception (named 
after the case in which the mechanism was famously at issue), under which-in the robust form 
upon which ATCA and TVPA courts have cast doubt-courts defer to executive branch state-
ments that it prefers that the act of state doctrine be applied or not be applied in a particular 
case. 
185. A non-ATCA/non-TVPA case that did raise human rights issues with respect to Taiwan 
is potentially suggestive here. The plaintiff in Liu v. Republic of China only narrowly escaped 
the act of state doctrine, by virtue of the court's determination that it was in fact crediting rather 
than questioning the foreign state's action at home when it accepted local tribunals' factual de-
terminations and avoided rejecting its legal determinations by applying U.S. law to the facts as 
found by the foreign sovereign's domestic court. See Liu v. Republic of China. 892 F.2d 1419 
(9th Cir. 1989). 
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Although some of the PRC actions that have triggered human 
rights litigation in the United States ground claims of torture or near-
slavery, many do not. Some of these asserted abuses-including beat-
ing, arbitrary detention, deprivation of First Amendment-like free-
doms and some coercive family planning practices-are not accepted 
in many quarters as infringements of rights that are the object of a 
strong international consensus. While these considerations are hardly 
likely to be enough to sweep away judicial reluctance to apply the act 
of state doctrine, they can weaken one key element-the preference 
for not applying the act of state doctrine where the actions violated 
core, universally accepted international legal principles-in the mul-
tivariate calculus that courts apply. 
Potentially of more significance, in China-related cases, the execu-
tive branch generally has not taken the steps that have encouraged 
courts to refuse to apply the act of state doctrine to human rights 
cases, even though deference might well be forthcoming if the execu-
tive branch were to take such steps. Thus, in some of the Falun Gong 
litigation, the U.S. government steered clear of the case and pointedly 
told the PRC that there was nothing it could do to stop the suit de-
spite arguments from PRC legal scholars that the U.S. government 
had the ability to do so on grounds that sounded very much like the 
act of state doctrine.186 Also, the United States limited its formal in-
tervention in the Li Peng case to addressing the narrow issue of ser-
vice of process. In contrast, in one of the first cases (one not related 
to human rights issues and not invoking the act of state doctrine) to 
arise after the normalization of U.S.-China relations, the United 
States intervened actively, citing American foreign policy interests, to 
encourage the court to lift a default judgment so that the PRC could 
seek (with U.S. support and instruction) the formerly discretionary 
grant of absolute sovereign immunity to shield itself from liability for 
railway bonds on which China had defaulted. 187 
By accepting the position urged by the executive branch, the court 
in the railway bonds case also in effect insulated from judicial review a 
sovereign act undertaken by the Chinese sovereign in its own territory 
and possibly in violation of a widely asserted but controversial inter-
national legal rule proscribing expropriation of foreign property (in 
this case by repudiating a predecessor government's bonds). Some of 
the actions giving rise to contemporary China-related human rights 
litigation in U.S. courts (and much other foreign human rights litiga-
186. See supra notes 65-66. 
187. Jackson v. People's Republic of China, 794 F.2d 1490 (11th Cir. 1986). 
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tion in U.S. courts as well) might be plausibly characterized in ways 
that fit this act-of-state-friendly template. 
G. Political Questions 
The political question doctrine can bar suits that invite U.S. judicial 
review of foreign states' abuses of their own nationals' human rights. 
ATCA and foreign plaintiff TVPA cases (as well as foreign human 
rights litigation generally) can raise several of the overlapping con-
cerns that are the focus of the political question doctrine, including 
the risks that in deciding such cases the courts: will usurp discretion 
that the Constitution textually and demonstrably commits to the polit-
ical branches; will have to apply standards that are not susceptible to 
judicial discovery and interpretation; will have to make policy deter-
minations of a kind not suited to the exercise of judicial discretion; or 
will otherwise embarrass or frustrate foreign policy by failing to ex-
press the respect due to decisions of a coordinate branch, or by upset-
ting a policy decision that has already been made and is important to 
support, or by creating multiple, discordant voices in U.S. foreign 
policy. 188 
Attempts to invoke the political question doctrine have met with 
mixed success in ATCA and foreign plaintiff TVPA cases, suggesting 
that the doctrine can provide an effective screen in some cases (or 
some courts). Some courts have found ATCA and TVPA suits to pre-
sent low risks of foreign policy embarrassment, of trampling on politi-
cal branch prerogatives, and of requiring courts to grapple with 
judicially unmanageable standards, given the ATCA's and TVPA's 
embodiment of the political branches' commitment of authority to the 
courts and given the well-settled and uncontroversial nature. of the 
international legal prohibitions the violation of which are typically at 
issue in such cases. 1B9 
On the other hand, other judicial opinions have been a good deal 
more sympathetic to arguments that ATCA claims and foreign human 
rights litigation more generally (and foreign relations cases still more 
generally) raise in especially severe forms the dangers against which 
the political question doctrine guards.l90 Such assessments stress the 
188. See generally Baker v. Carr. 369 U.S. 186, 211-12, 217-18 (1962); Kadic, 70 F.3d at 249-
250. 
189. See Kadic, 70 F.3d at 249-50 (addressing all these points); Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 797-98 
(Edwards, 1.. concurring): see also Von Dardel, 623 F. Supp. at 258-59 (finding diplomatic immu-
nity so well-settled that there was little risk of embarrassment where ATCA claim was based on 
violation of that law). See generally Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844 (11th Cir. 1996) (finding 
the political question doctrine did not bar ATCA suit for official torture). 
190. See, e.g., Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 803, 823-26 (Bork & Robb, JJ., concurring). 
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difficulties posed by vague or disputed standards for violations of the 
law of nations, and the potential for displacing political branch judg-
ments-both of which have been major elements in critics' general 
critiques of expansive ATCA and TVPA jurisdiction well beyond the 
specific context of the political question doctrine. Not surprisingly, 
given the concerns that animate the doctrine and, particularly, its ap-
plication to foreign affairs cases, courts in ATCA and foreign-plaintiff 
TVPA cases have been more inclined to discern political questions in 
cases where the U.S. government has taken diplomatic steps to ad-
dress the problematic acts with the targeted state and less inclined to 
find the doctrine applicable where the U.S. government's political 
branches have condemned the activity or the regime in question.19 1 
China-related cases help to indicate the doctrine's real, if limited, 
potential efficacy in stopping some foreign human rights litigation. As 
we have seen in the act of state doctrine context and elsewhere, some 
China-related foreign plaintiff human rights suits involve allegations 
of clear and egregious violations of core and fundamental principles of 
international human rights law such as the proscription of torture or 
extrajudicial killing. But other instances of China-related human 
rights litigation involve standards that are-in general or in their ap-
plication to the facts alleged by Chinese plaintiffs-less settled and 
certain and thus more vulnerable to arguments that adjudication of 
the plaintiffs' claim would raise several of the dangers that the politi-
cal question doctrine addresses. Particularly in light of PRC defenses 
of allegedly abusive measures as proper implementations of Chinese 
criminal law and state regulations, there may be room for arguments 
that the political question doctrine should be applied to preclude adju-
dication of claims based on coerced prison labor or arbitrary deten-
tion or jailing for dissent or other politically disapproved activities. 
Most of the China-related foreign plaintiff human rights suits do 
involve PRC actions condemned by U.S. political branches-such as 
the suppression of the democracy movement or political dissidents or 
Falun Gong, the use of forced prison labor to produce exports, brutal 
191. Iwanowa, 67 F. Supp. 2d at 484-88 (finding the political question banned suit against 
company that was de facto part of the state/state actor where plaintiffs claim was for reparations, 
a matter that executive had negotiated with other states at conclusion of the war and which court 
could not appropriately resolve, given the general commitment of reparations settlement author· 
ity to the executive, the lack of respect for the executive that would be shown by adjudicating 
claims that the executive had determined should be handled at a government-to-government 
level, the risk of embarrassment inherent in the courts' disregard for that executive determina-
tion, and the courts' limited capacity for dealing with the diverse, complex and varied materials 
that are at issue in the case); see also Burger-Fischer v. DeGussa AG, 65 F. Supp. 2d 248, 272-81 
(D.N.J. 1999); Hwang Geum Joo v. Japan, 172 F. Supp. 2d 52, 64-67 (D.C.C. 2001) (similar in 
FSIA/non-ATCA case). See also supra note 189. 
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population control policies, or a criminal justice system fundamentally 
lacking in due process. These cases do not raise in stark form the 
danger that adjudication will embarrass or undermine or show a lack 
of respect for a coordinate branch or introduce a radically different 
U.S. voice in foreign policy if the plaintiffs were to prevail. On the 
other hand, as we also have seen, deciding for the plaintiffs in such 
cases often entails the courts going well beyond what the political 
branches have said in tone and substance, and beyond what they have 
undertaken or clearly authorized in the way of sanctions or other rem-
edies. Such concerns can be-and have been-used to support argu-
ments that the political question doctrine should apply to stop some 
Chinese human rights suits in U.S. courts. 192 
More broadly, some China-related cases arising outside the ATCA 
and TVPA settings suggest that courts may be especially attuned to 
the arguments for applying the political question doctrine to human 
rights-related cases in the context of the particularly important, 
charged and actively managed type of bilateral relations that the U.S.-
PRC relationship exemplifies. To some degree, this appears to reflect 
an assessment of the potentially disruptive impact of courts' deciding 
such cases. In Wang Zong Xiao v. Re.'1o,193 for example, the court 
refused to apply the political question doctrine, which the United 
States had urged the court to apply, on the grounds that U.S. relations 
with aliens were committed to the discretion of the political branches. 
But, in rejecting the United States' argument, the court stressed the 
relatively low of risk of upsetting U.S.-China relations given that the 
claim focused on how U.S. government employees treated the plaintiff 
"albeit during a cooperative investigation with PRC officials." In Lui 
Kin-Hong, the appellate court permitted the executive branch to ex-
tradite a defendant to Hong Kong for a trial that would occur after the 
territory's reversion to PRC rule. In so doing, the court discerned that 
the interpretation of the extradition treaty signed between the United 
States and the United Kingdom for British-ruled Hong Kong had 
many of the characteristics of a political question in a foreign affairs 
case and thus accorded no occasion for the inquiry into the PRC's lack 
of due process and low regard for the human rights of defendants that 
had led the district court to conclude that the treaty could not be in-
terpreted to oblige (or allow) the United States to render up the 
defendant. 194 
192. See, e.g., Gruzen, supra note 8. at 239-40. 
193. 837 F. Supp. 1506, 1546 (N.D. Cal. 1993). 
194. Lui Kin-Hong v. United States, 110 F.3d 103 (1st Cir. 1997). 
I 
I 
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As the Lui Kin-Hong case also suggests (although somewhat in ten-
sion with Wang Zong Xiao v. Reno), deference to political branch 
(and especially executive branch) preferences with respect to whether 
the political question doctrine, or related barriers, should apply may 
be at work here as well. This possibility perhaps emerges more clearly 
in a China-related case that did not involve any of the human rights 
generally thought to be covered by the ATCA (although it did impli-
cate the international right against expropriation unsuccessfully in-
voked in some ATCA litigation). In Shanghai Power v. United 
States, 195 principles of deference to the will of the political branches 
and a strong sense of the constitutional commitment of some foreign 
affairs-related powers to the executive branch disposed of claims that 
the United States had "taken" plaintiffs' property when the United 
States, as part of the deal for normalizing relations with the PRC, ef-
fectively settled plaintiffs' claims concerning property expropriated 
when the communist regime came to power. 
Shanghai Power and the discussion in Dames & Moore v. Regan 196 
of the same settlement of claims agreement that accompanied the nor-
malization of U.S.-PRC relations, are also China-related reminders of 
another, related feature of courts' approaches to applying the political 
question doctrine in ATCA litigation: where the executive branch has 
undertaken a diplomatic solution of the issues that gave rise to human 
rights claims, the political question doctrine's concerns about derang-
ing the political branches' conduct of foreign policy apply with special 
force. 197 While this has not become a factor in PRC human rights 
litigation pursued in the United States so far, it is not hard to imagine 
that it might. The harassment of U.S. nationals and activities in U.S 
territory that are in controversy in the Falun Gong RICO case could 
become the object of serious diplomatic discussions. Any ATCA or 
TVPA case that might be brought by the U.S. nationals and residents 
detained in the PRC as spies could very well have to face an argument 
that the diplomatic settlement that led to their release provided rea-
195. Shanghai Power Co. v. United States, 4 Cl. Ct. 237 (1983) (finding Presidential power to 
recognize foreign governments a sufficient and unreviewable ground for President's settlement, 
incident to normalization of U .S.-PRC relations, of plaintiff's claims concerning property expro-
priated by PRC, and rejecting plaintiff's claim that such settlement constituted a taking under 
the Fifth Amendment); see also Dames & Moore v. Regan. 453 U.S. 654, 679-81 (1981) (discuss-
ing the claims settlement agreement incident to U.S.-PRC normalization as part of a long histori-
cal pattern of support for or acquiescence in such measures by Congress, in case that found 
congressional authorization for similar settlement agreement with respect to plaintiffs assets in 
Iran). 
196. 453 u.s. 654 (1981). 
197. See supra note 191. 
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sons to employ the political question doctrine or other related mecha-
nisms to bar the plaintiffs' claims. 
As this suggests, with the PRC's growing willingness to engage in 
international human rights discourse and with deepening U.S.-PRC 
bilateral discussions over a range of human rights issues, plaintiffs in 
China-related human rights cases may be worse off. More China-
based human rights cases could come to resemble more closely the 
previously rare types of ATCA cases in which the executive branch's 
pursuit of a diplomatic solution argued for finding the case nonjusti-
ciable, or the court faced executive branch preferences that lay more 
clearly and firmly on the side of applying the political question 
doctrine. 
H. Problematic Plaintiffs 
Even though ATCA and TVPA courts have been relatively capa-
cious in such matters,198 standing doctrine and the more general prob-
lem of appropriate plaintiffs may stand in the way of some suits that 
seek U.S. judicial examination and judgment of foreign human rights 
practices. 
Again, China cases illustrate the more general point and particu-
larly the difficulties of finding a plaintiff with standing to bring a claim 
that has the scope necessary to produce a broad judicial examination 
of serious human rights abuses. Strikingly, the coercive enforcement 
of China's restrictive population policies has not generated a wave of 
ATCA or TVPA cases. Allegations of such behavior have reached 
U.S. courts almost exclusively through the mechanism of judicial re-
view of asylum and refugee proceedings, which are not well-designed 
to achieve the political impact (and the potential if unlikely financial 
impact) that a successful ATCA or TVPA claim promises. The most 
notable attempt to bring systematic judicial scrutiny of human rights 
198. Beanal. 969 F. Supp. at 367-69 (finding that an individual could have standing to raise 
claims of "cultural genocide" against an indigenous people of which he was a member and of 
environmental harms to the region of his residence, given that he claimed to have been person-
ally harmed, though plaintiff's claims lacked sufficient specificity to survive motion to dismiss; 
plaintiff also failed to allege facts necessary to satisfy third-party standing requirements); Doe v. 
Islamic Salvation Front, 993 F. Supp. 3. 9 (D.D.C. 1998) (accepting possibility of standing of 
organized group to bring suit under ATCA and TVPA where human rights abuses allegedly 
committed against group's members prevented group from carrying out its human rights-pro-
moting activities); Xuncax, 886 F. Supp. 162, 189-93 (C.D. Mass. 1995) (granting standing for any 
person who may be a claimant in a wrongful death action to bring TVPA and ATCA claims for 
disappearance and summary execution of others); Wiwa, 2002 WL 319887, at *16 (holding that 
decedent's survivors may bring TVPA claim); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) 
(ATCA suit by brother and father of deceased torture victim); Cabello Barrueto, 205 F. Supp. 2d 
at 1333-35 (holding that legal representative of decedent may bring ATCA or TVPA claim). 
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abuses in PRC family planning policy (also outside the ATCA and 
TVPA) foundered on issues of standing. In Smith v. Atwood, a pair of 
Chinese plaintiffs sought to stop possible U.S. funding of the U.N. 
Fund for Population Activities on the grounds that such support at 
least indirectly would help to make possible forced abortions and ster-
ilization in China. The court judged the connection between possible 
funding and the "barbaric actions that might befall [the plaintiffs] if 
they returned to their homeland" to be "too remote to provide them 
with the requisite standing." 199 
Falun Gong cases have been few, and not all have taken the stan-
dard TVPA and ATCA form of Chinese plaintiffs suing for harms suf-
fered in China. Some Falun Gong litigation-specifically that 
involving actions in the United States or actions in China against non-
PRC nationals-illustrates the difficult trade-offs facing plaintiffs who 
depart from the usual paradigm. Simply, the links are weak or remote 
between the relatively modest harms suffered by the plaintiffs who 
bring such claims and the severe abuses inflicted on Chinese Falun 
Gong activists in China. Plaintiffs in such cases face potential stand-
ing problems to the extent that they must rely on the more grave 
harms suffered by others in order to clear the threshold of severity 
that typically applies in ATCA and TVPA-style human rights litiga-
tion. To the extent that they can avoid such barriers (including by 
relying on RICO or civil rights statutes as an alternative to the ATCA 
or TVPA), they may still face the difficulty that they cannot then se-
cure the judicial scrutiny they seek of severely abusive behavior 
against Chinese adherents in the PRC. Such practices may well be 
deemed to raise claims of harms to others with respect to which the 
plaintiffs lack standing. Or such aspects of PRC behavior-the expo-
sure and judicial condemnation of which motivated the suit-may be 
deemed irrelevant to the claims the plaintiffs can bring on their own 
behalf (although the RICO and civil rights approach employed in one 
Falun Gong case may help to ameliorate this problem as well). 
Where one or more paradigmatic plaintiffs can be found, class ac-
tions potentially offer a powerful mechanism to advance the goals of 
broad exposure of abuses that foreign human rights litigation typically 
seeks, as is suggested by the initial success in defining a class of pre-
sent and former Chinese prison camp laborers in Bao Ge and the 
199. Smith v. Atwood, 845 F. Supp. 911. 914 (D.D.C. 1994). 
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plaintiffs' decision to file a class action suit against Ding Guangen on 
behalf of many who have suffered in the crackdown on Falun Gong. zoo 
But U.S. class actions, as well as conventional ATCA and TVPA 
cases involving individual Chinese plaintiffs complaining of harms in 
China, have remained arrestingly few. This may reflect an under-ap-
preciated general feature of foreign human rights litigation that Chi-
nese cases (or the lack of them) manifest: Unlike the failed chaotic 
states or the states in which the abusers have fallen from power that 
are the most common sources of ATCA and TVPA claims and much 
other foreign human rights litigation, effective and on-going regimes 
like the PRC's may do a reasonably effective job of preventing victims 
of human rights abuses, or (where the victims die or are incapacitated) 
their relatives, from reaching the United States. Such regimes also 
may be more adept at insulating many potential defendants from U.S. 
courts' jurisdiction (at the very least by not sending them into exile in 
the United States), so that potential plaintiffs who do reach the 
United States may have a hard time tagging the right defendant. 
Thus, the burden of the problematic plaintiff may be especially effec-
tive as a barrier in cases that-given the number of victims, the sever-
ity of the abuse and the continuing power and foreign policy salience 
of the abusing regime-might pose an especially serious threat of de-
ranging U.S. foreign policy. 
I. Running Out the Clock and Hiding the Ball 
Statutes of limitations may bar some claims. The TVPA has an ex-
plicit ten-year statute of limitations provision.201 Cases under the 
ATCA generally face the same limit, although some courts may apply 
the usually more restrictive limits that the U.S. forum state imposes on 
tort actions.202 The ATCA and TVPA defendants cannot run out the 
clock as easily as the nominal limitations periods may suggest. Courts 
have found a wide variety of factors adequate to toll the statutes, es-
pecially acts by the defendants or other officials of the target state that 
have made it difficult or impossible for the plaintiff to bring his claim 
200. The class action approach has fared reasonably well in a handful of other ATCA cases 
too. See, e.g., Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767 (9th Cir. 1996); cf Iwanowa, 67 F. Supp. 2d 
424 (dismissed on other grounds). 
201. 28 u.s.c. § 1350 (1998). 
202. See generally Cabiri v. Assasie-Gyimah, 921 F. Supp. 1189. 1194-97 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (dis-
cussing statute of limitations provision in case raising TVPA and ATCA claims); Forti v. Suarez-
Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531, 1548 (N.D. 1987) (holding that state law tort statute of limitations 
applies to ATCA claim); lwanowa, 67 F. Supp. 2d at 461-63 (TVPA statute of limitations applies 
to ATCA claims): Xuncax. 886 F. Supp. at 191-93; Wiwa, 2002 WL 319887, at *18-19; Papa v. 
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sooner. Most typically, equitable tolling has followed from the plain-
tiff's home country denying the plaintiff any hope of an adequate rem-
edy in home-country fora, which were the only ones potentially 
available to him prior to his often-belated journey to the United 
States.203 
Here too, some China-related cases suggest that time limits may 
have a little bite despite the cases suggesting that they are largely 
toothless. By the time a jailed political dissident or an inmate from 
China's gulag overcomes the many barriers to emigration (possibly 
through illegal immigration to the United States), it may be many 
years after the end of his incarceration. Because potential Chinese 
plaintiffs often come to the United States illegally, they may spend 
additional years in hiding or in the asylum and refugee process, 
greatly delaying filings of ATCA or TVPA claims. 
While equitable tolling likely would still apply to the benefit of Chi-
nese human rights litigation plaintiffs facing such statute of limitations 
challenges, that still would not be enough to overcome all of the time-
related problems that plaintiffs face. Still further delay can follow 
from the difficulty of assembling the evidence that may be necessary 
to craft a viable TVPA or ATCA suit. Unlike many of the leading 
ATCA and TVPA cases in which the abuses have been undisputed 
and even acknowledged by the target state's government (albeit often 
in the form of a successor regime), plaintiffs and potential plaintiffs in 
China-related cases face the problem of official denials, poor docu-
mentation, and a good deal of controversy over PRC practices. A 
couple of anecdotes suggest the nature of the problem. Chinese asy-
lum-seekers (whose claimed sufferings might support an ATCA or 
TVPA claim) have had to fight against official U.S. reports (most no-
tably the INS's asylum guidelines and some portions of the State De-
partment's human rights reports) that often present a less harsh 
picture of China's family planning enforcement practices than plain-
tiffs allege. Harry Wu faced charges of "spying" and risked rein-
203. See, e.g., lwanowa, 67 F. Supp. 2d at 463-67 (tolling of statute by edicts and treaties that 
deferred individual war-related claims until final settlement of reparations issues); Xuncax, 886 
F. Supp. at 192-94 (tolling statute where plaintiffs had remained in territory of regime under 
which harms committed); Forti. 672 F. Supp. at 1549-51 (equitable tolling of statute of limitations 
where defendant had been in hiding and where home-country courts were effectively if not for-
mally unavailable to plaintiff given domination of courts by military regime the officials of which 
allegedly perpetrated harms that were the focus of plaintiff's complaint); Unocal, 963 F. Supp. at 
897 (equitable tolling of statute where home country lacked functioning judiciary); Hilao, 103 
F.3d at 773 (equitable tolling while president remained in office and benefited from statute con-
ferring immunity, and in light of plaintiffs' reasons to fear reprisal or intimidation if they had 
reported human rights abuses); Cabello Barrueto, 205 F. Supp. 2d at 1330-31 (equitable tolling 
where defendants concealed fact of decedent's body and cause of death). 
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carceration in China's gulag in order to try to document the sort of 
abuses alleged in the Baa Ge case and the torture elements alleged in 
the Tiananmen and Falun Gong cases, but denied by PRC authorities. 
As the Baa Ge case also suggests, uncovering the state role in human 
rights-abusing economic activities is an exceptionally difficult business 
in China's byzantine and secretive world of relationships between gov-
ernment and enterprise. 
Moreover, reforms--particularly formal ones-in administrative 
law and other mechanisms for government accountability that China 
has been undertaking in recent years might even begin to cast doubt 
on a factor that has moved courts to be generous in applying the stat-
ute of limitations in ATCA and TVPA cases, and which has defeated 
other possible grounds for dismissing Chinese and other foreign 
human rights litigation in U.S. courts: the unavailability of adequate 
home-country fora. 
J. Alternative Fora 
Alternative forum-related issues-including forum non conveniens, 
international comity (specifically where foreign court actions are at 
issue), and exhaustion of remedies requirements-point to still other 
possible means to thwart ATCA and alien-plaintiff TVPA litigation in 
U.S. courts.204 As courts repeatedly have recognized, these doctrines 
rarely will provide convincing grounds for dismissal of otherwise via-
ble foreign human rights cases.205 Often, it will be clear that there is 
no other adequate forum available, that requiring the plaintiffs to pur-
sue local remedies at home would be futile or perilous, or that defer-
ence to the target country's inadequate court's determinations would 
be unwarranted. Even if all of that were not entirely clear, courts 
have discerned that there is something more than a little awkward 
204. The TVPA, but not the ATCA, includes an explicit exhaustion requirement. See 28 
U.S.C. § 1350 (1993 & Supp. 2002); 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note (1993 & Supp. 2002). On these doc-
trines in ATCA and TVPA cases, see generally Bederman, supra note 173, at 277-80; DouglasS. 
Morrin, People Before Profits: Pursuing Corporate Accountability for Labor Rights Violations 
Abroad through the Alien Tort Claims Act, 20 B.C. THIRD WoRLD LJ. 427, 435-37 (2000). 
205. See, e.g., Cabiri, 921 F. Supp. at 1197-99 (rejecting application of fomm non conveniens 
on the basis of U.S. courts' interest in having issues of U.S. ATCA and TVPA law adjudicated by 
a U.S. court, and the inadequacy of plaintiff's home country forum-and danger to plaintiff of 
pursuing a remedy in that forum-if the allegations of mistreatment which form the basis of 
plaintiff's complaint are true); Wiwa, 2002 WL 319887, at *17-18 (holding that TVPA exhaustion 
requirement did not apply where defendant had not shown that new civilian regime's human 
rights investigation commission would provide adequate remedies); Flores v. S. Peru Copper 
Corp .• 2002 WL 1587224 (S.D.N.Y. July 16, 2002) (holding that forum non conveniens and com-
ity are discretionary doctrines, unlikely to be applied where relevant foreign government does 
not oppose proceedings in U.S. court); Bigio, 239 F.3d at 453-55 (addressing comity issues in 
ATCA context); Iota, 157 F.3d at 158-61. 
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about using discretionary doctrines or a doctrine with a futility excep-
tion to send an otherwise eligible plaintiff back to the courts of his 
torturer in a quest for relief. 
Here too, China cases often reinforce and underscore the general 
pattern. Unlike in cases where the torturing government has fallen, 
where the official defendant has lost power, or where the home-coun-
try courts are strongly independent, China cases-like potential cases 
from many parts of the world-are especially poor candidates for fo-
rum non conveniens, exhaustion of (non-futile) local remedies, or 
comity, even compared to the baseline of the unpromising universe of 
ATCA and TVPA cases in general. Plaintiffs in the Tiananmen and 
Falun Gong cases have been quite articulate and explicit in explaining 
that attempts to secure redress through the judicial and political 
processes in the PRC have been pursued and proven futile.206 Some 
of those who have pursued judicial remedies in China for such human 
rights abuses have found themselves not at the plaintiff's table but in 
jail.207 
Moreover, ATCA or TVPA cases brought by former political pris-
oners, targets of prosecution or detention for Falun Gong or dissident 
activities, and alumni of China's correctional institutions present 
claims that have made the political bias and inadequacies of Chinese 
courts and the PRC's justice system central issues in their cases. So, 
too, have China human rights cases that range beyond the ATCA and 
TVPA, including, for example, many asylum and refugee cases and the 
pair of suits challenging U.S. efforts to deport a PRC national who 
cooperated in a U.S. narcotics prosecution and a Hong Kong resident 
who faced prosecution on bribery charges in the territory after 
reversion. 
On the other hand, ongoing legal reforms in the PRC suggest how 
forum non conveniens, exhaustion of remedies, and kindred doctrines 
might someday become a more effective barrier to some ATCA, 
TVPA, and similar claims. Expanding administrative law remedies for 
citizens accusing the PRC government of unlawful acts, highly publi-
cized prosecutions of abusers of official power and position in China, 
206. See A Declaration on the U.S. Federal Court's Acceptance of the Lawsuit Brought by June 
Fourth Victims Against Li Peng for Crimes Against Humanity, at http://iso.hrichina.org/iso/arti-
cle.adp?article_id=2277&category_id=79 (last visited Nov. 25, 2002) (concerning demand for 
prosecutorial inquiry into Tiananmen); Victims Families and Dissident Applaud Court Decision 
on Li Peng, supra note 86 (describing lawsuit filed in China by relatives of victims ofliananmen 
Massacre, to which the regime did not respond); Li Peng Lawsuil Background Page, supra note 
86 (describing futile quest for political redress); Rowse, supra note 11 (quoting statement by 
plaintiffs' counsel in Falun Gong ATCA case that no remedies are available in China). 
207. See 2 Falun Gong Members Held After Lawsuit Against Jiang Zemin. supra note 86. 
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and other such reforms, may someday begin to erode the easy conclu-
sion that PRC fora are obviously inadequate. But, for now, the clear 
lack of access to such remedies for victims of the types of rights abuses 
at issue in China-related human rights litigation in U.S. courts indicate 
that any such change is still a long way off. 
Still, even if forum non conveniens, non-exhaustion of remedies, 
and comity remain unavailable in practice, some of the problems 
those doctrines are designed to address are not so easily escaped, spe-
cifically the problems of litigating a case in a forum physically and 
institutionally far removed from the site of the underlying events. 
Again, Chinese cases elucidate the issue. As the fate of the plaintiffs' 
case in Bao Ge v. Li Peng illustrates, even granting the plaintiffs' re-
quest to go forward with discovery did not allow them to turn up facts 
necessary to the survival of their case. Not many human rights-related 
cases come in the conveniently pre-packaged form of Liu v. Republic 
of China, in which the plaintiff could rely on factual findings made by 
the defendant's own court concerning the relevant behavior of gov-
ernment officials. 
The foregoing inventory of existing mechanisms that can screen out 
ATCA and foreign plaintiff TVPA suits (and kindred foreign human 
rights cases) is long, if uneven in terms of the efficacy of the barriers 
listed. The list may be longer still, limited for now only by the cases 
that have been presented and the legal imaginations of the parties, 
their counsel, and academic commentators. So far, these screens have 
shown the capacity for being effective in keeping out many of the 
cases that critics have identified as posing the greatest dangers to U.S. 
foreign policy, at least where the executive branch has made clear its 
wishes to keep cases out. 
V. THis OLD HousE?: OF RENOVATIONS AND 
STRUCTURAL SouNDNESS 
While existing legal screens can keep out many of the pests that 
critics of expansive human rights litigation in U.S. courts decry, the 
screens do have holes and do not fit their frames perfectly. Some 
ATCA and TVPA cases will still get through and may increase, cer-
tainly quantitatively and perhaps qualitatively, the opportunity for 
courts to complicate or frustrate the conduct of U.S. foreign policy. 
And foreign human rights cases that can be brought by other means 
will get through the screens as well. However, this still may not be the 
significant problem for the conduct of U.S. foreign policy that the crit-
ics fear or suggest. To evaluate the magnitude of these dangers, one 
needs a sense of the larger structure, which, on inspection, proves not 
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to be as obviously rickety, vulnerable to vermin, or in need of repair 
as it initially might seem or as critics of foreign human rights litigation 
in U.S. courts maintain. 
That this larger structure might be reasonably sound becomes a 
good deal more plausible when one inspects it with an eye to the polit-
ics and law of U.S. foreign relations in contemporary and comparative 
perspective. As we saw earlier, the China-related ATCA and TVPA 
cases (and China-related human rights cases more generally) suggest 
that human rights litigation is likely to be only a relatively peripheral 
factor among the many forces and strains besetting the complex 
framework of one of the United States' most important international 
relationships. But this is only a part of a much larger and more com-
plex setting that provides reasons to discount claims that ATCA and 
TVPA cases threaten seriously to derange American foreign policy. 
A. Warped Panes: The Distorting Lens of American Exceptionalism 
A standard challenge to expansive readings of the ATCA and other 
routes to foreign human rights litigation in U.S. courts claims that 
such jurisdiction is radically exceptional in two related respects. 
One argument holds that there is something unjudicial, abnormal, 
and therefore worrisome in U.S. courts wading into the adoption and 
application of customary international human rights law in the fashion 
and to the extent undertaken in ATCA cases and other foreign human 
rights litigation. It is, in other words, radically exceptional from what 
courts are supposed to do. The claim is hardly uncontroversial and 
has produced an extended and contentious debate in academic writing 
on U.S. separation of powers and foreign relations law.208 Much of 
that debate is beyond the scope of this discussion. The more relevant 
point here is a different one: The critics' assertion that such actions by 
U.S. courts are strange and unusual sounds a good deal odder, and the 
claim that such actions are likely to produce foreign policy problems 
sounds a good deal less plausible, once one leaves behind a narrow 
focus on distinctively American preoccupations. 
In much of the world, customary international law-including the 
customary international law of human rights-is unproblematically in-
208. For examples of this debate, including some that focus on human rights litigation, see 
Human Rights, supra note 19, at 461-64; International Human Rights Litigation, supra note 19, at 
2181; Illegitimacy, supra note 19; Bradley, supra note 19, at 538-57 (opposing incorporation as 
unconstitutional and/or undemocratic); Koh, supra note 173; Harold Hongjuh Koh, The 1998 
Frankel Lecture: Bringing International Law Home, 35 Hous. L. REv. 623 (1998); Gerald L. 
Neuman, Sense and Nonsense About Customary International Law: A Response to Professors 
Bradley and Goldsmith, 66 FoRDHAM L. REv. 371 (1997); Translating, supra note 19. 
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corporated in domestic law, sometimes without specific legislative au-
thorization and sometimes with a status superior to ordinary domestic 
law. Much of the world (like the good number of U.S. courts that have 
drawn the critics' censure) regards international human rights law as 
an expanding and progressively developing body of legal principles. 
Such legal principles almost inevitably demand a kind of on-going in-
corporation if they are to enter domestic law.209 In practice, such in-
corporation is, inescapably, at least partly judicial. (The myth that 
courts do not "make law" in civil law systems is tired and untenable.) 
Viewed in comparative perspective, it is the radically "dualist" U.S. 
system-particularly as portrayed or prescribed by critics of the 
ATCA and, more broadly, critics of the reception of international law 
into U.S. law by means other than legislation or treaties-that is the 
international outlier in keeping international law out of domestic law. 
Even the PRC is somewhat expansive on this score, despite China's 
generally being among the few states that have approached U.S.levels 
of wariness about permitting domestic law to be affected by interna-
tionallaw.210 
Moreover, the focus on the (by American standards) exotic source 
of international human rights law should not lead one to lose sight of 
the fact that the substantive legal principles usually at issue in ATCA 
and TVPA cases (prohibitions of torture and gross, systematic viola-
tions of fundamental rights and freedoms, including arbitrary deten-
tion without process and on the basis of political beliefs) are not 
strangers to U.S. law. They hardly represent the types of displace-
ments of U.S. sovereignty by heretofore unknown alien rules that are 
209. For a survey of many European states' laws-often embodied in constitutional provi-
sions-providing for the incorporation and on-going reception of international law. including 
CUStomary international law, see generally INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 238-48 
(Lori F. Damrosch et al. eds., 4th ed. 2001); Translating, supra note 19. On U.S. law concerning 
the reception of international law, see generally Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 
1980) (accepting the international consensus against torture as being a part of international law 
and thus part of the law to be applied under the relevant U.S. law, that is, the ATCA); The 
Paquete Habana. 175 U.S. 677 (1900) (stating that international law is part of U.S. law). See also 
supra note 74. 
210. See, e.g., Samuel S. Kim, The Development of International Law in Post-Mao China: 
Change and Continuity, 1 J. CHINESE L. 117, 158-59 (1987) (describing China's abandonment of 
the criticism of the theory of the superiority of international law over domestic law and embrace 
of an attack on the assumption of the superiority of domestic law over international law); Wang 
Tieya, International Law in China: Contemporary and Historical Perspectives. in AcADEMIE DE 
DROIT INTERNATIONAL, REctJEIL DES CouRs (Collected Courses of The Hague Academy of 
International Law) 326-33 (1990) (discussing provisions of Chinese law that permit international 
law, in the form of treaties, to enter domestic law and alter domestic legislation without further 
sovereign acts). 
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the usual target of those who resist internationalization of U.S. law or 
the supercession of U.S. domestic law by international law. 
These considerations, of course, do not resolve the dispute over the 
U.S. constitutional and quasi-constitutional law governing the courts' 
role in foreign affairs or foreign human rights cases. By some lights, 
they may seem to strengthen some of the ATCA critics' policy argu-
ments about the courts' potential for inexpertly mucking up the na-
tion's international relations through expansive foreign human rights 
litigation by pointing to real-world examples of courts doing what crit-
ics condemn in U.S. courts' behavior. But they also cast a skeptical 
light on part of the critics' parade of horribles concerning the impact 
of human rights litigation on the conduct of U.S. foreign affairs. Sim-
ply, even the most shallow of comparative inquiries helps to remind us 
that many countries manage to conduct their foreign affairs with 
courts playing a not-so-narrowly cabined role in shaping the positions 
of "the state" (which international law generally regards as a unitary 
actor) on international legal and related issues. 
It still might be supposed that courts roving about enforcing an ex-
panding body of international legal norms might be especially danger-
ous in the American context because of the unusually high levels of 
independence and power that U.S. courts enjoy as a coequal and (on 
some accounts) unaccountable branch. The potential for courts to de-
range the nation's foreign policy might seem to be commensurately 
greater. But it is far from clear that this is so. True, the structure of 
governmental power and the extensive autonomy of courts in the 
United States may still seem exotic and hard to imagine in much of 
the world, especially in China and many of the other authoritarian 
regimes that have been the foci of human rights litigation. But that 
does not mean that foreign governments and their leaders fail to com-
prehend the U.S. structure. It does not mean that they view court 
decisions as of a piece with U.S. foreign policy as articulated by the 
executive branch or Congress because they see courts as agents of the 
political branches (as they arguably are in China and many ATCA 
target countries). Nor does it mean that they view judicial opinions as 
on par with legislative or presidential pronouncements because they 
view courts as the equal of the political branches in foreign policy (as 
a highly simplistic version of American constitutional law and politics 
might suggest). Indeed, these two imaginable foreign views of U.S. 
courts are contradictory. Moreover, there is considerable evidence 
that the PRC has a reasonably accurate and sophisticated understand-
ing of U.S. separation of powers principles. In these circumstances, it 
is unwarranted and unwise-and would unnecessarily constrain and 
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undermine the political branches' conduct of foreign policy-to accept 
at face value statements from foreign governments (including notably 
China) that exaggerate opportunistically their incomprehension of 
U.S. separation of powers law, and that express shock and offense at 
judicial decisions (or, for that matter, congressional expressions of 
opinion that do not become law) and that purport to construe them as 
expressions of the foreign policy positions of the American 
government. 211 
A second argument claims that the ATCA (along with the TVPA 
and some of the other routes to foreign human rights litigation) is 
exceptional in reaching foreigners' human rights-abusing conduct 
abroad, and even "unique" in doing so through civil litigation by alien 
private parties, rather than criminal prosecution by the state.212 Here 
again, even a cursory review of other countries' practices is instruc-
tive. It erodes the claim of a malign instance of American exception-
alism. Many countries and some multilateral organs have been far 
more aggressive than the United States in adopting legislation basing 
jurisdiction (principally for criminal prosecution) on international 
211. For indications that official China does understand the role of the courts in the U.S. 
system and U.S. separation of powers principles, see, e.g., Making Political Civilization One of 
the Objects of Development is an Invention - Scholar Says We May Draw on Western Political 
Civilization, hut Must Proceed from our National Conditions and Must Not Copy Indiscrimi-
nately, TA KuNG PAo. Sept. 5, 2002. available at LEXIS NExrs (presenting an analysis of "separa-
tion of powers" principles by a political scientist at the Chinese Communist Party's Central Party 
School, and finding such principles in need of adaptation to Chinese conditions): Peter Seidlitz, 
Li Peng Clearly Rejects Western Democracy, HANDELSBLATr, Dec. L 1998, available at LEXIs 
NExrs (presenting PRC Premier's critique of the unruliness and unsuitability to Chinese circum-
stances of Western-style "separation of powers''); see also Mary Thornton, U.S. Backs China's 
Move to Reopen 1911 Railroad Bond Case. WASH. PosT, Aug. 19, 1983, at A2 (describing negoti-
ations between PRC top leader Deng Xiaoping and U.S. Secretary of State to enlist executive 
branch support for PRC motion to lift default judgment in initial Jackson v. PRC iitigation); 
Court Decision on Li Peng Applauded, supra note 64; Li Peng Tiananmen Lawsuit Could Be in 
Danger, supra note 64; Global Justice: The Li Peng Tiananmen Lawsuit and Universal Jurisdic-
tion over Violations of Rights supra note 1; Wong, supra note 1; Pomfret. supra note 11 (describ-
ing PRC calls on U.S. executive to intervene in Tiananmen/Li Peng and Falun Gong litigation). 
212. For the argument that the "extraterritorial reach" of the ATCA is unusual and therefore 
offensive to other states and thus dangerous to U.S. foreign policy, see, e.g., Univeral Jurisdic-
tion, supra note 19, at 341-49; International Human Rights Litigation, supra note 19, at 2181; cf 
Universal Jurisdiction, supra note 19 (noting the hypocrisy, and consequent offense to foreign 
states and problems for U.S. foreign policy, of the ATCA providing broader remedies for acts 
abroad by foreign governments than the liability other statutes impose for acts at home by the 
U.S. government); see also Ramsey. supra note 19. For contrary arguments asserting that the 
ATCA is not really an instance of conventional extraterritoriality but merely a matter of apply-
ing international law in U.S. courts and exercising relatively uncontroversial principles of univer-
sal jurisdiction to adjudicate or increasingly accepted principles of universal jurisdiction to 
prescribe, see Translating, supra note 19, at 22-24; Harold G. Maier et al.. The Role of Interna-
tional Law in Human Rights Litigation in the United States. 82 AM. Soc'v INT'L L. PRoc. 456, 
469-74 (1988). 
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law's universality principles to address severe human rights violations 
:::ommitted abroad by foreigners against foreigners. 213 
While universality jurisdiction is thus more clearly established as an 
international legal principle on the criminal law side, the significance 
of the civil/criminal distinction is easily overstated, particularly from 
the perspective of a functional analysis that is most germane to assess-
ing "derangement of foreign policy" arguments. The civil/criminal 
distinction that is so powerful in U.S. law fades in comparative con-
text. Several major legal systems give victims far more control over 
whether to prosecute than is the case in the United States. In a good 
many legal systems, including China's, prudent plaintiffs do not pur-
sue suits-and plaintiffs have poor prospects for success-if their civil 
claims are at odds with the government's agenda as expressed in the 
criminal law and elsewhere. More generally, and despite what some 
critics of the ATCA assert, extraterritorial exercises of criminal juris-
diction are, not surprisingly, regarded in many quarters as more prob-
lematic than extraterritorial exercises of civil jurisdiction.214 
Moreover, foreign states' views, including notably China's, have 
hardly been uniformly critical of civil litigation over foreign human 
rights abuses. The same PRC regime that has been predictably critical 
of human rights litigation in the United States concerning the PRC's 
behavior has supported litigation by Chinese "comfort women" and 
other Chinese national victims of Japanese war atrocities who have 
pursued suits in several venues against Japan. At the same time, Beij-
ing has refrained from criticizing such sex slavery suits and a suit con-
cerning the rights of PRC expatriate laborers, even though those suits 
were brought in the United States under the ATCA.21 5 
If one looks outside the narrow context of human rights cases, a 
claim that the ATCA's or TVPA's extraterritorial reach is an eccentric 
departure from the norm loses more of its persuasive force when one 
moves beyond a narrowly American perspective (and, specifically, a 
213. See generally Translating, supra note 19, ai 39-53: Van Schaak, supra note 19, at 295-97; 
International Human Rights Litigation, supra note 19; Universal Jurisdiction, supra note 19, at 
327-41. 
214. For the view that extraterritorial extension is more problematic for civil than for criminal 
jurisdiction, see Universal Jurisdiction, supra note 19, at 347-48; International Human Rights Liti-
gation, supra note 19. For contrary views, see generally Translating, supra note 19, and Corporate 
Liablitliy, supra note 19, at 408-11. 
215. See WWJJ Sex Slaves File Class Action Suit Against Japan, supra note 82; Chinese "Com-
fort Women" File Law Suit Against Japanese Government, supra note 82; Faison, supra note 83; 
Cleeland, supra note 83 (concerning suits over "comfort women" and labor in Saipan). See also 
Morrin, supra note 204, at 441-45 (concerning the Saipan case); Nathalie I. Johnson, Justice for 
"Comfort Women": Will the Alien Tort Claims Act Bring Them the Remedies They Seek?. 20 
PeNN. ST. INT'L L. REv. 253 (2001). 
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narrowly American perspective that adopts a disputable characteriza-
tion of U.S. practices as rarely enacting or construing laws to reach 
abroad). Nationality-based jurisdiction (whether based on the nation-
ality of the plaintiff/victim or the defendant) and thin forms of territo-
riality-based jurisdiction provide unexceptional and often-used bases 
for legislation that permits civil suits or prosecution for actions (which 
can include human rights violations) committed by foreigners abroad. 
While most countries have not gone as far as some European states in 
opening their courts to criminal or civil proceedings by or against their 
nationals for activities abroad, or to suits based on the most transient 
of connections to the jurisdiction, many go some distance down that 
path.216 Even the PRC-usually so wary of anything that might un-
dermine the principles of strong territorial sovereignty-embraces 
and often exercises an expansive notion of its authority to legislate 
and enforce with respect to the behavior of its nationals abroad, 
whether as defendants or victims, both in the criminal and civil 
contexts. 217 
Thus, many of the nations of the world manage to conduct their 
foreign affairs despite laws, legal processes, and views about the 
proper roles, functions, and scope of litigation that are in some ways 
functionally parallel to the ATCA or TVPA. Because of such parallels 
and because American legal idiosyncrasies are not so incomprehensi-
ble abroad as is sometimes assumed or asserted, there are ample rea-
sons to be suspicious of arguments against expansive foreign human 
rights litigation in the United States that discern threats to the conduct 
of U.S. foreign policy from visions seen through the distorting lens of 
American legal exceptionalism. 
216. Of course, it remains the case that foreign plaintiff suits against foreign defendants for 
torts committed abroad and with no particular connection (aside perhaps from the defendant's 
transient presence) are a step beyond nationality-based jurisdiction and even beyond some of 
the thinner conventional extensions of territorial-based jurisdiction, but this is a smaller step 
than it appears to be if one accepts and focuses only on the questionable depiction of U.S. law's 
aversion to extraterritorial extensions of jurisdiction. On European practices, see generally 
Translating, supra note 19; Corporate Liability, supra note 19, at 407-10. 
217. On PRC views and practices, see ZHONOHUA RENMIN GoNGHEGUO XINGFA, supra note 
121 (concerning extraterritorial reach of PRC criminal law); Bing Ling, Applicability of the PRC 
Criminal Law in Hong Kong and the Prospect of a Rendition Agreement between Hong Kong and 
the Mainland, 29 H.K.L.J. 393 (1999); see also 2 Falun Gong Members Held After Lawsuit 
Against Jiang Zemin, supra note 86 (concerning suit in PRC against U.S.-based Falun Gong 
spiritual leader Li Hongzhi). On Chinese sensitivity on the subject of territorial sovereignty, see 
generally Jacques deLisle, China's Approach to International Law: A Historical Perspective, 94 
AM. Soc'y lNT'L L. PRoc. 267 (2000). 
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B. Shifting Foundations: Globalization's Erosion of the Foreign/ 
Domestic Distinction 
Arguments that rely upon elements of American legal exceptional-
ism to criticize the U.S. courts' openness to foreign human rights liti-
gation suffer from a further problem: They are most tenable if the 
U.S. legal system can function as a relatively self-contained domestic 
system. The great jumble of developments often grouped under the 
unsatisfactory heading of "globalization," however, has done much to 
undermine such isolation and insulation. "Globalization" has been 
undermining a broad, fundamental assumption of ATCA and TVPA 
critics' arguments: There is a coherent, separable and relatively lim-
ited realm of foreign affairs-related cases (of which the ATCA and 
TVPA cases are an extreme subset) in which courts can-and 
should-stay out or be kept out, and this exclusion of courts can be 
accomplished without undermining the larger judicial role that is ap-
propriate in civil litigation concerning domestic matters. 
Here again, Chinese human rights cases provide particularly strik-
ing illustrations of a larger phenomenon. On one hand, PRC-related 
actions brought under the ATCA or TVPA (or kindred legal 
frameworks) have been relatively rare, dramatic, and controversial-
and controversial in part because of their seeming remoteness from 
the ordinary business of U.S. civil litigation. The Chinese gulag, co-
erced abortion and sterilization, killing or jailing pro-democracy 
protesters and adherents to an obscure Eastern quasi-religion are not 
items on the ordinary American judicial docket. On the other hand, 
much of what has been at issue in such litigation has involved matters 
that are not obviously unconventional or non-routine concerns for 
U.S. courts. The Chinese cases illustrate that foreign human rights 
litigation often, and probably increasingly, departs from the prototypi-
cal Filartiga-style claim brought by a foreign national who happened 
to make it to the United States, who was lucky enough to find his 
persecutor transiently present or in political exile in the United States, 
and who thus could prosecute his suit over abuses suffered in his 
home country at the hands of his countrymen. While some of the Chi-
nese suits take this form (including, for example, the Tiananmen-re-
lated political persecution litigation and much of the Falun Gong 
litigation), others already brought or easily imaginable do not. 
As we have seen, such filed and fileable actions involve multination-
als with strong presences in the United States, investment of Ameri-
can capital in China, the production of Chinese goods for sale in U.S. 
markets, and activities conducted on U.S. soil. The parties to such 
suits include a growing number of Chinese officials who travel regu-
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larly and in official capacities to the United States to engage in widely 
varied activities with significant effects in the United States, members 
of the large groups of PRC nationals (including tens of thousands of 
students and asylum-seekers) who are or who seek to be in the United 
States as long-term or permanent residents, U.S. nationals who exer-
cise their expressive and associational and religious freedoms in the 
United States, or U.S. nationals who travel to China to undertake a 
range of activities, including some that American law and policy re-
gard as exercises of fundamental, internationally protected rights. 
Such are some of the consequences of the increasingly dense and 
complex cross-national connections and international interactions that 
comprise "globalization." They have helped to make U.S.-PRC rela-
tions more complicated and more important, and thus have made U.S. 
litigation over Chinese human rights practices seem both more feasi-
ble and more threatening to the conduct of U.S. foreign relations in 
recent years. But they also have made it far more difficult to keep 
cases addressing Chinese human rights abuses out of U.S. courts with-
out also restricting those courts' reach over matters that are ordinarily 
and appropriately within their ambit. 
As the foregoing inventory of real and imaginable types of China-
related human rights cases underscores, even when brought under the 
ATCA or by alien plaintiffs under the TVPA, and especially when 
based on other grounds, U.S. lawsuits concerning human rights abuses 
abroad are, or can be expected to become, on average, a good deal 
less "foreign" and less disconnected from the ordinary substance and 
process of "domestic" litigation. Rejecting or avoiding foreign human 
rights litigation less clearly and less often involves shunning something 
remote and alien, or waiting for home-country institutions-or collec-
tive international institutions-to address problems that might be de-
scribed as predominantly intra-national foreign problems, not of 
specific concern or interest to the United States except perhaps as a 
foreign policy matter.218 Instead, keeping out ATCA, foreign plaintiff 
TVPA, or other "foreign" human rights cases is significantly and in-
creasingly likely to be possible only at considerable cost in the per-
formance of more ordinary and more widely valued judicial functions, 
including addressing activities in the United States, with substantial 
impact on the United States, against U.S. residents and citizens, or by 
U.S. citizens or others notoriously or protractedly present in the 
United States. Keeping out the pests that critics have identified in 
218. See Human Rights, supra note 19. at 468-69 (arguing that alien tort actions are costly to 
the international system because they risk preempting or disrupting local remedies or interna-
tional institutional responses); see also Van Schaack, supra note 19 (arguing the opposite view). 
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Filartiga-like cases thus looks as if it may require bricking up the win-
dows-a radical measure indeed for dealing with the real, or even the 
imagined, dangers to the conduct of U.S. foreign policy that the 
ATCA's critics have stressed. 
It is of course possible that the flood of increasingly unexotic-seem-
ing foreign human rights cases that globalization may be unleashing 
will produce a backlash against U.S. openness to foreign human rights 
litigation, not least because such cases conjure a specter of serious dis-
ruption to U.S. foreign policy and extensive judicial trampling in areas 
that had been seen as political branch prerogatives. That presumably 
is part of what critics foresee and perhaps hope to foster by depicting 
the dangers that they see lying down the path staked out by Filartiga, 
Marcos, Karadzic, and their progeny.219 
But it seems also quite possible that arguments for restriction of the 
judicial role face an increasingly tough uphill climb as the implications 
of globalization continue to unfold. Hard choices (in the form of es-
chewing litigation of claims that are not "foreign" in the full, tradi-
tional sense and that seek redress for harms involving people, places, 
activities and interests that U.S. courts ordinarily address) are presum-
ably less likely to be made than seemingly easier ones (in the form of 
not opening the courthouse door to suits with no obvious or perceived 
connection to the United States and the ordinary business of U.S. 
courts). 
Moreover, even where the cases remain more conventionally Filar-
tiga-like, as the most visible PRC human rights cases have been, 
globalization may exert considerable pressure against retrenching U.S. 
litigation over foreign human rights abuses. Globalization has en-
tailed a new moral interdependence or moral immediacy. The inter-
national growth of interest in universal jurisdiction and in the idea of 
international crimes reflects a more general emerging sense that se-
vere human rights abuses anywhere are the legitimate concern-and 
perhaps therefore the legitimate objects of the law and courts-every-
219. See Goldsmith, supra note 47 (assessing the problem of the U.S. "double standard" of 
holding foreign governments to account in U.S. courts through the ATCA but not allowing par-
allel recovery against the U.S. government). One plausible version of playing out the logic of 
this argument is that the contradiction and the tensions and criticisms the "double standard" 
generates could and should best be resolved by cutting back the ATCA's reach. See also Illegiti-
macy, supra note 19, at 369 (arguing that the internationalist or expansionist version of incorpo-
ration of customary international human rights law by the courts through interpretation of the 
ATCA or similar means risks undermining the legitimacy of international law and the progress 
of human rights); cf Human Rights, supra note 19, at 469 (arguing that resort to the ATCA risks 
cutting off the development of more effective and more legitimate international institutional or 
legal mechanisms for addressing human rights violations). 
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where. More concretely, at least where the specific abuse is severe and 
telegenic enough, the perpetrator is important enough, or watchdog 
groups are skilled and dogged enough, foreign human rights violations 
seem less remote. The CNN and NGO effects can be quite formida-
ble, as the Tiananmen Incident of 1989 and, to a lesser degree, the 
PRC crackdown on Falun Gong and political dissidents more broadly 
have shown. It would take a rather thorough-going legal anti-realist to 
think that judges would be uniformly unaffected-and should be ex-
pected to be unmoved-by such developments when they decide how 
to handle at least the borderline ATCA suit or other foreign human 
rights case. 
In addition, there are signs that the political branches regard as ac-
ceptable and even politically desirable relatively broad or expanding 
judicial authority to entertain suits involving at-least-partly-foreign 
human rights abuses. Faced with vivid evidence, effective lobbyists 
and concerned voters, elected officials (immediately or through their 
constituents) have seemed vulnerable to the influences of the CNN 
and NGO effects and the impact of globalization more generally. 
Again, Chinese cases provide illustrations. With the Bush executive 
order concerning political asylum for Chinese nationals after 
Tiananmen (and addressing coercive family planning as well as the 
repression of political dissent), the President showed himself willing to 
countenance a widening of the openings for judicial consideration of 
foreign human rights conditions (including through judicial review of 
asylum decisions). As we have seen (and however much executive 
guardians of presidential foreign affairs perogatives may dislike such 
litigation), the executive branch has done little to exercise its consider-
able power to stop ATCA and Chinese plaintiff TVPA suits against 
PRC state and official defendants. · 
Congress too can be and has been moved to open new doors to the 
courthouse and to forego closing doors that judges have opened 
wider. Congress adopted one of the key provisions under which Chi-
nese plaintiffs have sued (the TVPA), largely in response to a judicial 
decision denying recovery under the FSIA to an American national 
tortured abroad by a foreign government, and it also adopted a terror-
ism exception to the FSIA for U.S. plaintiffs. (Although the State 
Department initially opposed such legislation, the President signed it.) 
Congress passed several pieces of legislation that paralleled provisions 
in the post-Tiananmen executive orders, in one instance entrenching 
in the immigration laws a coercive family planning provision that PRC 
nationals have invoked in seeking asylum and judicial reviews of asy-
lum that have put PRC human rights practices under the U.S. courts' 
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scrutiny. While Congress has considered and declined to enact laws 
that would have clearly and explicitly broadened the courts' jurisdic-
tion to hear some classes of foreign human rights cases, it tellingly has 
not used such reexaminations of the existing statutory framework as 
an opportunity for reversing or reigning in the judicial constructions 
of the ATCA and TVPA that have been the target of voluminous at-
tacks by academic-and some non-academic-critics.22o 
If this assessment of the impacts of globalization and the earlier dis-
cussion of "flies" that get in despite the "screens" are right, then the 
arguments against the ATCA or relatively expansive judicial interpre-
tations of it, the foreign plaintiff part of the TVPA, and perhaps other 
routes to foreign human rights litigation begin to look less like a mat-
ter of reining in rogue and potentially foreign policy-deranging courts. 
They thus look more like a rather narrow originalism (that Congress 
did not intend such expansive litigation when it enacted the ATCA in 
1789) or formalism (that Congress has not sufficiently specifically au-
thorize courts to take jurisdiction over many of the ATCA or TVPA 
cases that the courts have decided).221 That is, the air of "judicial 
roguishness" dissipates and the asserted dangers of judicial derange-
ment of the political branches' conduct of foreign policy fade in a 
world, reshaped by globalization, in which: Courts face genuinely hard 
interpretive choices among seemingly legitimate and compelling no-
tions of proper judicial roles; much of the same foreign behavior can 
be the subject of litigation under relatively uncontroversial statutes; 
Congress and the President seem relatively unconcerned with much 
that U.S courts have done to condemn "foreign" human rights abuses; 
and the political branches have staked out critical positions on foreign 
human rights practices while acquiescing in or even extending the 
courts' exercises of jurisdiction over cases arising from those practices. 
C. How About if We Take Out That Non-Structural Wall? 
So What if the Floor's a Little Tilted?: Plural Institutions 
and Foreign Policy 
As we have seen, one major element in the "derangement of for-
eign policy" critique of foreign human rights litigation in U.S. courts is 
the claim that such litigation can subvert a unitary national voice in 
foreign policy or can force a political branch to "speak" on delicate 
220. Concerning amendments and contemplated amendments to the ATCA and relevant por-
tions of the FSIA and the enactment of the TVPA, see generally Bederman, supra note 173, at 
281-85; Edward D. Re, Human Rights, Domestic Courts and Effective Remedies, 67 ST. JoHN's 
U. L. REv. 581 (1993); international Human Rights Litigation, supra note 19, at 2156-57. 2181-82. 
221. See generally, Illegitimacy, supra note 19, at 256-68; The Alien Tort Statute, supra note 19. 
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matters in foreign affairs (or face the undesirable consequences of 
failing to speak and thereby allowing the litigation to go forward un-
checked and unguided). From this critical perspective, the political 
branches' near-monopoly-and the executive branch's dominance 
and relatively unfettered discretion-in the conduct of foreign rela-
tions must be preserved, for consequentialist reasons as well as consti-
tutional ones, which may themselves be rooted in prudential 
calculations. The view that dangers to the national interest flow from 
multiple voices in foreign relations, or from pressures on the executive 
branch to articulate a potentially controversial position in foreign pol-
icy, enjoys a rather impressive pedigree.222 But the "one voice" and 
"forced to speak" arguments do not give critics the sockdologer they 
seek in the debate over foreign human rights litigation in U.S. courts. 
This aspect of the critics' argument weakens once one considers the 
virtues and value of plural institutions in U.S. foreign relations. 
As we have seen ATCA, TVPA, and other human rights cases can 
and do add a second (or third) voice to the chorus of U.S. foreign 
policy and put pressure on the executive branch to "speak" in situa-
tions that the executive branch and-perhaps, although less cer-
tainly-Congress might rather have avoided. China-related cases 
have provided vivid examples. The awkward U.S. intervention on the 
service of process issue in the Li Peng/Tiananmen case, the evident 
diplomatic embarrassment of a rash of process-serving on PRC offi-
cials in the United States, and the somewhat sheepish-sounding expla-
nation of the executive branch's limited authority to stave off 
litigation that Beijing found offensive are all arguably instances of 
courts forcing a reluctant executive branch to intervene and make its 
views known or risk even greater damage to foreign policy. Similarly, 
judicial disquisitions on the horrors of Tiananmen, the injustice of the 
PRC's criminal process and similar issues constitute cases of the 
courts adding an additional and different (at least in tone or in timing) 
voice in foreign policy. 
On the other hand, as we have also seen, the notion that courts have 
a proper and legitimate role to play in making decisions that shape-
and complicate-foreign relations is far from heretical, internationally 
and even in the United States. As we have also seen, it becomes still 
less exotic amid globalization's erosion of the distinction between for-
eign affairs-related and more quotidian subjects of litigation in U.S. 
courts. 
222. See supra note 178 (concerning act of state doctrine); supra note 188 and accompanying 
text (concerning political question doctrine). 
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More to the point, it is not always clearly or inevitably the case that 
a separate judicial voice or litigation-induced pressure on the political 
branches to speak in human rights cases impedes or undermines the 
conduct of the nation's international relations, even in cases where the 
government officials tasked with putting out the diplomatic fires 
would rather not see the courts tossing matches, and despite the re-
flexive opposition of the executive branch to legislation that would 
expand courts' authority to hear foreign human rights cases. Simply 
put, the conduct of U.S. foreign policy can sometimes be enhanced-
and is not often unambiguously harmed-by these "problems" that 
arise in the context of human rights litigation in U.S. courts. 
At least where the executive branch or the political branches en-
dorse a critical view of a foreign regime's practices, the addition of a 
judicial voice through litigation may extend and reinforce the political 
branches' foreign policy. Opposition to and criticism of human rights 
abuses abroad are, after all, stated goals of U.S. foreign policy. These 
aims-and specific critiques of much of the behavior at issue in for-
eign human rights litigation-have been amply embodied in numer-
ous statutes (including legislative directives to the President, the State 
Department, and other entities within the executive branch), execu-
tive orders and less formal statements of the United States' agenda in 
international relations. In this content, cases brought by ATCA claim-
ants, or foreign TVPA plaintiffs and their ilk, can play a role loosely 
akin to suits relatively routinely undertaken by private attorneys gen-
eral or qui tarn relators or, more broadly, by plaintiffs asserting pri-
vate rights of action provided or implied by regulatory statutes. The 
substantive principles being enforced may be different-core interna-
tional law norms (which proponents regard as incorporated into U.S. 
law) rather than more conventional U.S. laws-but the function is 
much the same. Private individuals, aided by the court, provide addi-
tional enforcement resources to supplement limited public ones, and 
ferret out evidence of proscribed or condemned behavior that might 
otherwise have gone undetected and unaddressed by government and 
the courts. 
It is plausible to portray several instances of China-related human 
rights litigation as fitting with this pattern, including the Bao Ge 
prison labor case, the suit concerning actions against U.S.-resident 
Falun Gong practitioners, much of the litigation concerning coercive 
family planning, and arguably other cases as welL These are all exam-
ples of litigation in which there was very little doubt about the politi-
cal branches' condemnation of the targeted activity, in some instances 
expressed through legislative or executive action addressing the same 
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or similar behavior.223 Under these conditions, the lawsuits' functions 
include bringing to bear additional sanctions and additional resources 
to expose and address the activities or types of activities deplored by 
the political branches. 
United States civil litigation over human rights abuses abroad can 
also further the executive branch's or the political branches' conduct 
of foreign policy by providing additional means that contribute to a 
subtler and more varied array of responses to foreign human rights 
abuses. Legislative or presidential sanctions may sometimes appear to 
exact too high a price, whether in terms of diplomatic relations or do-
mestic political calculations, or they may seem to constitute wielding a 
sledgehammer where a scalpel would do (and where toothless rhetoric 
or doing nothing at all seems better than swinging the sledgehammer). 
Under these conditions, the executive-or the political branches 
collectively or elements within the political branches that Congress or 
the President has directed to pursue a human rights agenda-may 
favor, or at least benefit from, the courts offering a plural, critical 
voice on the relevant foreign policy matters. Judicial chastisement or 
disquisition on the evils of the foreign sovereign's or its agents' behav-
ior can help to advance the conduct of the political branches' foreign 
policy by adding a desirable degree of flexibility and an opportunity 
for "the U.S." to make the critical point without making such criticism 
into the unitary "U.S." position, and without the executive branch 
bearing full-or perhaps much of any-responsibility with the foreign 
government. U.S. civil litigation over the PRC's repression of political 
dissent and Falun Gong, the sometimes-brutal implementation of fam-
ily planning policies, forced prison labor, and the like, can be credibly 
depicted in these terms given the political branches' combination of 
tolerance or support of such litigation and eschewal of substantial 
sanctions against China for the underlying behavior. And the some-
times-loud complaints, but lack of tangible response, by the PRC sug-
gests that this judicial aspect of "U.S. foreign policy" sometimes finds 
its mark. 
Viewed in this light, foreign human rights litigation also may pre-
sent opportunities for calculated political branch speech or silence, or 
a summing of the sometimes-divergent views of "U.S." or "executive" 
branch positions, rather than problematic pressure on the executive to 
speak or to bear the risks of remaining mute. Executive branch silence 
or a diluted executive branch support for the litigation (in the form of 
saying it would be inappropriate for the executive branch to interfere) 
223. See supra notes 67-68. 
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permits a still~more calibrated degree of criticism with limited foreign 
relations accountability. So too, and further down a spectrum of re-
sponses, the executive branch can explain to the foreign government 
that, much as it would like to help, it cannot do anything to stop the 
litigation-much as occurred in the context of some of the Falun 
Gong suits. Still farther along the continuum, the executive branch 
could articulate a position that might allow it to play hero-or would-
be hero-to the foreign government without losing some-or perhaps 
any-of the benefits of judicial exposure and examination of the un-
derlying human rights situation. The United States' role in the service 
of process question in the Tiananmen-based suit against Li Peng illus-
trates what this course can look like: The U.S. government patiently 
explains to the PRC that it is doing its best to make the case go away, 
yet unless and until the court accepts that argument, the plaintiffs' 
case can go forward. 
Such perspectives on judicial roles in human rights-related aspects 
of U.S. foreign relations rub uncomfortably against a few staples of 
analysis of U.S. constitutional law and the constitutional aspects of 
U.S. foreign relations law that are often key underpinnings of argu-
ments critical of the ATCA and kindred routes to the U.S. courthouse. 
First, the structure of separated powers is supposed to guard against 
informal and too easy inter-branch collaboration, which critics might 
see as an evil that pervades the foregoing picture of human rights liti-
gation. Even if this is good constitutional theory (albeit of a narrowly 
America-centric sort that ignores constitutions' function as power-cre-
ating instruments), it does not suggest that such inter-branch coopera-
tion deranges, rather than advances, the conduct of U.S foreign policy 
and the effective pursuit of the national interest abroad. Moreover, 
prudential arguments for a strong separation of powers-usually fo-
cusing on the preservation of liberties at home-have little resonance 
in a discussion of the role of courts in U.S. foreign policy concerning 
other states' human rights practices. 
Second, the judicial branch's proper role is especially narrowly con-
strained in the field of foreign affairs, a proposition very much at odds 
with any expansive notion of courts' jurisdiction over foreign human 
rights cases. This form of "foreign affairs exceptionalism" too may be 
fine constitutional theory (although it is not uncontroversial in the 
U.S. context or of particular resonance abroad). But it too does little 
to answer the functional question that is at issue in "derangement" 
arguments. As the foregoing discussion of ways of comprehending the 
functions of human rights litigation in U.S. foreign policy suggests, it is 
not obvious why some of the usual asserted practical virtues of plural 
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institutions in the U.S. constitutional structure-that three heads may 
be better than one-cannot under the right circumstances extend to 
foreign affairs, particularly those aspects of U.S. foreign relations that 
focus on human rights claims that, in the domestic context, are often 
thought to be especially suited to judicial definition and enforcement. 
Third, a unitary executive is a constitutional value, one that weighs 
heavily against those aspects of the foregoing account of foreign 
human rights litigation that countenance lawsuits as a means for ex-
tending conflicts within the executive or reaching a middle ground in 
intra-executive (or inter-branch) disagreements over the precise place 
of human rights in foreign policy. Again, as we have seen, it is not 
clear that the half-way house that human rights litigation might help 
to offer is not the muddy middle ground where the internally divided 
executive would stand if the ordinary non-judicial policy mechanisms 
could effectively produce such a position. Moreover, the "unitary ex-
ecutive" is hardly an uncontroversial principle. Beloved by advocates 
of strong presidential power, the unitary executive concept has had to 
contend with the venerable notion that agencies (including the State 
Department and its human rights bureau) are equally or predomi-
nantly the creatures of Congress (and thus not free to disregard its 
mandates to pursue a more aggressive human rights agenda than that 
preferred by the President, the Secretary for the department, other 
cabinet-level agencies, or other bureaus within the same department). 
And one of the supposed functional attractions of the unitary execu-
tive principle-accountability by attaching to the President singular 
political responsibility (as a correlate of unitary political control)-
may be a plus for democratic governance in general. But it is, at best, 
an ambivalent virtue in the context of foreign affairs and, specifically, 
the risk of deranging the conduct of foreign affairs. There, a greater 
degree of opacity is generally accepted as necessary, wise, or at least 
tolerable. And there, the greater accountability that would stem from 
an insistence on a principle of unitariness would run, in effect, to for-
eign powers as well as to domestic electorates. 
In any event, the prospect that a robust judicial role in adjudicating 
foreign human rights cases under the ATCA and- other statutes will 
:ierange foreign policy remains greatly limited by the political 
branches' ability to stop much such litigation. If the political branches 
~hare the critics' perception of serious threats to derange foreign pol-
icy in the behavior of U.S. courts in foreign human rights litigation, 
they can act on that perception. Congress is free to enact-at the urg-
ing of the President or on its own-legislation to curtail the ATCA, 
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tions of those statutes. As we have seen, this has not happened de-
spite the obvious occasions to address the supposed problem that the 
enactment of the TVPA, consideration of human rights-related 
amendments to the FSIA and other revisiting of the statutory 
frameworks for human rights-related litigation have provided. 
As we also have seen, if the executive branch concludes that partic-
ular litigation does not serve the interests of U.S. foreign policy or the 
political interests of the President, the executive branch can inter-
vene-with a high likelihood of success-to stop the case, often at a 
very early stage before much offense can have been caused or, at 
least, when executive branch intervention on the targeted regime's be-
half can undo much of any damage already done. The act of state and 
head-of-state immunity doctrines invite such intervention. The politi-
cal question doctrine at least tolerates it. Courts' openness to amicus 
briefs and more informal appearances by the United States in ATCA, 
TVPA, and other foreign relations-related cases provide an avenue 
even where such conventional doctrinal hooks are unavailable or 
unappealing. 
Certainly, the executive branch has been willing and able to inter-
vene in some foreign human rights cases. Sometimes it has done so 
aggressively to stop the litigation. Other times it has pointedly ex-
pressed a lack of opposition to the suit's going forward. 224 As the 
China human rights cases-particularly the Tiananmen and Falun 
Gong cases-illustrate, the executive branch more often takes the in-
termediate course, either staying silent or intervening in a limited way 
to nudge the court or calm the offended foreign government. Thi5 
varied repertoire of executive branch responses suggests that the exec-
utive branch's conduct of foreign relations may gain useful flexibilit) 
224. See, e.g., Kochan, supra note 19, at 180-81 (describing the argument of the United State: 
under the Bush administration, in one of the Marcos cases that it was for Congress, not th• 
courts, to define an offense against the law of nations. and describing the very different U.S 
indication to the court, during the Carter administration, that the U.S. had no objection to th• 
suit's going forward); Edward D. Re, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Domesti 
Courts, 31 SuFFOLK U. L. REv. 585,596-97 (1998) (describing Department of State interventiOJ 
on behalf of defendant in Nelson v. Saudi Arabia); International Human Rights Litigation, supr. 
note 19, at 2181, n.256 (describing U.S. amicus briefs in Filartiga, Kadic, and Marcos litigations: 
see also Court Decision on Li Peng Applauded, supra note 64; Li Peng Tiananmen Lawsuit Caul, 
Be in Danger, supra note 64; The Li Peng Lawsuit and Universal Jurisdiction over Violations c 
Rights, supra note 1; Wong, supra note 1; Pomfret. supra note 11; see also supra note 64-6 
(concerning executive branch role in Li Peng!Tiananmen case and its more passive role in Falu 
Gong cases); Tachiona v. Mugabe. 169 F. Supp. 2d at 297-303 (concerning issue of diplomati 
immunity/head of state immunity suggestion from executive for Mugabe and co-defendant); Hie 
bert & McBeth, supra note 120 (concerning Depanment of State opposition to suit against EJ 
xon Mobil for activities in Indonesia): Thornton. supra note 211 (concerning State Departmer 
role in securing the lifting of default against PRC in Jackson v. PRC railway bonds case). 
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from the existing jurisprudence of foreign human rights 
cases (even if the executive branch generally would prefer that 
jurisprudence were less expansive concerning jurisdiction), or at 
that the executive branch does not see the adjudication of many 
cases as posing severe threats to the conduct of foreign policy. If . 
is right, prudential arguments for walling off the courts are u .... .,6 ..... .._. . .., 
or, at least, overreaching. And even a more modest assertion that 
floor should be "tilted" toward the executive branch (by, for · 
presumptions that a case not go forward unless the executive 
approves) has little to recommend it. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Suits in American courts over human rights abuses committed 
China suggest that the ATCA, the foreign plaintiff provision in 
TVPA, and U.S. litigation concerning human rights abroad more 
erally, do not create the threat to derange the conduct of the na·noJrt' 
foreign policy that critics of foreign human rights litigation often 
tray. Because the U.S.-PRC relationship is among the most · 
tant, sensitive, and volatile bilateral relationships that the 
States has, foreign human rights litigation's failure to imperil 
ties casts significant doubt on the claim that such suits are likely 
cause significant harm to the conduct of the country's · 
affairs. 
Reflection upon the China-related human rights cases makes 
that, in evaluating consequentialist claims about the evils of the 
ATCA, TVPA and kindred routes to the U.S. courthouse, "'""'"~ .. ·.n.• 
matters, and an examination of relevant contexts generally nrr·nn.rn··~·· 
reasons to discount fears of derangement. Diplomatic context mat• 
ters. Human rights litigation is but a small part-and at most a minor, 
source of strains-in the United States' dense, sprawling and heavily 
tended relationship with the PRC. Much judicial scrutiny of China's: 
human rights practices would occur in the absence of the ATCA;. ·· 
TVPA, and similar statutes. Asylum and refugee cases, administrative 
law and habeas corpus actions, suits by U.S. plaintiffs, and suits for 
harms occurring in the U.S. could still be brought to achieve court 
review of PRC human rights practices. The same is surely true with 
respect to other states that matter for U.S. foreign policy. 
Legal or doctrinal context matters. United States law affords many, 
mechanisms for keeping out human rights litigation that seems rela-
tively likely to portend harms to the nation's conduct of foreign policy. 
And, especially where the executive branch chooses to intervene, sev-
eral of those means seem available-and perhaps most fully availa-
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ble-to deal with human rights cases that seem to pose the most 
serious dangers to U.S. foreign policy, specifically those that implicate 
major relationships with still-in-power regimes in strategically impor-
tant countries, such as the PRC. 
International and political context matters. Other countries, includ-
ing China, practice themselves and tolerate in others (including the 
United States) legal structures and processes that embody traits that 
are or that closely resemble what critics identify as the dangerous fea-
tures of the ATCA and other aspects of the U.S.law of foreign human 
rights litigation. "Globalization" includes a number of developments 
that have been eroding the foreign/domestic distinction and that have 
been changing the domestic politics of U.S. foreign human rights liti-
gation in ways that increasingly tip the balance against those who see 
suits over ''foreign" abuses as likely to impose foreign policy costs that 
outweigh the benefits such litigation provides or the costs that a signif-
icant retrenchment in such suits would bring. Finally, the assertion 
that foreign human rights litigation in U.S. courts adds a troubling 
second or third voice to the articulation of U.S. foreign policy, or 
forces the political branches to speak when they would rather remain 
silent, betrays an insufficiently subtle and rather controversial under-
standing (one partly rooted in archaic and overly inward-looking no-
tions of relationships among the three governmental branches) of the 
complex political process of making and implementing U.S. foreign 
policy in the contemporary world. 
As the China-related human rights cases suggest with particular viv-
idness, once these contextual factors are taken into account, ATCA 
suits, or foreign plaintiff TVPA actions, or other claims requiring or 
seeking U.S. judicial scrutiny of "foreign" human rights conditions 
and practices, do not seem likely to bring down, or even much dam-
age, the edifice of American foreign policy. 
